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Preface
Firms’ everyday business is strongly driven by the permanent need of adjustment to
changes in the economic environment. This dissertation comprises of four contributions
that independently examine the expectation formation of firms in light of new informa-
tion, the role of market volatility for the expectation formation process, as well as firms’
adjustment to changes in policy using the example of changes in minimum wage legisla-
tion. Despite their diverse research questions, all contributions demonstrate the usefulness
of the firm-level micro data of the IFO Business Survey (IBS) for the understanding of
the behavior of firms.
Lucas (1972, 1976) was the first to show the importance of the expectation formation
process for the modeling of dynamic processes. The benchmark of rational expectations
with full and costless information in the sense of Muth (1961) has—despite its widely
undisputed merits—repeatedly failed to predict empirically observed patterns in the be-
havior of firms and other economic agents, see, e.g., Nerlove (1983). As a response,
information frictions have become increasingly popular in macroeconomics to model the
expectation formation process in a more realistic way. The most prominent examples of
this new class of models are the “sticky information” models of Mankiw and Reis (2002,
2006) and “rational inattention” models in the tradition of Sims (2003) and Woodford
(2003). The former assume that agents update their beliefs only irregularly, while the
latter endogenize information rigidities as a rational choice of agents in presence of costly
gathering and procession of information.
In contrast to this progress in economic theory, empirical evidence on the expecta-
tion formation process of firms is still surprisingly scarce. Recent literature has mainly
focused on firms’ expectations regarding economy wide aggregates such as inflation, total
output, and aggregate stock market returns (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2013; Coibion and
Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015; Coibion et al., 2015) or examined the determinants of indi-
vidual expectations (e.g., Malmendier and Nagel, 2016). Lacking appropriate data, little
is known about the determinants of firms’ expectations regarding their own future condi-
tions; in spite of their undisputed role for firms’ investment, hiring, and pricing decisions.
The first two chapters of this dissertation aim to contribute to the recent literature that
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opens the black-box of the expectation formation process with the help of survey data.
The first chapter, which is based on joint work with Lukas Buchheim, examines the role
of aggregate and disaggregate information for expectation formation of firms. Although
neglected in standard economic theory, the distinction between aggregate, industry-wide
information and disaggregate information referring to the levels of firms or sub-industries
has shown to be important, for example, the explain coordination motives of firms (Hellwig
and Veldkamp, 2009) or business cycle comovement (Veldkamp and Wolfers, 2007).
However, empirical evidence on the importance of aggregate and, in particular, dis-
aggregate information for firms’ expectations is scarce. This is mainly due to limited
availability of micro data on both firm’s expectations as well as proxies for firms’ informa-
tion sets. To circumvent this constraint, we make use of the panel structure of the IBS.
While time fixed effects allow for a flexible assessment of aggregate information in firms’
expectations, the future realizations of firms’ business conditions orthogonal to time fixed
effects serve as a proxy for today’s disaggregate information. This dataset allows us to ex-
plore two closely related sets of questions concerning firms’ expectation formation: First,
to which degree are firms’ expectations affected by disaggregate information? Second,
what is the causal effect of new information regarding a disaggregate demand shock on
expectations?
Regarding the first question, we find that disaggregate information is an important
component of firms’ expectations across all empirical specifications. Controlling for ag-
gregate information at fairly narrow industry-levels reveals that firms strongly rely on the
disaggregate part of their information set when forming their expectations for the next
six months. Hereby, firms’ expectations are more strongly associated with disaggregate
information about the near future (one quarter ahead) than with information about the
more distant future (two quarters ahead). In addition, we show that aggregate and disag-
gregate information are roughly equally important for explaining variation in expectations
by means of the marginal R2 of the measures for information as well as a Shapley variance
decomposition.
In answering the second question, we are the first to document a causal effect of new
information on firms’ expectations in a real world setting. For this purpose, we examine
retail firms’ expectation adjustment to information about a large demand shock. Namely,
a three percentage point increase in German VAT in January 2007. Announced well
in advance, the VAT shock constitutes a rare natural experiment because non-durable
good retailers were largely unaffected by this policy, while retailers of durable goods faced
predictable pull forward effects in demand. Hence, the quality of information about future
demand exogenously differed between both groups of firms. We identify the causal effect of
this increase in quality of information on expectations in a difference-in-differences design
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by exploiting the similarity of durable and non-durable good retailers during all other
periods. We find that treated retailers of durable goods become more forward-looking
once the demand shock enters their expectation window. The effect is quantitatively large
and the increased weight of disaggregate information in expectations is entirely driven by
the disaggregate information about the more distant future. Overall, the results suggest
that firms are sensitive to the quality of disaggregate information when forming their
expectations.
While Chapter 1 mainly focuses on the importance of disaggregate information for the
expectation formation of firms, Chapter 2 asks the more general question whether the way
these expectations are formed is consistent with rational models of information frictions
in the tradition of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Sims (2003). More specifically, Chapter
2 examines whether firms allocate more attention to shocks that are more volatile when
forming their expectations as they have a higher marginal benefit from new information—a
prediction common to this class of models. Therein, Chapter 2 is the first to use firm-level
expectations data to provide empirical evidence on this mechanism.
The results show that firms in generally more volatile markets are better in predict-
ing their own future business conditions. This finding is reflected in a strongly increased
degree to which ex post realized business conditions are associated with previous expecta-
tions of these firms. This increased information content of expectations can be observed
irrespectively of using firm-specific or sector-specific measures of market volatility. The
former is based on firm-specific backlog of orders; the latter are either calculated from
industry-level revenue data or based on industry-averages of firms’ reported business con-
ditions. Moreover, the relationship appears to be quite stable across firms in all important
sectors of the economy. This suggests that information frictions play an important role for
the expectation formation of firms. Seen through the lens of the models in the tradition
of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Sims (2003), firms in more volatile markets rationally
invest more resources (or a larger part of their limited attention) into the costly collection
and processing of information about the future development of their businesses resulting
in increased information content of expectations.
While the first two chapters examine the expectation formation of firms, Chapter 3
contributes to the literature on the economic effects of minimum wages that was spurred
by the seminal study of Card and Krueger (1994). Although being neglected in large parts
of the literature on minimum wage effects, prices have been perceived as an important
margin of adjustment for firms (see, for example, the seminal paper of Aaronson, 2001).
However, previous studies that found evidence in favor of pass-through on prices usually
did not jointly assess the price and employment response at the firm-level. In addition,
they mainly focused at the price response to changes in existing minimum wages of firms
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in highly affected industries, such as restaurants (e.g., Aaronson, 2001, Lemos, 2006,
Aaronson et al., 2008, and Fougère et al., 2010) and retailers (Leung, 2016 and Montialoux
et al., 2017).
Chapter 3 analyzes the introduction of statutory minimum wages in Germany in 2015.
This offers a unique opportunity to take a broader perspective on these issues, as the new
statutory minimum wage was directly set to the average level of OECD countries (see
OECD, 2015). As a result, firms in a wide range of sectors were affected by this policy.
The differential degree to which firms’ were affected by the minimum wage introduction
can be identified by means of sectorally and regionally disaggregated wage data. Moreover,
the firm-level micro data of the IBS contain monthly information on both price changes
as well as expected changes in the number of employees. This allows for a joint analysis
of these two potentially important margins of adjustment to minimum wages.
Based on a generalized difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I only find a very
modestly negative and insignificant effect of the minimum wage introduction on firms’
planned employment changes. While a negative employment effect cannot be ruled out
with certainty in light of potential measurement error in the treatment intensity measure,
this finding points into the direction of a prominent strand of papers including Card and
Krueger (1994, 2000), Dube et al. (2010), and Allegretto et al. (2011) who find that mini-
mum wages do not inevitably destroy jobs. Moreover, Chapter 3 adds to initial evidence in
favor of moderate employment effects in response to the introduction of minimum wages
in Germany, e.g., Bossler and Gerner (2016).
However, Chapter 3 is the first to provide credibly identified evidence for substan-
tial price pass-through in response to the introduction of statutory minimum wages in
Germany. The minimum wage-induced price reaction of affected firms is quantitatively
large and firms appear to have rolled over a non-negligible share of increased labor costs
to prices. Conditional on the same degree of affectedness, the strength of the minimum
wage effect on the probability to increase prices does not differ between manufacturing
firms and service companies as well as between firms in West and East Germany. This
result thus provides evidence in favor of the external validity of the previously cited stud-
ies that document strong minimum wage effects on prices in a much narrower subset of
highly affected industries.
All chapters of this dissertation exploit the panel dimension of the IBS and therein
provide examples for the variety of potential research questions that can be addressed
based on its micro data. The survey is unique in asking a sample of approximately 7000
firms that is representative for the German economy at monthly frequency. In light of high
response rates, low attrition, and a large variety of questions covered by the survey, the
IBS is ideally suited for micro-econometric analysis of firms in all sectors of the economy.
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Despite of these advantages, researchers usually restricted their analysis to the subset of
manufacturing firms instead of using the entire sample of firms covered by the IBS, e.g.,
Pesaran and Timmermann (2009), Bachmann et al. (2013b), Carstensen et al. (2013),
Strasser (2013), Fidrmuc and Hainz (2013), and Bachmann and Elstner (2015).
Chapter 4 of this dissertation describes how two major obstacles that have prevented
panel data research based on the universe of all firms in the IBS can be removed: namely,
heterogeneities (1) across different sector-specific surveys of the IBS in the level of analysis
(product vs. firm) and (2) in the industry classification schemes used in the micro data.
For this purpose, the level of analysis of the most important industry surveys covering
manufacturing, retail/wholesale, and services is transferred to the firm-level by means of
aggregation. Moreover, the sector identifiers contained in the micro data are transferred
to the official German industry classification systems of 2003 and 2008.
The resulting harmonized dataset expands the scope for economic research based on
the micro data of the IBS as it allows for a joint analysis of firms in all main sectors
of the economy—a prerequisite for the analyses presented in the first three chapters of
this dissertation. Adjusting for a break in the methodology of the survey in 2006, the
value added of this harmonization procedure is largest for the micro data of the retail and
wholesale survey as it allows to link firms’ responses before and after the methodological
break which was previously not feasible. Moreover, the uniform coding of firms according
to the standard German industry classification systems of 2003 and 2008 is useful for at
least two reasons. On the one hand, fixed effects can be applied at different aggregation
levels to flexibly control for industry-specific components, such as industry-wide infor-
mation in firms’ expectations as implemented in the first chapter. On the other hand,
the firms in the IBS can be merged to industry-level data from other sources such as
market volatility measures based on sectoral revenue data used in Chapter 2 or data on
the industry-specific wage distribution in the firms’ location exploited in Chapter 3 to
identify the “bite” of the minimum wage introduction.
Moreover, Chapter 4 exploits the harmonized firm-level dataset to shed light on the
interpretation of the most widely used variables in the IBS, i.e., firms’ assessments about
their current business conditions as well as their expectations for the next six months. The
results speak in favor of interpreting these variables as firms’ assessment of current and
expected future levels of revenues. Despite of the potentially misleading wording of the
questions, it is hence very unlikely that business expectations capture the expected change
in reported current business conditions. Empirical studies that examine the relationship
of firms’ reported current and expected business conditions should hence interpret these
variables as referring to the similar dimension of the same latent variable.
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Chapter 1
Disaggregate Information and Firms’
Expectation Formation∗
1.1 Introduction
Firms’ expectations regarding their own future business conditions are an important de-
terminant of their investment, hiring, and pricing decisions. Yet, empirically little is
known about which types of information are incorporated in these expectations. Firms
may gather their information from diverse sources such as news articles, market sentiment,
their order books or their own market research. Put in more abstract terms, firms may
rely on both aggregate, industry-wide information (public industry benchmarks, private
signals strongly correlated across firms, or market sentiment) and disaggregate informa-
tion (idiosyncratic or sub-industry level information orthogonal to aggregate information)
when forming their expectations.1
Uncovering the role of aggregate and disaggregate information for expectation forma-
tion is challenging, however, because it requires micro data on both firm’s expectations
as well as proxies for firms’ information sets. The limited availability of such data is
one of the main constraints for the empirical study of firms’ expectations.2 We circum-
vent this constraint by exploiting the panel dimension of the IFO Business Survey (IBS).
This survey is unique in asking a sample of around 7000 firms that is representative for
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Lukas Buchheim.
1The distinction between aggregate and disaggregate information has proven to be important. On
the one hand, a focus on aggregate information may be optimal if it helps firms to coordinate (Veldkamp
and Wolfers, 2007; Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009) or when it can be acquired and processed more cheaply
than disaggregate information. On the other hand, a focus on aggregate information may fuel animal
spirits and amplify or cause news-driven business cycles (e.g., Angeletos and La’O 2013; Beaudry and
Portier, 2014, provide a survey of the literature).
2The most common surveys (Survey of Professional Forecasters, Livingston Survey) elicit expectations
about economy-wide aggregates like inflation, output growth, or stock prices. This data is hence not
suitable to study the role of aggregate and disaggregate information for expectation formation.
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the German economy about both their current and their expected business conditions
at high, monthly, frequency. The panel structure of the data thus allows us to flexibly
and precisely learn about aggregate information via time fixed effects, whereas the future
realizations of firms’ business conditions (net of time fixed effects) serve as a proxy for
today’s disaggregate information.
This chapter utilizes this dataset to learn more about how important aggregate and,
in particular, disaggregate information are for the expectation formation of firms. We
address two questions. First, to which extent is disaggregate information reflected in
firms’ expectations? And second, what is the causal effect of news about a disaggregate
demand shock on expectations?
Our first finding is that disaggregate information is an important component of firms’
expectations. Specifically, there is a strong association between expectations and the
measure of disaggregate information—future firm-specific business realizations—across all
empirical specifications. The result is particularly noteworthy for the main specification
that controls for aggregate information via time fixed effects at the fairly narrow two-
digit industry level of the German official industry classification, because it implies that
firms within a given two-digit industry (e.g., manufacture of furniture) strongly rely on
those components of their information sets that are orthogonal to the industry-specific
information when forming their expectations.3 Given the high dimension of the time fixed
effects, this set of orthogonal, disaggregate information is typically a small subset of the
information contained in firms’ private signals (from, e.g., their order books), as the latter
are often highly correlated within industries.
Moreover, additional analyses reveal that firms’ expectations, which cover a six month
window, are more strongly associated with disaggregate information about the near future
(one quarter ahead) than with information about the more distant future (two quarters
ahead). We also compare the extent to which information at the aggregate and disaggre-
gate level are successful in explaining variation in expectations both via the marginal R2
of the measures for information and a Shapley variance decomposition. Both comparisons
show that, overall, aggregate and disaggregate information are roughly equally important
for explaining variation in expectations. Across industries, the share of variance explained
by disaggregate information is lowest in industries with arguably the strongest aggregate
component in business conditions (services and manufacturing) and highest in industries
3The WZ 03 classification of the German Statistical Office (Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige
2003 ) used in this chapter largely corresponds to NACE Rev. 1.1 (the European Industry Classification
System). The WZ 03 two-digit codes (divisions) are, in general, more narrow than the NAICS (North
American Industry Classification System) two-digit codes (sectors). Often, WZ 03 two-digit divisions
are comparable to NAICS three-digit subsectors (NAICS version of 2002); for example, in manufacturing
there are 23 WZ 03 two-digit divisions, 3 NAICS two-digit sectors, and 21 NAICS three-digit subsectors.
In total, there are 60 WZ 03 two-digit divisions and 20 (103) NAICS two-digit (three-digit) subsectors.
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with a weak aggregate component (retail and wholesale).
To answer the second question, we use the sample of retail firms to provide causal
evidence of how expectations react to information about a large demand shock: the
demand effects of the three percentage point increase in the German VAT in January
2007, which was announced in late 2005. The VAT shock led to a differential treatment
regarding the quality of information about future demand available to durable and non-
durable good retailers. While durable good retailers experienced predictable pull-forward
effects in demand—as manifested in strong demand increases before the VAT increase and
strong demand reversals thereafter—non-durable good retailers were largely unaffected
by the shock.4 In contrast, the business conditions and expectations of durable and non-
durable good retailers follow similar trends at all other times. We exploit this similarity
of durable and non-durable retailers in a difference-in-differences design to identify the
causal effect of the VAT-induced increase in the quality of information on expectations.
The main finding is that the treated durable goods retailers become more forward-
looking once the demand shock enters the expectation window and, hence, information
of higher quality is available to them. The effect is quantitatively large, as the weight
of disaggregate information in explaining expectations doubles. The increased weight of
disaggregate information in expectations is thereby entirely driven by the disaggregate
information about the more distant future, possibly reflecting the fact that high-quality
information about the VAT-induced demand shock was available from early on.
This chapter is the first to document the causal effect of new information on firms’
expectations in a real world setting. Identifying this effect is challenging because the
information sets of firms are typically unobservable and data on firms’ expectations is
scarce. The VAT-induced demand shock in Germany is thus a rare natural experiment
for which both changes in firms’ information sets can be inferred and high frequency data
on firms’ expectations exists. By showing that firms become more forward-looking when
new (and precise) information becomes available, this chapter complements recent work
by Coibion et al. (2015) who demonstrate by means of survey experiments that firms
rationally adjust their expectations in response to additional information.5
This chapter contributes to the study of the determinants of firm’s expectations by
showing that disaggregate and aggregate information are equally important drivers of
expectations. Taking a similar perspective as this chapter, Fuhrer (2015) argues that
expectations are influenced by the consensus of past forecasters, one important type
4D’Acunto et al. (2016) document a sizable increase in consumers’ readiness to spend on durable
goods in response to the expected price increase due to the VAT change.
5In parallel work with the IBS data, Triebs and Tumlinson (2016) use the German reunification in
1990 as a natural experiment. They show that it took firms from the former East German states between
two and five years to learn forecasting their business situation within the new capitalist environment they
faced after 1990.
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of aggregate information. Fuhrer’s and our focus on the determinants of expectations
thus complements the literature on survey expectations of firms and professional fore-
casters that tests specific models of expectation formation by inquiring whether relevant
information is neglected in agents’ expectations (see Pesaran and Weale, 2006, for a lit-
erature review). For example, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015), Andrade and
Le Bihan (2013), and Dovern et al. (2015) test the implication of models of sticky infor-
mation (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) and rational inattention (Sims, 2003; Woodford, 2003;
Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009, 2015) that expectations react sluggishly to shocks.
Similarly, Bacchetta et al. (2009), Gennaioli et al. (2015), and Massenot and Pettinicchi
(2016) test—and reject—the implication of rational expectations that forecast errors are
uncorrelated with past observables.6
While work on the determinants of firms’ expectations is rather scarce, a number of
recent papers is concerned with the determinants of consumer expectations. D’Acunto
et al. (2016) study the adjustment of consumers’ inflation expectations to the German VAT
shock of 2007 and the ensuing effects on the willingness to purchase durable goods. There
is also an increasing number of works that examine the impact of past personal experiences
on expectations (e.g., Ehrmann and Tzamourani, 2012; Malmendier and Nagel, 2016;
Kuchler and Zafar, 2015) or the adjustment of consumer expectations to new information
in survey experiments (e.g., Armantier et al., 2016; Cavallo et al., 2017; Armona et al.,
2016).
The knowledge about the degree to which aggregate and disaggregate information
influence expectations may contribute to a better understanding of macroeconomic dy-
namics in several ways. Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) argue that the distinction between
aggregate and disaggregate information is important for understanding the extent of syn-
chronized price movements, which amplify the business-cycle co-movement across sectors.
Similarly, learning about disaggregate shocks to large individual firms can help anticipate
business cycle movements if these shocks cause non-negligible general equilibrium effects
because they are “granular” in the sense of Gabaix (2011). Finally, our results suggest
that disaggregate information is a time-varying source of cross-sectional heterogeneity in
expectations, which, in turn, exhibits stable correlations with the fluctuations of aggregate
variables (e.g., Mankiw et al., 2004; Bachmann et al., 2013b; Ben-David et al., 2013; Bach-
mann et al., 2017). As such, this chapter complements the works by Ito (1990), Patton
6Another strand of the literature evaluates the forecasting properties of survey expectations. Recent
examples of this line of work are Ang et al. (2007) and Faust and Wright (2013), who show that inflation
expectations are among the best available predictors of realized inflation. In contrast, Greenwood and
Shleifer (2014) find a strong negative correlation between investors’ expectations of stock market returns
and the realized returns. In classical work, König et al. (1981) and Nerlove (1983) show strong bivari-
ate associations between different outcome variables (prices, business conditions) and the corresponding
expectations.
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and Timmermann (2010), and Bachmann and Elstner (2015) who demonstrate that time-
constant differences in firms’ optimism and pessimism as well as persistent differences in
priors are important drivers for cross-sectional disagreement.
The next section describes the survey data of the IBS used in this chapter. Section 1.3
develops a simple conceptual framework to dissect the impact of disaggregate and aggre-
gate information on expectations. Section 1.4 utilizes this framework in panel regressions
to quantify the effect of both types of information in general. In Section 1.5 we exploit
the natural experiment given by the German VAT increase in 2007 to estimate the causal
effect of new information on expectations. The last section concludes.
1.2 Data
The main data source of this chapter is the micro data of the IFO Business Survey (IBS).
The IBS is conducted monthly, and is primarily used to construct the IFO Business Cli-
mate Index, Germany’s most important lead indicator of economic activity (see Becker
and Wohlrabe, 2008, for details on the survey). The IBS is divided into four industry sur-
veys that cover the main sectors of the economy (manufacturing, services, retail/wholesale,
construction), with each encompassing a sample of more than thousand firms represen-
tative for the German economy. Due to methodological peculiarities of the construction
survey, our analysis focuses on data from the manufacturing (IBS-IND, 2015), services
(IBS-SERV, 2015), and retail/wholesale (IBS-TRA, 2015) surveys.
The main data of interest are the firms’ responses to questions regarding their realized
and expected general business conditions. Specifically, every month all firms in the sample
of the IBS are asked to provide an assessment of their current realized business conditions,
which can be either bad (encoded as -1), normal (0), or good (1). Using a similar three
point scale, the IBS also elicits firms’ expected business conditions for an expectation
window of six months.7 In our interpretation, the categorical variables on firms’ general
business conditions and expectations are informed by the same latent variable that is likely
related to the profitability of firms.8 Bolstering this interpretation, Chapter 4 reports that
7Given that our main analysis rests on linear econometric models, quantitative data would be prefer-
able to the qualitative data of the IBS. However, quantitative data on firms’ expectations of comparable
sectoral depth and long time horizon, which is required for the analyses of this chapter, is unavailable.
Given these data constraints, we carefully verify that employing linear models delivers reliable results.
The application of the Frisch–Waugh–Lovell Theorem in Section 1.4.1 shows that the data is consistent
with the symmetry assumption imposed by linear models.
8The exact wording of the question regarding firms’ realized business conditions is as follows: “Current
situation: We evaluate our current business condition (latest business trends) as [1] good, [0] satisfactory
(typical for the season), [-1] bad.” The question regarding expectations, in turn, is: “Expectations for
the next 6 months: After elimination of purely seasonal fluctuations the development of our business will
be [1] more favorable, [0] about the same, [-1] more unfavorable.” Hence, the wording of the question
regarding expectations seemingly seeks to elicit the change in business conditions. This would be incon-
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the sector aggregates of business conditions and expectations from the IBS closely follow
the log deviation from trend of sector-specific aggregate revenue. Similarly, Abberger
et al. (2009) find, in a meta survey of the retail/wholesale sample, that firms mostly refer
to their current and expected profits and sales when they answer the questions of the IBS.
Our sample consists of all firms in the micro data of the IBS between March 2005
and October 2015 that remain in the sample for at least one year. The latter restriction
is needed, because most of the empirical models include reported business conditions for
the past six months (including the current month) and the following six months. For
the same reason, the first month of the sample, March 2005, is the sixth month after the
launch of the survey for the service sector in October 2004. Accordingly, our sample ends
in October 2015 as, at the time of writing, the micro data were available until April 2016.
The sample is large, comprising of, on average, 2400 manufacturing firms, 2170 service
firms, and 1330 retailers/wholesalers per month. We harmonize the data over time and
across the industry surveys following the procedure presented in Chapter 4. This primarily
involves assigning the industry code of the official German industry classification system
(Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige 2003, abbreviated as WZ 03, which closely follows
the European industry classification NACE Rev. 1.1) to each firm based on the internal
industry classification system of the IFO Institute. We also collapse the product-level
surveys conducted in the retail and wholesale sector prior to 2006 to the firm level.
Sample attrition is low. Table 1.A.1 in Appendix 1.A shows that roughly 90 percent of
firms remain in the sample after one year, with the number of firms declining by five to six
percentage points per year thereafter. The average spell length of firms in our sample is
more than five years. If firms are in the sample, they also have a high response rate: they
answer the survey in more than three out of four months.9 We linearly interpolate missing
observations as long as the answers are missing for at most two consecutive months.
The empirical analyses of this chapter seek to explain the variation in expectations
sistent with our interpretation that both categorical survey responses are informed by the same latent
variable. However, Chapter 4 documents several facts that favor our interpretation. First, the aggregate
expectations lead the aggregate conditions by several months in each sector-specific survey, while the
correlation between aggregate expectations and aggregate changes in business conditions over the past
six months is highest at contemporaneity. Second, there is a positive association between current business
conditions and expectations in the micro data, consistent with both referring to the same persistent la-
tent variable. If expectations were referring to changes in business conditions, however, we would expect
mean reversion, and, hence, a negative association between current conditions and expectations. Third,
a horse race between both interpretations in the micro data clearly favors both variables being driven
by the same latent variable. Last, but not least, the practitioners at the IFO Institute agreed with our
interpretation in private conversations. This also manifests itself in the calculation of the IFO Business
Climate Index, which is a weighted average of the elicited business conditions and expectations. Taking
the average of these two variables is most sensible if they represent the same latent variable.
9Across industry surveys, the average sample spell and response rates, respectively, are as follows:
manufacturing: 6.3 years and 81 percent; services: 5.4 years and 75 percent; retail/wholesale: 5.3 years
and 81 percent.
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Table 1.1: Transition Frequencies
Conditions Next Period Expectations Next Period
1 0 -1 1 0 -1
Current 1 0.233 0.064 0.003 0.130 0.074 0.007
Conditions/ 0 0.064 0.410 0.045 0.071 0.481 0.062
Expectations -1 0.003 0.046 0.133 0.009 0.060 0.106
Sum 0.300 0.520 0.181 0.210 0.615 0.175
Notes: This table shows the transition frequencies of reported realized business conditions and expected
business conditions. The left (right) panel shows the frequencies of reported business conditions (ex-
pected business conditions) in the next reported month for each possible current report of business con-
ditions/expectations. Since these statistics are derived from the time dimension of the panel dataset, the
overall frequencies of reported future conditions/expectations displayed in the last row (Sum) are equal
to the overall frequencies for the current conditions/expectations, which are, for this reason, omitted.
about firms’ future business conditions with variation in future realized business condi-
tions. The bulk of the variation to be explained as well as the identifying variation is
thereby provided by the variation of the firms’ survey responses over time. Table 1.1
displays this variation by reporting the aggregate transition frequencies between the cat-
egorical values of both the realized (left panel) and expected business conditions (right
panel) from one month to the next.10 The table shows that reported business condition
change frequently. The business conditions differ between the current and next month in
between two to three out of ten months, regardless of whether they currently report bad,
normal, or good conditions. The conditional transition frequencies of expectations are
almost identical if current expectations equal zero, and are slightly higher—one change
in reported expectations in four out of ten months—when expectations are either good
or bad. This results in a slightly lower fraction of normal realized conditions vis-a-vis
normal expectations (0.52 vs. 0.61), possibly reflecting the shorter reporting window of
realized conditions than the expectation window (one month vs. six months). Considering
that firms report different realized or expected business conditions in at least two out of
ten months but remain in the sample for more than five years on average, there is hence
sufficient (within firm) variation both in the dependent and the independent variables of
interest.
10The transition frequencies within each of the three industry surveys are similar to the aggregate, as
Table 1.A.2 in Appendix 1.A shows.
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1.3 Expectations and Disaggregate Information:
Conceptual Framework and Empirical Model
This section presents a conceptual framework that establishes why, exploiting panel data,
future realized business conditions can be used as a proxy for disaggregate information.
This framework also governs the choice of the empirical model for the remainder of the
chapter.
1.3.1 Conceptual Framework
Denote firm i’s realized business condition at time t by yi,t and note that realized business
conditions can be decomposed into an aggregate component at and a disaggregate com-
ponent di,t. Hence, yi,t = at + di,t, with di,t orthogonal to at. We assume that the future
aggregate and disaggregate business conditions at t + 1, at+1 and di,t+1, both consist of
known, orthogonal components denoted by ât+1t and d̂
t+1
i,t , and unknown shocks denoted
by αt+1 and δi,t+1, respectively. We call ât+1t aggregate information, and d̂
t+1
i,t disaggregate
information; αt+1 and δi,t+1 are normal, independent and zero mean shocks with variances
σ2α and σ2δ .11 Given the information known at t, the expected business conditions at t+ 1
are hence given by Et[yi,t] = Et[at+1] + Et[di,t+1] = ât+1t + d̂
t+1
i,t .
When reporting their expectations in t, firms use their information as embodied in ât+1t
and d̂t+1i,t , but also make an error εi,t that has a zero mean. Firm i’s observed expectations
ŷt+1i,t are hence given by
ŷt+1i,t = â
t+1
t + d̂
t+1
i,t + εi,t. (1.1)
The challenge for assessing the importance of aggregate and disaggregate information for
expectation formation is that firms’ information sets (ât+1t , d̂
t+1
i,t ) are, in general, unobserv-
able. Our empirical strategy exploits two ideas to overcome this constraint. First, with
panel data it is possible to non-parametrically identify the aggregate information ât+1t via
time fixed effects. Second, given this and the information structure, future firm-specific
realized business conditions can serve as a proxy for the disaggregate information.
To formally see these points, consider the following empirical model that regresses
expectations at t, ŷt+1i,t , on date fixed effects ψt and ex post realizations yi,t+1:
ŷt+1i,t = ψt + β1 yi,t+1 + εi,t. (1.2)
11Note that ât+1t and d̂
t+1
i,t represent the knowledge of firm i. As this chapter is concerned with
identifying the sources of information that govern firms’ expectations and not with firms’ forecast precision
or forecast errors, we are agnostic about whether firms know the entire learnable information (as implied
by, e.g., models of rational expectations), or only subsets of it (as implied, e.g., by models of rational
inattention).
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By the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell Theorem, we have that β1 can also be identified via
ν̂i,t = β1 νi,t + ηi,t. (1.3)
Here, ν̂it and νit are the residuals of regressing expectations and future realizations, re-
spectively, on date fixed effects
ŷt+1i,t = λ̂t + ν̂i,t
yi,t+1 = λt + νi,t.
Given the definition of observed expectations in (1.1) and due to the independence of
ât+1t and d̂
t+1
i,t + εi,t, we have that λ̂t
p→ ât+1t and, hence, ν̂it,
p→ d̂t+1i,t + εi,t. By a similar
argument, it holds that νi,t
p→ di,t+1 = d̂t+1i,t + δi,t+1. Hence, (1.3) becomes equivalent to
d̂t+1i,t = β1 (d̂
t+1
i,t + δi,t+1) + (ηi,t − εi,t).
We conclude that, after controlling for time fixed effects, future firm-specific future realized
business conditions are indeed a proxy for disaggregate information d̂t+1i,t , albeit with
classical “measurement error” given by the disaggregate shock δi,t+1. As a consequence,
the coefficient of future realizations will reflect attenuation bias. Specifically, since the
true coefficient of regression d̂t+1i,t on itself equals one, we have that β1 → 1×
V ar(d̂t+1i,t )
V ar(d̂t+1i,t )+σ
2
δ
,
where the latter term is the attenuation factor.
Thus, there are three important observations that can be drawn from the analysis
above. First, with panel data it is possible to use future firm-specific business conditions as
a proxy for disaggregate information. This is because time fixed effects non-parametrically
filter out both aggregate information ât+1t and aggregate business conditions at+1 in the
application of the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell Theorem. Second, the size of the coefficient of
the ex post realized business conditions can be interpreted as a measure of how well
informed firms are about their future (disaggregate) business conditions. Ceteris paribus,
firms are better informed about their disaggregate business conditions if the variance of
the disaggregate shock σδ decreases. This leads to an increase in the attenuation factor
V ar(d̂t+1i,t )
V ar(d̂t+1i,t )+σ
2
δ
, and hence to an increase of β1.12 Third, due to the attenuation bias, the
marginal R2 of using future realized conditions as a proxy for disaggregate information is
a lower bound of the variance explained by disaggregate information d̂t+1i,t .
12While the inclusion of an additional regressor into (1.3) alters the definition of the attenuation factor,
the conclusion that a decrease in σδ implies an increase in β1 remains valid as long as the disaggregate
shock δi,t is uncorrelated with the additional regressor.
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1.3.2 Empirical Model
The empirical model that guides the empirical analyses throughout the chapter closely
follows the conceptual framework outlined above. Specifically, we estimate a slightly
modified version of (1.2) to test whether expectations primarily reflect aggregate infor-
mation at the industry level or disaggregate information orthogonal to industry-specific
information.
The empirical model is the following:
Expectations+6mi,t =
β1 Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) + β2 Conditionsi,(t,t−5) +mi + at × 1(Subsectori) + εi,t. (1.4)
As for the conceptual framework (1.2), the dependent variable of the empirical model (1.4)
are firm i’s expectations stated at the monthly date t, which cover an expectation window
of six months. As in (1.2), moreover, we non-parametrically identify the aggregate infor-
mation at the two-digit level of the German industry classification system of 2003, which
is roughly equivalent to three-digit NAICS subsectors (see Footnote 3), via the subsector-
specific time fixed effects at × 1(Subsectori).13 Furthermore, we proxy for disaggregate
information via the ex post realization of business conditions during the expectation win-
dow of the following six months, as given by Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6). Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) is
calculated as the moving average of the monthly reports of business conditions between
the months t+ 1 and t+ 6.
We modify the conceptual framework (1.2) slightly by including firm fixed effects
mi and the six month moving average of current and past realized business conditions,
Conditionsi,(t,t−5), as additional independent variables. The firm fixed effects mi filter out
a constant firm-specific tendency of expectations that may be caused by structural factors
like an (un)successful business model as well as persistent firm-specific optimism or pes-
simism (as documented by Bachmann and Elstner, 2015). The past business conditions
control for adaptive expectations or the effect of past (disaggregate) information on ex-
pectations. This ensures that the proxy for disaggregate information, Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6),
predominantly captures the effect of newly relevant information that is not included in
past conditions on expectations. That being said, none of our results qualitatively depend
on the inclusion of either mi or Conditionsi,(t−5,t) in the empirical model.
Finally, note that the empirical model (1.4) is linear irrespective of the discrete and
ordinal nature of the data. This choice is driven by the non-existence of standard methods
13To keep the notation lean, we abuse notation slightly and assign the same letter to different (but
related) parameters and variables. For example, in the empirical model (1.4), at denotes the time fixed
effect, while in the conceptual framework at denotes the aggregate business conditions. To avoid confusion,
parameters will be uniquely defined within the subsections of the chapter.
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for the estimation of fixed effects models with non-binary ordinal data. While Riedl and
Geishecker (2014) find that linear panel data models generally perform quite well in
comparable settings with large cross-sections and long time series (large N and T ), it
is a priori not clear that assuming linearity is appropriate in the context of this study.
We therefore verify in Section 1.4.1 that the linear model is consistent with the variation
present in the data.
1.4 Panel Results
This section documents the strong association between disaggregate information and
firms’ expectations. The analysis begins with an application of the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell
Theorem in a regression anatomy exercise that displays the substantial degree of identify-
ing variation in the data. In addition, the analysis verifies that the linearity imposed by
the empirical model (1.4) is reflected in the data despite its categorical nature. Then, we
turn to the direct estimation of the main empirical model (1.4) and corresponding model
variants to quantify the strength and statistical significance of the positive association
between firms’ expectations and disaggregate information. Finally, a comparison of the
variance in expectations explained by disaggregate and aggregate information reveals that
both sources of information influence expectations to a similar degree.
1.4.1 Regression Anatomy of the Identifying Variation
Section 1.3 argues that the effect of disaggregate information on expectations can be
identified via the partial correlation of expectations and future realized business conditions
with both variables purged for their aggregates via time fixed effects. We now bring
this analysis to the data and analyze the empirical correlation between purged current
expectations ν̂i,t and purged future business conditions νi,t, our proxy for disaggregate
information. In the context of the empirical model (1.4), ν̂i,t and νi,t are thereby defined
as the residuals of the following regressions:
Expectations+6mi,t = β̂2 Conditionsi,(t,t−5) + m̂i + ât × 1(Subsectori) + ν̂i,t (1.5)
Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) = β̃2 Conditionsi,(t,t−5) + m̃i + ãt × 1(Subsectori) + νi,t. (1.6)
Given this, note that the linear projection of ν̂i,t on νi,t corresponds to the effect of
disaggregate information on expectations, because for β1 from (1.4) it holds that β1 =
Cov(ν̂i,t,νi,t)
V ar(ν̂i,t)
by the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell Theorem.14
14Angrist and Pischke (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the theorem and its usefulness for as-
sessing the identifying variation.
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Figure 1.1: Regression Anatomy
Panel A: Manufacturing
Panel B: Services
Panel C: Retail and Wholesale
Notes. The left figures plot, for each sector-specific survey of the IBS, firms’ six month ahead expectations
at t (purged for firm fixed effects and date fixed effects at the firms’ two-digit industry level as well as
current and past conditions according to (1.5)) against the future realized business conditions between
t+ 1 and t+ 6 (purged for the same variables as expectations according to (1.6)). The right figures group
the residuals of the ex post conditions by percentile and plot, conditional on the percentile, the means of
the purged expectations against the means of ex post realized business conditions. The straight lines in
both panels represent the regressions of purged expectations on purged future conditions.
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The left panels of Figure 1.1 plot, separately for each sector-wide survey, the purged
expectations ν̂i,t against the proxy for disaggregate information νi,t. The large dispersion
of νi,t along the horizontal axis reveals that there is sufficient identifying variation in the
disaggregate component of the future realized business conditions even after filtering out
the aggregate variation at the subsector level. In addition, the regression lines in these
figures, the slopes of which are between 0.25 (services) and 0.29 (manufacturing and re-
tail/wholesale), indicate that there is a strong positive association between disaggregate
future realizations, the proxy for disaggregate information, and firms’ expectations. Yet,
this positive association is somewhat masked by the large visible dispersion of ν̂i,t that
is due to the large number of observations (between approximately 160’000 in the re-
tail/wholesale survey and 310’000 in the manufacturing survey). It is hence not clear
whether the positive correlation between disaggregate information and expectations is
due to outliers or non-linearities—potentially originating from the categorical nature of
the data—, or whether the positive and linear association is a general and robust feature
of the data.
To reduce noise in both dimensions, the right panels of Figure 1.1 group the purged
future conditions νi,t by percentiles and plot, conditional on the percentile of νi,t, the means
of the purged expectations ν̂i,t against the means of the purged future business conditions.
Evidently, the correlation of these conditional means is highly linear in all industry surveys
and tightly clustered around the linear projections of ν̂i,t on νi,t. The average effect of
the proxy for disaggregate information on firms’ expectations is thus constant across the
entire domain of disaggregate information, suggesting that the estimation of linear models
is appropriate despite the categorical nature of the data.
1.4.2 Disaggregate Information Is Strongly Associated with Ex-
pectations
We now proceed to document the main findings of this section. Column (5) of Table 1.2
reports the complete estimates of the empirical model (1.4). As became clear in the
regression anatomy exercise, there is a strong positive association between firms’ expecta-
tions and the future realized business conditions, the proxy for disaggregate information
after controlling for aggregate information via the time fixed effects. Because the stan-
dard deviations of expectations and realized conditions are of similar magnitude, the
estimated coefficients imply that a one standard deviation change in realized conditions
(disaggregate information) is associated with an adjustment of expectations by between
0.25 (services) and 0.29 (manufacturing and retail/wholesale) in the same direction. The
effects are precisely estimated with standard errors more than one order of magnitude
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Table 1.2: Firms’ Expectations and Disaggregate Information
Expected Business Conditions for the Next 6 Months
Panel A: Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.41∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.0067)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.13∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.0094) (0.0091)
R2 0.102 0.231 0.285 0.304 0.329
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.220 0.275 0.288 0.313
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Time*2dig-Sector FE yes yes
Observations 334542 336014 334473 333426 331899
Panel B: Services
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.35∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.0085)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.090∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.14∗∗∗ 0.0079 -0.11∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.0092) (0.0079)
R2 0.075 0.304 0.333 0.350 0.368
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.292 0.321 0.332 0.350
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Time*2dig-Sector FE yes yes
Observations 304136 306462 303936 306066 303548
Panel C: Retail and Wholesale
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.0079)
Conditionst,t−5 0.22∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
R2 0.237 0.381 0.413 0.414 0.436
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.371 0.404 0.403 0.426
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Time*2dig-Sector FE yes yes
Observations 180400 181156 180339 180930 180115
Notes: Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post realized business conditions in the following six months
which is the proxy for disaggregate information. Conditionst,t−5 is defined accordingly. “Time*2dig-
Sector FE” are time fixed effects at the two-digit industry level. Standard errors are two-way clustered
at the levels of firms and dates. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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smaller than the point estimates.15 Note also that, conditional on future business condi-
tions within the expectation window, expectations seem to exhibit mean reversion with
respect to current and past conditions in the manufacturing and service surveys, while
they follow current conditions more closely in the retail/wholesale survey.
In Column (5), we non-parametrically control for aggregate information (and aggregate
realizations) via high dimensional time fixed effects at the subsector level. For this rea-
son, the coefficient of future realized conditions captures the degree of information about
disaggregate outcomes reflected in the expectations. Column (3), in turn, estimates the
same coefficient without the time fixed effects. Then, the coefficient reflects the impact
of information regarding the firms’ total future conditions, i.e., the sum of aggregate and
disaggregate conditions, on their expectations. The increase in the coefficient of future
realized conditions hence indicates, plausibly, that firms expectations reflect the future
total conditions more strongly than only the disaggregate conditions.16 Finally, the com-
parison of the results in Columns (3) and (1) reveals that the coefficient of future realized
conditions increases slightly if we remove the firm fixed effects from the set of covariates.
This indicates that both expectations and business outcomes are partly determined by
firm-specific conditions like, for example, the general success of their business model.17
Next, we take a closer look at the time horizon of the disaggregate information reflected
in the expectations. To this end, we split the proxy of disaggregate information, the ex
post realized business conditions in the following six months, into business realizations one
quarter and two quarters ahead (denoted by Conditionsi,(t+1,t+3) and Conditionsi,(t+4,t+6),
respectively). For symmetry, we proceed similarly with current and past conditions. The
results in Table 1.3 show that firms’ expectations about the following six months are
more strongly associated with disaggregate information about the business conditions
one quarter ahead than with the conditions two quarters ahead. The difference is least
pronounced in the service and manufacturing surveys, where firms potentially face a
relatively steady business environment, than in the retail/wholesale survey, where the
business environment potentially fluctuates with higher frequency. Overall, however, the
result is consistent with the hypothesis that firms are, in general, better informed about
the near than the more distant future.
15Standard errors are two-way clustered along the firm and time dimensions following Dube et al.
(2010) and Cameron et al. (2011). This adjusts for serial correlation of standard errors within firms as
well as correlations of errors within time periods.
16Following the conceptual framework in Section 1.3.1 and interpreting the coefficient of future con-
ditions as an attenuation factor, the result implies that the ratio of the variance of the aggregate shock
(αt+1 + δi,t+1) to the variance of aggregate information (ât+1t + d̂
t+1
it, ) is smaller than the ratio of the
variance of the disaggregate shock δi,t+1 to the variance of disaggregate information, d̂t+1i,t . While this
finding is plausible, it is by no means obvious.
17The remaining results of Table 1.2 in Columns (2) and (4) will be useful in the analysis of the
variance explained in the next subsection.
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Table 1.3: Firms’ Expectations and Disaggregate Information: Different Forecast Horizons
Expected Business Conditions for the Next 6 Months
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
Manufacturing Services Retail and Wholesale
Conditionst+4,t+6 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0060)
Conditionst+1,t+3 0.17∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0053)
Conditionst,t−2 0.0055 -0.060∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0081)
Conditionst−3,t−5 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0068)
Time*2dig-Sector FE yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
R2 0.332 0.370 0.449
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.352 0.439
Observations 318100 283688 172487
Notes: Conditionst+4,t+6 is the mean of ex post reported business conditions in four to six months
in the future. Conditionst+1,t+3, Conditionst,t−2, and Conditionst−3,t−5 are defined accordingly.
Conditionst+1,t+3 and Conditionst+4,t+6 serve as proxies for disaggregate information. “Time*2dig-Sector
FE” are time fixed effects at the two-digit industry level. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
levels of firms and dates. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In Appendix 1.B, we perform various robustness checks all of which leave the results
unchanged. Table 1.B.1 shows that the parameter estimates are largely independent of
the exact specification of the time fixed effects, including the introduction of time fixed
effects at the state level. In addition, sample attrition should be of little concern, as the
results are identical for subsamples of firms that are observed for sufficiently long time
periods. Table 1.B.2 demonstrates that the main results are robust to changes in the
vector of covariates. For example, we show that controlling for aggregate, industry-wide
observations by means of industry-level revenues instead of the industry-level fixed effects
leads to similar results with coefficients approaching the ones reported in Column (3) of
Table 1.2. This is not surprising, as industry-level revenues plausibly proxy only for parts
of the aggregate information available to firms. We also control for lagged expectations
or separately for current and past business conditions, with both specifications leading to
results very close to the findings reported in this section. Finally, Table 1.B.3 confirms
that firms’ expectations are associated with disaggregate information independent of their
current business situation.
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1.4.3 Variance Explained by Aggregate and Disaggregate Infor-
mation
This section assesses the relative importance of disaggregate information in comparison
to aggregate, industry-wide information for explaining variation in firms’ expectations.
For this purpose, we first take a look at the marginal R2 of these variables. Comparing
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 1.2 shows that the aggregate and industry-level conditions
captured by the time fixed effects add between 3.3 (retail/wholesale) and 7.3 (manu-
facturing) percentage points to the fraction of overall variance explained. Comparing
Columns (4) and (5), the marginal R2 of disaggregate information as proxied by the
realized future business conditions is between 1.8 (services) and 2.5 (manufacturing) per-
centage points. Hence, the marginal R2 of disaggregate information amounts to between
one third (manufacturing) and two thirds (retail/wholesale) of the marginal R2 of the
aggregate information at the subsector level.
To put these numbers in perspective, recall from the conceptual framework in Section
1.3.1 that the estimated marginal R2 of disaggregate information is a lower bound for its
true marginal R2. The reason is that the proxy for disaggregate information, the ex post
realized business conditions, induces attenuation bias for the coefficient of disaggregate
information. In contrast, the estimated marginal R2 of aggregate information closely
approximates its true value, because the time fixed effects capture the variance explained
by aggregate information flexibly and non-parametrically.
The extent to which proxying for information via future realized conditions leads to
underestimating the true marginal R2 can be gauged from comparing the marginal R2 of
the time fixed effects—i.e., the comparison of Columns (2) and (4)—with the marginal
R2 of realized conditions without time fixed effects—i.e., the comparison of Columns (2)
and (3). Without the inclusion of time fixed effects, the realized conditions are a proxy
for the sum of disaggregate and aggregate information. Nevertheless, the marginal R2 of
proxying for both disaggregate and aggregate information is smaller than the marginal R2
of flexibly accounting for only the aggregate conditions via the fixed effects. This suggests
that the empirical framework severely underestimates the variance explained by disaggre-
gate information. Seen in this light, the prominent role of disaggregate information in
explaining variance in expectations is even more remarkable.
Broadening the perspective, it is also instructive to ask how much of the variance in
expectations is explained by the future realized business conditions per se, i.e., when they
are not necessarily interpreted as a proxy for (disaggregate) information. The answer to
this question is not trivial, as the contribution of the future conditions to the share of
total variance explained depends on the order with which the covariates are included in
the estimation. This is because the identifying variation of each additional covariate is its
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Table 1.4: Generalized Shapley Decomposition of the Variance Explained
Average Marginal Contribution to R2 (in % of R2)
Manufacturing Services Retail and Wholesale
Conditionst+1,t+6 16.6 10.7 21.5
Conditionst,t−5 3.8 3.1 17.2
Time*2dig-Sector FE 19.2 13.1 8.2
Firm FE 60.4 73.2 53.0
R2 0.329 0.368 0.436
Observations 331899 303548 180115
Notes: Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post reported business conditions in the following six months.
Conditionst,t−5 is defined accordingly. “Time*2dig-Sector FE” are time fixed effects at the two-digit
industry level.
partial variation that is uncorrelated with the covariates already included in the model.
Clearly, the (partial) identifying variation of each additional covariate declines with the
number of covariates already included.
A recent method to deal with this issue is the generalized Shapley value decomposition
approach suggested by Shorrocks (2013).18 Given groups of covariates defined by the
researcher, this method decomposes the overall model R2 into the relative contributions
of each group. Applied to our setting, the generalized Shapley value corresponds to the
average marginal contribution of each group of covariates to the overall model R2 across
all possible sequences of adding these groups to the empirical model.
We compute the generalized Shapley values for the following four groups of covariates:
(A) the realized future business conditions (Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6)), (B) the current and past
business conditions (Conditionsi,(t,t−5)), (C) the set of industry-specific time fixed effects
(at × 1(Subsectori)), and (D) the set of firm fixed effects (mi).19 Table 1.4 displays the
results of this variance decomposition. Clearly, the firm-specific future business condi-
tions and the aggregate information as captured by the time fixed effects both contribute
a similar—and sizable—share to the total variance explained. Specifically, the future
business conditions contribute, on average, 21.5 percent to the total variance explained in
the retail/wholesale survey, and 19.2 and 10.7 percent, respectively, in the manufacturing
18Huettner and Sunder (2012) illustrate this approach and review findings of the literature on its
desirable properties such as efficiency, monotonicity, and equal treatment of groups as well as of players
within groups.
19Given this grouping, the generalized Shapley values are computed as follows. Within each of the
4! = 24 permutations of groups (ABCD, ABDC, ..., DCBA), the respective groups are sequentially added
to the regression model and the marginal contribution of each group of covariates to the overall model
R2 is determined. Each group’s Shapley value is then given by the average marginal contribution over
all permutations of groups.
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and services surveys. The aggregate effects at the two-digit industry level contribute,
on average, between 8.2 percent (retail/wholesale) and 16.6 percent (manufacturing) to
the total variance explained. These statistics are hence consistent with the notion that
the manufacturing and services sectors are more exposed to the aggregate business envi-
ronment than the retail and wholesale sectors. Nevertheless, across all industry surveys,
firm-level information as captured by future realized business conditions seems to be an
important driver of expectations.20
1.5 The Effect of Information on Expectation Forma-
tion: Quasi-Experimental Evidence
The previous section has shown that firms’ expectations reflect information about firm-
specific future business conditions that are orthogonal to aggregate or sector-specific fluc-
tuations. As such, firms are at least partially forward-looking when forming their expec-
tations during “normal times.” During these periods, however, it is likely that information
about future business conditions is imprecise as well as costly to gather and process. In
the remainder of the chapter, we study an episode during which a subset of firms had
precise and salient information about a disaggregate demand shock and ask how firms
incorporate this new information into their expectations.
It is difficult to identify the causal effect of a change in available information on expec-
tations in the field, predominantly because the information sets of firms are unobservable
to the researcher. Although aggregate shocks are often observable and can, at times, be
anticipated, they affect all firms at the same time so that the effect of new information
becomes indistinguishable from the potential impact of other sources of aggregate fluctu-
ations. Hence, it requires information about a disaggregate information shock that affects
a well-defined subset of firms to learn more about how expectations react to changes in
the quality of available information.
The announcement of the newly formed German government in November 2005 to raise
the VAT from 16 percent to 19 percent as of January 2007 constitutes such a disaggregate
information shock.21 It is well known that increases in the VAT heterogeneously affected
20The decomposition exercise also reveals the very prominent role of time-invariant firm-level factors in
explaining variation in firms’ expectations. At least one fifth of the variation in expectations is explained
by firm fixed effects which accounts for between 53.0 percent (retail/wholesale) and 73.2 percent (services)
of the overall R2. The importance of firm fixed effects is not surprising. As shown in Section 1.2, firms
frequently report that they expect normal business conditions. Hence, firm fixed effects close to zero
presumably “explain” many of the observations with Expectations+6mi,t = 0. In addition, the firm fixed
effects also account for the general success of firms’ business strategies in the medium and long run as
well as for systematic, time-invariant expectation biases (Bachmann and Elstner, 2015, find the latter to
be quite prevalent).
21During the 2005 election campaign, Ms. Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) promised to lower
24
business conditions of retail firms depending on the type of products they sell. While firms
trading with durable goods usually face a large pull-forward effect in demand resulting in
sizable fluctuations of their business conditions, firms trading with non-durable goods are
typically not affected.22 For the case of the German VAT reform, this asymmetric effect
has been documented by D’Acunto et al. (2016) who find a sizable increase in consumers’
readiness to spend on durable goods in advent of the tax rise. Moreover, they do not find
evidence for intra-temporal substitution from non-durable to durable goods. Because such
pull-forward effects in demand are a common result of VAT increases, they were easy to
predict for Germany’s durable good retailers, so that the VAT shock led to a differential
treatment regarding the quality of information about future demand available to durable
and non-durable good retailers.
1.5.1 Empirical Strategy: Difference-in-Differences
We seek to identify the causal effect of the VAT-induced increase in the quality of in-
formation on expectations in a difference-in-differences (DiD) design. For this purpose,
we assign firms to treatment and control groups based on the findings of Carare and
Danninger (2008) and a report of the German central bank (Bundesbank, 2008). Both
studies document that the pull-forward effect in demand was strongest in sales of new
cars followed by sales of furniture, furnishings, electronic household appliances, and con-
struction material. Accordingly, we assign approximately 220 retailers of cars, furniture,
and electronics to the treatment group to which we henceforth refer as “durable good
retailers.” The remaining 340 retail firms are assigned to the control group.23 As the
non-wage labor costs and to refinance the decrease in revenue via an increase in the VAT by 2 percent
(CDU/CSU, 2005, p. 13). All other parties with a path to being part of a ruling coalition after the election
(Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals) were in strong opposition to the proposed VAT increase (see,
e.g., SPD, 2005, p. 39). As none of the blocks (CDU/CSU & Liberals or Social Democrats & Greens)
gained an absolute majority in parliament (Bundestag), Christian Democrats and Social Democrats
formed a “grand coalition” headed by the new chancellor Ms. Merkel and decided to increase VAT by
3 percent in order to consolidate the federal budget; the non-wage labor costs were lowered by only 1
percent. The draft of the law was accepted by the federal cabinet on February 22, 2006, and was passed
into law by the two chambers of parliament on May 19th (Bundestag) and June 16th (Bundesrat). Given
the broad majority of the coalition in both chambers, parliamentary approval of the tax increase did
not come as a surprise to the public. D’Acunto et al. (2016) provide a more detailed discussion and
documentation of unexpectedness and purposes of the 2007 VAT increase.
22In Germany, virtually all durable goods are taxed with the full VAT of 19 percent. A sizable fraction
of non-durables such as food, newspapers, and flowers are taxed with a reduced rate of 7 percent that
has not been changed since 1983.
23Specifically, we define firms as being “treated” if they are classified as being part of the following
sectors of the German industry classification system of 2003 (WZ 03 ): “50.1 Sale of motor vehicles,”
“52.44 Retail sale of furniture, lighting equipment, and household articles,” and “52.45 Retail sale of
electrical household appliances and radio and television goods” (Destatis, 2003). We do not include firms
in WZ 03 group “52.46 Retail sale of hardware, prints and glass” to the treatment group, as the IBS does
not contain observations of firms in this group at the time of the VAT increase.
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Figure 1.2: The VAT-Induced Demand Effects
Notes: This figure plots the time series of aggregated revenues in the sectors “treated” by the VAT change
(black line) against reported business conditions of “treated” firms in the IBS as given by the average
responses of retailers of cars, furniture, and electronics in a range between -1 (bad), 0 (normal), and 1
(good conditions). The aggregate revenue series displayed here weights the sector-specific revenues by
the share of “treated” firms in the respective sectors in the IBS. The vertical red line corresponds to the
date of the VAT increase (January 2007).
VAT increase aimed at the consolidation of the federal budget, the policy intervention
neither intended to facilitate or suppress sales in specific retail sectors nor was it related
to economic conditions in these sectors. The “assignment” of firms to the “treatment” can
hence be considered as exogenous.
We further restrict the data set that we use for the analysis of the VAT shock to
retail firms’ expectations reported the latest in December 2007 in order to exclude the
repercussions of the 2008 financial crisis from the six-month expectation window. In order
to be able to observe pre-trends in firms’ expectations and current conditions of sufficient
length, we extend the data set to earlier periods covering expectations reported in January
2004 and thereafter.24
Figure 1.2 compares the business conditions of “treated” firms reported to the IBS
to aggregate revenues of durable good retailers. To this end, we construct a measure
of aggregate revenue in the “treated” sectors by weighting sector-specific revenue series
24The restricted data set hence covers reported business conditions between August 2003 and June
2008. Another reason for the extension of the data set towards earlier periods is that this raises the
number of time periods to 48, satisfying the rule of thumb from the literature that the number of clusters
should not fall far below 50. In Appendix 1.C.3, we show that the results are virtually the same when
using the same start date (March 2005) as in the previous sections.
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Figure 1.3: Identifying Variation in Business Conditions
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Notes: The dashed red line plots the mean of business conditions reported by treated firms (durable good
retailers) from the IBS, purged for past conditions and firm fixed effects. The solid black line plots the
same variable for firms in the control group (all other retail firms). The shaded area corresponds to the
treatment period between July 2006 and June 2007.
received from the German Statistical Office with the corresponding share of “treated”
firms per sector in the IBS.25 Clearly, the assessments of current business conditions in the
IBS, although qualitative in nature, closely track aggregate revenues in the corresponding
sectors. In particular, both time series display a sharp increase in advent of the VAT
change in the beginning of 2007, followed by a sharp downswing in the months thereafter.26
The identifying variation exploited in the DiD estimation is the difference in reported
business conditions of durable and non-durable good retailers during the treatment period.
Figure 1.3 illustrates this variation by plotting the business conditions of treated and
untreated firms that are purged for the past business conditions and firm fixed effects.27
Evidently, the purged current business conditions of treated and untreated firms follow
similar trends with the notable exception of the treatment period defined as the six months
25The revenue data are available from the German Federal Statistical Office as monthly time-series at
the industry level according to the more recent German industry classification system of 2008 (WZ 08 ),
which largely corresponds to the European classification NACE Rev. 2. The displayed time series in Fig.
1.2 is calculated using the revenue time series of the WZ 08 sectors “45.1 Sale of cars,” “47.54 Retail trade
with electronic household appliances,“ and “47.59 Retail trade with furniture” weighted by the number
of firms in the respective sectors observed in the IBS.
26Figure 1.C.1 in Appendix 1.C.1 plots revenues and average reports of current business conditions in
the retail industries unaffected by the VAT change.
27Specifically, Figure 1.3 plots the residuals of the following linear model, averaged separately for
treated and untreated firms: Conditionsi,t = ξ̂1 Conditionsi,(t−1,t−6) + m̂i + ε̂i,t.
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Figure 1.4: Common Trend in Expectations
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Notes: The dashed red line plots the mean of expectations for the next 6 months from the IBS as reported
by treated firms (durable good retailers) purged for past and current conditions and firm fixed effects.
The solid black line plots the same variable for firms in the control group (all other retail firms). The
shaded area corresponds to months when the six-month expectation window covers at least four months
of the demand shock’s treatment period between July 2006 and June 2007, i.e., expectations reported
between April 2006 and February 2007.
before and after the VAT increase on January 1st, 2007. During this period, the business
conditions of the treated firms are highly non-linear. Due to the overall similarity of all
retail firms, non-durable good retailers, which were not affected by the VAT increase,
seem to be a well-suited control group that can be used to filter out aggregate trends and
different sources of shocks during the treatment period.
Next, we show that the expectations of treated and control firms follow a common
trend when the VAT-induced demand shock is outside of the expectation window—the
key assumption for the identification of causal effects in a DiD design. To inspect the
common trend in expectations, we purge firms’ expectations for current conditions and
past trends as well as time-invariant firm characteristics captured by firm fixed effects,
as before.28 Figure 1.4 plots the mean purged expectations separately for durable good
retailers and all other retail firms. Clearly, the expectations do not differ substantially
between both groups before the end of 2005. If anything, the expectations of treated firms
already start appreciating in November 2005. Interestingly, this perfectly coincides with
the announcement of the VAT increase. Hence, the common trend assumption is very
28These purged expectations correspond to the residuals of the following regression:
Expectations+6mi,t = ξ̃1 Conditionsi,(t,t−5) + m̃i + ε̃i,t.
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likely to hold.
We exploit this similarity of durable and non-durable retail firms to study the ad-
justment of expectations to the VAT-induced differential treatment regarding the quality
of information about future demand. In order to elicit whether firms “treated” with the
information shock become more forward-looking once the time of the demand shock en-
ters the expectation window of six months, we compute the difference-in-differences of
the coefficients of both the future and the current/past realized business conditions. For
this purpose, we extend the main empirical model (1.4) to the following standard DiD
framework:
Expectations+6mi,t =
γ1
′Conditionsi,t + γ2′Conditionsi,t × 1(Durablei) + γ3′Conditionsi,t × 1(VATt)
+ δ′ Conditionsi,t × 1(Durablei)× 1(VATt) + at +mi + εi,t, (1.7)
As before, Expectations+6mi,t captures firm i’s expectations for the next 6 months as re-
ported in the IBS. The column vector Conditionsi,t contains all measures of business
conditions employed in the respective empirical specification. Moreover, the indicator
1(Durablei) equals one if the firm is a treated durable good retailer and zero otherwise,
and the indicator 1(VATt) equals one if t ∈ [2006m4, 2007m2], i.e., if the six-month ex-
pectation window covers at least four months of the demand shock’s “treatment” period
between July 2006 and June 2007. Lastly, at and mi denote the time and firm fixed
effects, and εi,t is the error term.29 The vector δ contains the coefficients of interest that
capture the adjustment of expectations to the VAT information shock by affected firms.
1.5.2 The Causal Effect of More Precise in Information on Ex-
pectations
In a first step, we focus on adjustments in the respective weights that durable good
retailers put on information regarding their future business conditions as well as current
and past conditions when forming expectations. Hence, the column vector Conditionsi,t
in model (1.7) equals (Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6),Conditionsi,(t−5,t))T .
Column (1) of Table 1.5 reports the vector of estimated “treatment” effects (δ̂) and
documents the main result of this section: Firms “treated” with the shock become sig-
nificantly more forward-looking once the time of the demand shock enters the six-month
expectation window. This manifests itself in a statistically highly significant increase of
29Note that all retail firms (with the exemption of car sellers) belong to the same two-digit sector
according to the German industry classification system of 2003. Hence, applying date fixed effects only
controls for all common components at the level of the overall retail sector at each point in time.
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Table 1.5: The Effect of More Precise Information on Expectations: Main Results
Expected Business Conditions for the Next 6 Months
Treated Firms Control Firms
Diff-in-Diff VAT Period Control Period VAT Period Control Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.18∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.039) (0.033) (0.039) (0.024)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.046) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adjusted R2 0.472 0.472
Firm FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 26688 26688
Notes: The table summarizes the results from two separate empirical models. Column (1) reports the
estimate of the vector δ in model (1.7), that is the VAT-induced change in the coefficients of future
realized business conditions (Conditionst+1,t+6) as well as current and past conditions (Conditionst,t−5)
when forming their expectations. These estimates are given by the difference-in-differences of the absolute
coefficients reported in Columns (2) through (5). The latter correspond to ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, and ψ4 in model
(1.8). The treatment period (VAT period) includes expectations formed between April 2006 and February
2007. The treatment group includesall durable good retailers, and the control groups includes all other
retail firms. Standard errors are twoway clustered at the levels of firms and dates. Level of significance:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
0.18 in the weights that durable good retailers put on Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) when forming
their expectations. Hence, firms’ expectations are almost twice as sensitive to disaggre-
gate information about future business conditions compared to periods with “average”
fluctuations.30 At the same time, the weight on current and past business conditions
(Conditionsi,(t,t−5)) becomes considerably smaller and decreases by 0.16.
Next, we confirm that the treatment effect is driven by a change in behavior of the firms
in the treated groups during the treatment period (as opposed to a change in behavior of
the control group). To this end, we estimate the coefficients of future business conditions
Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) as well as the coefficients of current and past trends Conditionsi,(t,t−5)
separately for the treated and control firms during the treatment and control periods.
30The analysis of retail firms’ expectation formation along the lines of Section 1.4 can be found in
Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C.2.
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This is achieved via the following empirical model
Expectations+6mi,t =
ψ′1 Conditionsi,t×1(Durablei)×1(VATt)+ψ
′
2 Conditionsi,t×1(Durablei)×1(no VATt)
+ψ′3 Conditionsi,t×1(Non-Durablei)×1(VATt)+ψ
′
4 Conditionsi,t×1(Non-Durablei)
× 1(no VATt) + at +mi + εi,t, (1.8)
where the indicators 1(Non-Durablei) and 1(no VATt) equal one if their counterparts
1(Durablei) and 1(VATt) are zero. It is straightforward to see that the differences-in-
differences of coefficients the from model (1.8) deliver the same treatment effects as directly
estimated in model (1.7), i.e., δ = (ψ1 −ψ2)− (ψ3 −ψ4).
The estimation results of (1.8) in Table 1.5, Columns (2) through (5), strongly con-
firm that the “treated” firms become more forward-looking in response to the VAT-induced
increase in the quality of disaggregate information. During those times when the VAT-
induced demand shock does not enter the six-month expectation window, the expectations
of durable good retailers (Column (3)) and all other retail firms (Column (5)) reflect fu-
ture as well as current and past business conditions in a comparable manner. Moreover,
the forecasting behavior of the firms of the control firms remains stable between the
treatment and control periods (Columns (4) and (5)). In contrast, treated firms largely
rely on information about two quarter ahead business, when they form their expectations
during the treatment period, with the corresponding coefficient increasing to 0.35 (Col-
umn (2)). At the same time, the sensitivity of expectations with respect to variation
in Conditionsi,(t,t−5) substantially drops to 0.15. This confirms, hence, that the shift in
attention towards information about the future observed for firms affected by the demand
shock cannot be attributed to general adjustments of the expectation formation process
of all retail firms.
1.5.3 Early Anticipation of the VAT-Induced Disaggregate De-
mand Shock
In a next step, we ask whether information about the VAT-induced disaggregate demand
shock is incorporated into expectations from particularly early on. For this purpose, we
decompose the measure Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) into two quarter ahead business conditions
(Conditionsi,(t+1,t+3)) and one quarter ahead business conditions (Conditionsi,(t+4,t+6)).
Along the lines of Section 1.3, these ex post realized business conditions can serve as a
proxy for the disaggregate information available at t about business conditions in the next
quarter and two quarters ahead. We proceed similarly with Conditionsi,(t−5,t.
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Table 1.6: The Effect of More Precise Information on Expectations: Extended Results
Expected Business Conditions for the Next 6 Months
Treated Firms Control Firms
Diff-in-Diff VAT Period Control Period VAT Period Control Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conditionst+4,t+6 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.030 0.052∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.019)
Conditionst+1,t+3 0.014 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015)
Conditionst,t−2 -0.11∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.045) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024)
Conditionst−3,t−5 -0.048 -0.012 0.0018 0.0098 -0.025
(0.041) (0.033) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adjusted R2 0.482 0.482
Firm FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 24798 24798
Notes: The table summarizes the results from two separate empirical models. Column (1) reports the
estimate of the vector δ in model (1.7), that is the VAT-induced change in the coefficients of two quarter
ahead business conditions(Conditionst+4,t+6), one quarter ahead business conditions (Conditionst+1,t+3)
as well as on current quarter’s and past quarter’s conditions (Conditionst,t−2 and Conditionst−3,t−5,
respectively) when forming their expectations. These estimates are given by the difference-in-differences
of the absolute coefficients reported in Columns (2) through (5). The latter correspond to ψ1, ψ2, ψ3,
and ψ4 in model (1.8). The treatment period (VAT period) includes expectations formed between April
2006 and February 2007. The treatment group includes all durable good retailers and the control groups
includes all other retail firms. Standard errors are twoway clustered at the levels of firms and dates. Level
of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 1.6 reports the results of estimating models (1.7) and (1.8) after inclusion of the
more fine-tuned measures of realized business conditions.31 In “normal” times (Columns
(3) and (5)), the two quarter ahead business conditions are only weakly reflected in expec-
tations although firms are asked for their assessment of the next six months. Accordingly,
expectations mostly reflect firms’ current conditions, and information about business con-
ditions in the near future appears to enter expectations more strongly than information
referring to the more distant future. Note also that durable good retailers perform worse
than retailers of non-durables in anticipating future business conditions during normal
31The column vector Conditionsi in models (1.7) and (1.8) now contains Conditionsi,(t+4,t+6),
Conditionsi,(t+1,t+3), Conditionsi,(t,t−2), and Conditionsi,(t−3,t−5). Note that we use the same definition
of 1(VATt) as independent variables as in the specification with six-month moving averages of business
conditions, so that the interaction terms of Conditionsi,(t+1,t+3) × 1(VATt) and Conditionsi,(t+4,t+6) ×
1(VATt) refer to realized business conditions during different phases of the shock. A specification with
adjusted treatment period dummies that accounts for this issue does not deliver substantially different
results. The results are available from the authors on request.
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times.
In contrast, at the time of the information shock, the treated firms incorporate infor-
mation about the VAT-induced demand shock into their expectations from particularly
early on, while expectations of unaffected firms remain widely unchanged (Columns (2)
and (4)). Strikingly, the disaggregate component of the two quarter ahead business con-
ditions is not only significantly more reflected in the expectations of the treated firms,
but is also associated more strongly with expectations than the treated firms’ information
about the current as well as the one quarter ahead business conditions. This pattern
is also reflected in DiD coefficients in Column (1). The weight that durable good re-
tailers put on two quarters ahead business conditions when forming their expectations
increases substantially by 0.17. At the same time, the weight of the one quarter ahead
business conditions remains virtually unaffected, and the weight on current conditions
drops substantially by 0.11.32
We conclude that the firms “treated” by the VAT-induced increase in the quality of
information become significantly more forward-looking once the time of the disaggregate
demand shock enters their six-month expectation window. Appendix 1.C.3 shows that
this result is not driven by the choice of the baseline specification. Specifically, the results
are robust to the definition of the treatment period (Panel A of Table 1.C.3), the inclusion
of wholesale firms to the control group (Panel B), as well as different restrictions on the
minimum duration of firms in the sample or controlling for attrition (Panel C). Moreover,
the results are robust to restricting the sample to the period used in Section 1.4 (Panel
D) as well as by the specification of time fixed effects (Panel E).
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the formation of firms’ expectations regarding their own future business
conditions. First, we document that disaggregate information, proxied by firms’ future
business conditions orthogonal to aggregate information at the two-digit industry level,
is strongly reflected in firms’ expectations. We also show that disaggregate information
explains an economically significant share of the variance in expectations.
Second, we provide causal evidence of how firms’ expectations react to new information
about a large disaggregate demand shock: the pull-forward effect in demand for durable
good retailers in response to a pre-announced VAT increase in Germany. Exploiting
the similarity of retailers of durable and non-durable goods in a difference-in-differences
32This result also holds when estimating model (1.7) with monthly measures of realized business
conditions. In this setting, the monthly DiD coefficients are amplified in particular in the months t + 5
and t+ 6, but are close to zero in the months t+ 7 and later. The results are available from the authors
on request.
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design, we find that firms “treated” with the shock become significantly more forward-
looking in advent of the large shifts in demand. In particular, when the information about
the shock becomes relevant, durable good retailers put larger weights on the information
about the two quarters ahead business conditions when forming their expectations and
rely substantially less on information about the current business conditions.
The documented adjustment of expectation formation to the VAT-induced increase
in quality of information about future business conditions could be expected for at least
two reasons. First, firms may rationally put more weight on more distant shocks at times
when these shocks can be predicted more reliably. Similarly, at times when large swings
in demand are to be expected, firms should view current conditions as less reliable signals
for future conditions and thus weight them less when forming expectations. A second
interpretation of the results is that the shift in weights reflects a shift in attention to more
distant realizations of shocks. As predicted by theories of rational inattention by Sims
(2003), Woodford (2003), and Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009, 2015), such shifts may
occur if information regarding business conditions in the more distant future becomes
either more informative or more cheaply to process; this is likely to be true for the case of
the VAT shock. Both somewhat distinct interpretations emphasize that the more forward-
looking expectations at times of the VAT shock are a rational response to the change in
the information structure firms face.
One way to disentangle these two effects in future work could be to study the ad-
justment process of firms’ expectations in response to pre-announced shocks that vary in
their information content or magnitude. If firms were constrained in their ability to gather
and process information, these variations should lead to differential costs and benefits of
adjusting expectations to those shocks, and, hence, to differential adjustments of expec-
tations conditional on the information structure of the shock. In contrast, unconstrained
firms are expected to unconditionally adjust their expectations to shocks. A challenge
for this approach is, however, that suitable shocks are notoriously hard to identify. Thus,
one would likely have to abandon some credibility in the identification strategy—relative
to the cleanly identified VAT shock used in this chapter—in order to perform analyses of
this sort. We leave this challenge to future work.
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Appendices to Chapter 1
1.A Appendix to Section 1.2: Additional Tables
Table 1.A.1: Attrition
Fraction of Firms Surviving (in %)
Start Date Firms@Start 6m 1yr 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs
2005m3 5701 95.5 91.2 83.9 78.2 72.7 67.9 63.8 59.6 55.4 51.2 46.6
2006m3 6510 95.6 91.2 84.6 78.3 73.0 68.3 63.7 59.1 54.5 49.5 0
2007m3 6822 95.5 92.1 85.1 78.9 73.9 69.0 63.9 58.8 53.4 0 0
2008m3 6974 96.0 92.1 85.4 79.9 74.4 69.0 63.3 57.4 0 0 0
2009m3 7356 95.9 92.6 86.5 80.5 74.5 68.2 61.7 0 0 0 0
2010m3 7752 96.2 93.0 86.3 79.5 72.8 65.9 0 0 0 0 0
2011m3 7827 96.4 92.5 85.3 78.1 70.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012m3 8069 95.6 91.8 83.4 75.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013m3 7880 95.0 90.5 81.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014m3 7468 94.5 89.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015m3 6983 88.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: This table displays, for all firms in our sample in March of each year, the percentages of firms that
remain in the sample after the passage of different time intervals (between six months and ten years).
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Table 1.A.2: Transition Frequencies by Sector
Panel A: Manufacturing
Conditions Next Period Expectations Next Period
1 0 -1 1 0 -1
Current 1 0.228 0.055 0.002 0.113 0.069 0.007
Conditions/ 0 0.055 0.431 0.041 0.067 0.500 0.064
Expectations -1 0.002 0.041 0.145 0.009 0.062 0.108
Sum 0.285 0.527 0.188 0.189 0.631 0.179
Panel B: Services
Conditions Next Period Expectations Next Period
1 0 -1 1 0 -1
Current 1 0.284 0.072 0.003 0.167 0.087 0.008
Conditions/ 0 0.072 0.391 0.037 0.084 0.462 0.053
Expectations -1 0.003 0.037 0.102 0.010 0.051 0.079
Sum 0.359 0.500 0.142 0.261 0.600 0.140
Panel C: Retail and Wholesale
Conditions Next Period Expectations Next Period
1 0 -1 1 0 -1
Current 1 0.156 0.067 0.006 0.103 0.061 0.006
Conditions/ 0 0.067 0.402 0.067 0.059 0.477 0.071
Expectations -1 0.006 0.068 0.162 0.006 0.071 0.146
Sum 0.229 0.537 0.235 0.168 0.609 0.223
Notes: This table shows the transition frequencies of reported realized business conditions and expected
business conditions for each industry survey. The left (right) panel shows the frequencies of reported
business conditions (expected business conditions) in the next reported month for each possible current
report of business conditions/expectations. Since these statistics are derived from the time dimension of
the panel dataset, the overall frequencies of reported future conditions/expectations displayed in the last
row (Sum) are equal to the overall frequencies for the current conditions/expectations, which are, for this
reason, omitted.
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1.B Robustness Checks for Section 1.4: Panel Results
This section confirms that the main results of Section 1.4, which are documented in Col-
umn (5) of Table 1.2, remain unchanged when exposed to a variety of robustness checks.
Columns (2), (3), and (4) of Table 1.B.1 document that the coefficient of the disaggre-
gate components of Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) is unaffected by the specification of the time fixed
effect that controls for aggregate information. Relative to the baseline specification in
Column (1), the change in the estimated coefficient of Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) never exceeds
0.01. This holds regardless of whether we control only for a single aggregate time fixed
effect in Column (2), about 180 time fixed effects at the three-digit industry level in Col-
umn (3), or whether we add 16 time fixed effects, one for each German federal state, in
Column (4). The results also remain remarkably stable when we restrict the sample of
firms to control for attrition. Neither restricting firms to be in the sample for at least
two years in Column (5) nor dropping all obervations of firms within one year of the last
firm-specific observation in Column (6) alters the coefficient of interest.
Table 1.B.2 verifies that the benchmark results in Column (1) are unaffected by chang-
ing the vector of covariates. In Column (2), we alter the industry definition underlying
the time fixed effects from the German industry classification of 2003 (WZ 03 ), which
we use throughout the chapter, to the more recent German industry classification of 2008
(WZ 08 ). While this requires additional adjustments of the industry codes in the data
of the IBS, doing so leaves the results completely unchanged. In Columns (3) and (4),
we directly control for aggregate industry conditions by means of aggregate revenues.
To this end, we generate a measure of detrended revenue at the two-digit industry level
by computing the log deviation of the monthly revenue data (that is publicly available
from the German statistical office for the manufacturing and retail/wholesale sectors)
to the industry-specific trend in revenue.33 Column (3) then adds current (detrended)
industry revenues as an additional covariate, while Column (4) includes average future
revenues during the expectation window of six months. Note that Columns (3) and (4)
do not include time fixed effects, as these are perfectly collinear to the industry-specific
revenue data. Unsurprisingly, the coefficients of future realized business conditions in
Columns (3) and (4) increase, because the industry-specific revenues only partially cap-
ture the industry-specific variation in business conditions. Note also that, as expected,
the association between current revenues and expectations is not statistically significant,
while the association between future industry-specific revenue levels and expectations is
strong. Column (5) accounts for the possibility that firms extrapolate from past expecta-
tions when forming their current expectations by controlling for the expectations reported
33Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), the monthly revenue data are detrended using a HP filter with
smoothing parameter 129’600.
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Table 1.B.1: Panel Regressions: Robustness Checks - Fixed Effects and Attrition
Expected Business Conditions for the Next 6 Months
Panel A: Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0070)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.095∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.0092) (0.0098) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0096)
R2 0.329 0.318 0.351 0.334 0.327 0.333
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.307 0.319 0.314 0.312 0.316
Observations 327369 329927 327006 327369 325191 282368
Panel B: Services
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0093)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.0080) (0.0082) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0085)
R2 0.367 0.355 0.384 0.372 0.365 0.370
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.344 0.357 0.350 0.348 0.352
Observations 299011 299398 298566 298881 296522 255611
Panel C: Retail and Wholesale
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0086)
Conditionst,t−5 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
R2 0.437 0.433 0.445 0.444 0.435 0.436
Adjusted R2 0.426 0.423 0.430 0.427 0.425 0.425
Observations 177330 177553 177330 177330 175852 150254
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes
Time*2dig-Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Time*3dig-Sector FE yes
Time*State FE yes
Firm at least 24 Months in Sample yes
Firm in Sample for at least one more year yes
Notes: Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post realized business conditions in the following six months
which is our proxy for disaggregate information. Conditionst,t−5 is defined accordingly. “Time FE” are
aggregate time fixed effects, “Time*2dig-Sector FE” are time fixed effects at the two-digit industry level,
and “Time*3dig-Sector FE” are time fixed effects at three-digit industry level, and “Time*State FE” are
time fixed effect at the level of the German states. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the levels of
firms and dates. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
38
Table 1.B.2: Panel Regressions: Robustness Checks - Additional Controls
Expected Business Conditions for the Next 6 Months
Panel A: Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0068) (0.018) (0.012) (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0070)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.095∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(0.0092) (0.0091) (0.013) (0.015) (0.0095)
log(Revenuest) 0.0056
(0.12)
log(Revenuest+1,t+6) 0.65∗∗∗
(0.14)
Expectations+6mt−6 0.060
∗∗∗
(0.0057)
Conditionst 0.045∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0059)
Conditionst−1,t−5 -0.17∗∗∗
(0.0080)
R2 0.329 0.329 0.284 0.288 0.331 0.327 0.335
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.313 0.273 0.277 0.315 0.311 0.319
Observations 327369 327369 327369 327369 306916 327369 324099
Panel B: Services
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0088) (0.0087)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
(0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0082)
Expectations+6mt−6 0.025
∗∗∗
(0.0060)
Conditionst -0.013∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0062)
Conditionst−1,t−5 -0.13∗∗∗
(0.0074)
R2 0.367 0.379 0.374 0.364 0.369
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.356 0.356 0.347 0.352
Observations 299011 298746 258671 299011 292035
Panel C: Retail and Wholesale
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.28∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0081) (0.012) (0.010) (0.0086) (0.0075) (0.0075)
Conditionst,t−5 0.21∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
log(Revenuest) 0.086
(0.14)
log(Revenuest+1,t+6) 0.85∗∗∗
(0.21)
Expectations+6mt−6 0.064
∗∗∗
(0.0061)
Conditionst 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0065)
Conditionst−1,t−5 0.015∗
(0.0090)
R2 0.437 0.447 0.414 0.416 0.438 0.459 0.459
Adjusted R2 0.426 0.431 0.404 0.406 0.427 0.449 0.449
Observations 177330 177324 177330 177330 161850 177330 174774
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*2dig-Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Time*2dig-Sector FE (WZ08) yes
Notes: Conditionst+1,t+6, Conditionst,t−5, Conditionst, and Conditionst+1,t−5 analogously as in the re-
mainder of the chapter. log(Revenuest) is the log deviation of revenues at the two-digit level from its
HP-filtered trend (smoothing parameter 129,600); log(Revenuest+1,t+6) is its average between t+ 1 and
t + 6. The revenue data are unavailable for services. Expectations+6mt−6 are the expectations as of t − 6.
“Time*2dig-Sector FE” and “Time*2dig-Sector FE (WZ08)” are time fixed effects at the two-digit indus-
try levels according to the WZ03 and WZ08 classifications, respectively. Standard errors are two-way
clustered at the levels of firms and dates. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.B.3: Panel Regressions: Conditional on Normal Current Conditions
Expectations+6mt
Panel A: Manufacturing
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0069)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.10∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0081)
R2 0.334 0.333
Adjusted R2 0.317 0.301
Observations 309028 159226
Panel B: Services
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0077)
Conditionst,t−5 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0088)
R2 0.382 0.387
Adjusted R2 0.358 0.342
Observations 281142 136299
Panel C: Retail and Wholesale
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.29∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0080)
Conditionst,t−5 0.20∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
R2 0.437 0.330
Adjusted R2 0.426 0.306
Observations 164616 85572
Neutral Conditions in t no yes
Firm FE yes yes
Time*2dig-Sector FE yes yes
Notes: Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post reported business conditions in the following six months.
Conditionst,t−5 is defined accordingly. “Time*2dig-Sector FE” are time fixed effects at the two-digit
industry level. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the levels of firms and dates. The sample in
the second column consists only of those firms which currently report normal business conditions, that
is those firms for which Conditionst = 0. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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six months ago; these expectations cover an expectation window of the past six months
(including the current month). Even though the association between past and current
expectations is statistically significant, the association is economically small and does not
alter the remaining coefficient estimates or the goodness of fit substantially. In Columns
(6) and (7), we separately control for current realized conditions, with and without past
conditions. This also has little impact on the parameter estimates of interest.
Finally, we rule out the possibility that firms at the extremes of the distribution of
current conditions drive our results. Specifically, one concern could be that firms with
unusual good or bad business conditions can expect these conditions to continue to be
good or bad in the future with high confidence, and are thus very well informed about
their future. Such a mechanism could generate our results, even if all other firms possess
no information about their future disaggregate conditions. To deal with this concern, the
second column of Table 1.B.3 estimates the main empirical model (1.4) only for those
firms that currently report normal conditions. The comparison of the estimates for this
restricted sample of firms to the benchmark results in the first column of Table 1.B.3 shows
that the effect of disaggregate information on expectation is independent of whether firms
currently experience a business as usual or particularly good/bad business conditions.
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1.C Appendices to Section 1.5
1.C.1 Additional Description of the VAT Shock
Figure 1.C.1: Effect of VAT Increase in 2007 on Other Retail Firms
Notes: This figure plots the time series of revenues in a subset of sectors “not treated” by the VAT
change (black line) against reported business conditions of “untreated” firms in the IBS as given by the
average responses to the IBS in a range between -1 (bad), 0 (normal), and 1 (good conditions). The
subset of untreated firms displayed here refers to retailers corresponding to the WZ 08 group "47.7
Indoor retail trade with other goods" which contains clothes, shoes, leather goods, pharmaceuticals,
medical/ orthopedical/cosmetic goods, flowers/plants/fertilizer/animals, watches/luxury goods, glasses,
fotographical/optic goods, art/paintings, antiques, used goods, etc. The vertical red line corresponds to
the date of the VAT increase (January 2007).
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1.C.2 Panel Results for Subset of Retail Firms
Table 1.C.1: Retail Firms’ Expectations and Disaggregate Information
Expected Business Conditions for the Next 6 Months
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.29∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Conditionst,t−5 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.462 0.472 0.476 0.474 0.478
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes
Time*State FE yes yes
Time*3digit-Sector FE yes yes
Observations 26711 26688 26688 26667 26688 26667
Notes: Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post reported business conditions in the following six months.
Conditionst,t−5 is defined accordingly. “Time*State FE” and “Time*3digit-Sector FE” are time fixed
effects at the state-level or at the 3-digit industry level. The sample includes all retail firms in the IBS
between January 2004 and December 2007 that respond to the survey between t-5 and t+6. Standard
errors are two-way clustered at the levels of firms and dates. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Table 1.C.2: Retail Firms’ Expectations and Disaggregate Information: Different Forecast
Horizons
Expected Business Conditions for the Next 6 Months
Conditionst+4,t+6 0.10∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Conditionst+1,t+3 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Conditionst,t−2 0.25∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Conditionst−3,t−5 0.0037 -0.0047 -0.0088 -0.0030 -0.0055 0.000100
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Adjusted R2 0.214 0.471 0.482 0.486 0.484 0.487
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes
Time*State FE yes yes
Time*3digit-Sector FE yes yes
Observations 24830 24798 24798 24783 24798 24783
Notes: Conditionst+4,t+6 is the mean of ex-post reported business conditions in four to six months in the
future. Conditionst+1,t+3, Conditionst,t−2, and Conditionst−3,t−5 are defined accordingly. “Time*State
FE” and “Time*3digit-Sector FE” are time fixed effects at the state-level or at the three-digit industry
level. The sample includes all retail firms in the IBS between January 2004 and December 2007 that
respond to the survey between t-5 and t+6. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the levels of firms
and dates. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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1.C.3 Robustness Checks for Section 1.5
This appendix performs a series of robustness checks to demonstrate that the results are
not driven by the choice of the baseline specification. For this purpose, we estimate the
difference-in-differences effect of facing the large pull-forward effect in demand due to the
VAT increase on expectations of affected firms under different specifications. The results
of all robustness checks are summarized and compared to the benchmark in Table 1.C.3.
To begin with, we show that our results are robust to the definition of the treatment
period. First, we symmetrically shorten the treatment period at the beginning and the
end by two months each. Hence, we define expectations to cover the period of the pull-
forward effect in demand if they are formed between June and December 2006. Although
the difference-in-differences effect is estimated based on only 7 instead of 11 treatment
months, results are qualitatively similar to the benchmark scenario as can be inferred from
Table 1.C.3 Panel A. If anything, the relatively early anticipation of the disaggregate shock
is estimated to be even stronger in this setting as the difference-in-differences coefficient for
Conditionsi,(t+4,t+6) increases to 0.174. This appreciated treatment effect is not surprising
having in mind that expectations formed within this shorter time frame put a relatively
higher weight on realized conditions from periods that are closer to the increase in VAT
and do not cover realizations from more distant periods when the magnitude of the VAT-
induced disaggregate demand shock was smaller.
Second, we define the treatment period asymmetrically such that it covers less months
in which expectations are mainly referring to periods with appreciated business conditions
during the upward-movement in demand before the VAT increase and more months in
which expectations are formed that cover the downswing thereafter. This is done because
the appreciating effect on business conditions of treated firms preceding the VAT increase
lasted shorter than the period of depreciated business conditions thereafter as documented
in Figure 1.3. However, the coefficients in row 2 of Table 1.C.3 Panel A show that choosing
the treatment period to asymmetrically capture the upward and downward effects of the
VAT increase on business conditions does not change the results, either.
Next, Table 1.C.3 Panel B confirms that our results are robust to the inclusion of
wholesale firms to the control group. Using survey responses of all firms in the retail and
wholesale survey of the IBS, the majority of firms in the control group are wholesalers
whose expectation formation is arguably more dissimilar from durable good retailers than
that of other retail firms. The treatment effects in response to the VAT shock, how-
ever, do not hinge on this choice and still show the particularly early anticipation of the
disaggregate demand shock in expectations of affected firms.
Moreover, the explanatory power of firm fixed effects for expectations is highest for
firms that are in the sample for only a few periods by construction. If the treatment
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Table 1.C.3: The Effect of More Precise Information on Expectations: Robustness Checks
Difference-in-Differences Coefficients
Condt+4,t+6 Condt+1,t+3 Condt,t−2 Condt−3,t−5 Obs. Adj. R2
Baseline Specification 0.151∗∗∗ 0.0182 -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0156 24798 0.502
(0.0585) (0.0435) (0.0518) (0.0454)
Panel A: Robustness to Choice of Treatment Period
1(VATt) = 1 if
t ∈ (2006m6, 2006m12) 0.174∗∗∗ 0.0562 -0.137∗∗ -0.0258 24798 0.503
(0.0637) (0.0507) (0.0667) (0.0577)
t ∈ (2006m6, 2007m2) 0.135∗∗ 0.0572 -0.136∗∗ 0.000913 24798 0.503
(0.0642) (0.0443) (0.0567) (0.0514)
Panel B: Robustness to Choice of Control Group
Control: Other Retail & Wholesale 0.151∗∗∗ 0.0224 -0.116∗∗ -0.0107 50923 0.494
(0.0449) (0.0407) (0.0468) (0.0333)
Panel C: Restrictions on Minimum Duration in Sample and Attrition
Firm at least 24 months in sample 0.176∗∗∗ 0.0331 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.00133 21270 0.493
(0.0551) (0.0479) (0.0522) (0.0425)
Firm covers at least 2006m4-2007m2 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0180 -0.163∗∗∗ -0.0153 19990 0.493
(0.0540) (0.0472) (0.0514) (0.0437)
Firm covers at least 2005m6-2007m12 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0309 -0.171∗∗∗ 0.0135 17923 0.491
(0.0550) (0.0494) (0.0538) (0.0416)
Panel D: Robustness to Choice of Time Period Covered By Dataset
Dataset covers 2005m3-2007m12 0.157∗∗ 0.0199 -0.117∗∗ -0.0495 18056 0.510
(0.0629) (0.0447) (0.0548) (0.0464)
Panel E: Robustness to Estimation of Fixed Effects
FE: Firm only 0.234∗∗∗ -0.00997 -0.165∗∗∗ -0.0312 24798 0.493
(0.0718) (0.0459) (0.0572) (0.0469)
FE: Firm, Time*State 0.143∗∗ 0.0215 -0.130∗∗ -0.00821 24783 0.521
(0.0592) (0.0438) (0.0524) (0.0482)
Notes: Each row corresponds to the results of one robustness check and reports the respective estimate of
the vector δ in model (1.7), that is the change in the weights, caused by the VAT shock, that firms put on
ex post realized business conditions two quarters ahead (Condt+4,t+6), one quarter ahead (Condt+1,t+3)
as well as on current quarter’s and past quarter’s conditions (Condt,t−2 and Condt−3,t−5, respectively)
when forming their expectations. If not stated otherwise all regressions use the baseline specification
with (1) firm- and time-fixed effects, (2) the treatment period referring to expectations formed between
April 2006 and February 2007, (3) the treatment group entailing all durable good retailers, (4) the control
group including all other retail firms, and (5) no restriction on duration of the firm in the sample and
attrition. If not stated otherwise, the range of data is restricted to retail frims between January 2004 and
December 2007 that respond to the survey between t− 5 and t+ 6. Standard errors are twoway clustered
at the levels of firms and dates. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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and control group consisted of different proportions of these short-lived firms, the results
might be biased, too. Results in row 1 of Table 1.C.3 Panel C confirm that results are
unaffected from restricting the analysis to firms that are in the sample for at least 24
months during the 4 years under consideration (2004-2007).
A further potential issue is attrition. Given that the sample is unbalanced, some firms
drop or enter the sample during the time period under consideration. If attrition was
correlated with the outcomes of the treatment, our results would be biased. We control
for attrition by restricting the analysis to firms that neither drop nor enter the sample
during the treatment period (row 2 of Table 1.C.3 Panel C) as well as the period between
June 2005 and December 2007 in row 3, i.e., the treatment period ±10 months. As shown
by the difference-in-differences coefficients, the particularly early and relatively better
anticipation of the disaggregate demand shock due to the VAT increase is estimated to
be even stronger once attrition is controlled for.
Furthermore, Table 1.C.3 Panel D confirms that our results are robust to the choice of
the time period covered by the dataset. Restricting the dataset to firms between March
2005, i.e., the first period of the joint data set including all industry surveys used in Section
1.4, and December 2007 and thereby reducing the length of the pre-treatment period by
half, the treatment effects in response to the VAT shock are virtually left unchanged
despite of the reduced number of observations in the control period.
In a last step, we estimate the treatment effects using different empirical specifications
of fixed effects in model (1.7). Table 1.C.3 Panel E shows that the treatment effects
explain an even more pronounced early anticipation of the pull-forward effect in demand
of affected firms once only firm fixed effects are applied and time fixed effects are excluded.
In contrast, applying time fixed effects interacted with regional identifiers at the level of
federal states leads to slightly weaker, albeit still statistically significant results.34
In sum, all robustness checks confirm that firms “treated” by the VAT-induced increase
in the quality of information about future business conditions become significantly more
forward-looking once the time of the disaggregate demand shock enters their expectation
window of six months. While fluctuations one to three months ahead are, if anything, only
reflected slightly more than in “normal” times, current conditions are reflected significantly
less by expectations and ex post realized business conditions four to six month in the future
are significantly better anticipated in all specifications.
34Note that time fixed effects interacted with sectoral identifiers are not sensible at levels that are
more disaggregate than the two-digit level, which exactly refers to the group of all retail firms, as the
treatment and control group are defined along these dimensions.
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Chapter 2
Market Volatility, Information
Frictions, and the Information Content
of Firms’ Expectations
2.1 Introduction
Information frictions have become increasingly popular in macroeconomics to model
the expectation formation process of firms and other economic agents more realistically
compared to the usual full-information rational expectations approach. However, these
frictions—often modeled as capacity constraints or costly acquisition and processing of
information—are usually rationalized on intuitive grounds because empirical evidence on
the importance of information rigidities for the expectation formation process of firms is
scarce. This chapter aims at narrowing this gap by providing evidence that firms form
expectations regarding their own future business conditions consistently with rational
models of information frictions.
For this purpose, I test whether firms allocate more attention to shocks that are more
volatile—a prediction that different types of these models share and that has not been
tested at the firm level, yet.1 For example, Reis (2006) shows that in the “sticky infor-
mation model” of Mankiw and Reis (2002) “more volatile shocks lead to more frequent
updating since inattentiveness is more costly in a world that is rapidly changing” (Reis,
2006, p. 803). Moreover, calibrating a “rational inattention model” à la Sims (2003),
Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) show that firms allocate a low degree of attention
to monetary policy shocks because of their relatively low volatility which explains why
1To my knowledge, Maćkowiak et al. (2009) is the only paper that directly assessed the relationship
between volatility and information frictions. Using industry-level data in a dynamic factor model, they
find that the speed of response of a sectoral price index to aggregate shocks is increasing in the standard
deviation of sectoral inflation due to aggregate shocks.
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responses to monetary policy are exceptionally sluggish and persistent. The results pre-
sented in this chapter provide evidence in favor of this prediction by documenting that the
degree to which firms’ expectations reflect information about future business conditions
is strongly increasing in the volatility of market conditions firms are generally exposed to.
This chapter contributes to a small, but growing literature on the importance of in-
formation frictions for the expectation formation of firms. Identifying this relationship is
challenging because the information sets of firms are typically unobserved and data on
firms’ expectations is scarce. In line with my results, Kacperczyk et al. (2016) document
that mutual funds managers allocate their attention rationally. Moreover, Sarte (2014)
finds evidence for notable information lags consistent with Mankiw and Reis (2002) in
manufacturing firms’ information sets by contrasting industry-level time series on produc-
tion with survey-based balance indices. Analyzing errors in inflation forecasts of firms in
the semiannual Livingston survey, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015) find that the
importance of information frictions for firms’ inflation forecasts is comparable to what
can be found in survey data of professional forecasters, consumers, and central bankers.
Lastly, Chapter 1 documents that firms adjust their expectation formation to the avail-
ability of precise information about future demand which is consistent with the presence
of information frictions.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe
the data and present the empirical framework. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical findings.
Finally, Section 2.4 relates these findings to the literature and concludes.
2.2 Data and Empirical Framework
I use the micro data of the IFO Business Survey (IBS) that is unique in asking a large and
representative sample of German firms about current realizations and six-month-ahead
expectations of their business conditions at monthly frequency.2 Aiming for a high level
of generality, the analysis focuses on the three main surveys of the IBS covering manu-
facturing firms (IBS-IND, 2015), retailers and wholesalers (IBS-TRA, 2015), and service
2See Becker andWohlrabe (2008) for details of the survey. I use the following questions: (Q1) “Current
situation: We evaluate our current business condition as [1] good, [0] satisfactory, [-1] bad.” and (Q2)
“Expectations for the next 6 months: After elimination of purely seasonal fluctuations the development
of our business will be [1] more favorable, [0] about the same, [-1] more unfavorable.” Importantly, firms
appear to refer to the same latent variable when answering (Q1) and (Q2) despite of the potentially
misleading wording. As can be inferred from Figure 2.1 and discussed in detail in Chapter 4, it is very
unlikely that (Q2) captures the expected change in (Q1). Moreover, the manufacturing survey is at the
product level similarly to the retail/wholesale survey until January 2006. For the sake of uniformity, I
aggregate the data to the firm level. See Chapter 4 for details on the aggregation and the procedure
how industry identifiers contained in the micro data are transferred to the official German industry
classification system of 2008 (“WZ 08”) that corresponds to NACE Rev. 2.
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Figure 2.1: Time Series of Average Realized Business Conditions and Expectations
Manufacturing Retail and Wholesale Services
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Notes: Time series of mean reports on expected business conditions and current business conditions of
firms in the respective industry surveys of the IBS after purging for firm fixed effects as well as month
fixed effects.
providers (IBS-SERV, 2015). The sample is restricted to firms that responded to the sur-
vey for at least one year as well as to dates and sectors that can be matched to all volatility
measures described below. The final data set comprises of on average 1300 manufacturing
firms per month between 1992 and 2015, 520 retail and wholesale firms between 1995 and
2015, and 990 service providers between 2004 and 2015.3 Figure 2.1 displays the time
series of average realized business conditions as well as six-month-ahead expectations of
the firms in the sample after purging for month fixed effects (deseasonalization) and firm
fixed effects.
Each firm i is matched to two proxies that capture the general level of market volatility
specific to its industry s, the first based on external administrative revenue data and the
second constructed from the IBS itself. Moreover, a firm-specific market volatility measure
can be constructed for the subset of manufacturing firms. The market volatility measures
are defined as follows:
1. σRevenuesi∈s : standard deviation of monthly indices of seasonally adjusted total revenues
in each industry. The time series are obtained from the German Federal Statisti-
cal Office and allow for the computation of σRevenuesi∈s at the four-digit industry level
according to the German industry classification system of 2008. No rule without ex-
emption: for service providers, the revenue data are of much lower quality such that
σRevenuesi∈s can only be calculated based on quarterly data at the two-digit industry
level.4
3Overall, attrition is low and firms respond quite regularly: manufacturing (average duration in IBS:
13.1 years/response rate: 88%), retail and wholesale (7.3/78%), services (5.7/76%). As the empirical
approach requires data from 12 consecutive months, I linearly interpolate missing survey data if answers
are missing for at most two consecutive months. Chapter 4 shows that interpolated observations do not
differ from original reports in a systematic way.
4The following time series of seasonally adjusted revenue indices are downloaded from Destatis’
GENESIS database: manufacturing (code 42152/period 1992-2015/monthly frequency/4-digit industry
level), retail and wholesale (45211,45212,45214/1995-2015/monthly/4-digit), and services (47414/2005-
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2. σIFO Indexi∈s : standard deviation of the industry-specific analog of the “IFO Business
Situation Index”—a widely-recognized business indicator of the German economy
based on the IBS—which corresponds to the average reported realized business
conditions of all firms in the same four-digit industry after deseasonalization using
industry-specific month fixed effects. To ensure that volatility is not driven by non-
response or entry and exit of firms, the analysis is restricted to industries with at
least 20 firms at all dates.
3. σBacklogi : firm-specific market volatility based on a supplementary question in the
manufacturing survey of the IBS which asks firms once per quarter for a quantitative
assessment of their backlog of orders as measured in months of production. First,
these reports are deseasonalized using quarter fixed effects for each firm. Then,
σBacklogi is calculated for firms that reported their backlog of orders at least 12 times.
In order to test whether the information content of firms’ expectations increases with the
market volatility they generally face, I estimate the following empirical model for each
volatility measure5
Expectations+6mi,t = β1 × Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) + γ1 × Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) × σi
+ β2 × Conditionsi,(t,t−5) + γ2 × Conditionsi,(t,t−5) × σi + αi + εi,t, (2.1)
where Expectations+6i,t denotes firm i’s expectations for the next 6 months reported in
month t to the IBS. Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) summarizes ex post realized business conditions
in the six months following reporting month t. Conditionsi,(t,t−5) covers business conditions
between t − 5 and t. I construct the measures Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) and Conditionsi,(t,t−5)
as moving averages of the realized business conditions reported to the IBS. In order
to estimate the volatility effect, Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) and Conditionsi,(t,t−5) are interacted
with one of the market volatility measures σi constructed above. Lastly, I add firm fixed
effects αi to capture systematic, time-invariant expectation biases of firms documented
by Bachmann and Elstner (2015).
As model (2.1) controls for current and past conditions as well as firm fixed effects, the
coefficient β1 can be interpreted as the magnitude to which firms incorporate information
about future business conditions available at date t into their expectations that is neither
2015/quarterly/2-digit). I detrend all time series using the log-deviation from an HP-filtered trend with
smoothing parameter λ = 129, 600 (1,600) for monthly (quarterly) data as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig
(2002).
5To correct for potential correlation in the error terms, I follow Cameron et al. (2011) in twoway-
clustering standard errors at the levels of firms and dates. Moreover, the fixed effects model is estimated
with ordinary least squares because of the non-existence of standard methods for the estimation of fixed
effects models with non-binary ordinal data. Chapter 1 discusses this choice in greater detail.
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captured by current conditions or past trends, nor due to time-invariant firm-specific
effects. Consequently, the information content of expectations is estimated to β̂1+γ̂1 × σi,
where the coefficient γ1 captures the degree to which the expectations of firms in highly
volatile markets contain more information relative to firms in more stable markets. For
the sake of interpretability of the coefficients, the volatility measures are standardized
such that they take the values of zero and one for the firms at the 10th and 90th percentile
of their distribution, respectively.
2.3 Results
The results are presented in Table 2.1. Panel A reports results for manufacturing firms,
while Panels B and C cover the samples of retail and wholesale firms as well as service
companies, respectively. As documented in Columns (1) of each panel, six-month-ahead
expectations strongly reflect the corresponding variation in ex post realizations of future
business conditions after controlling for current and past conditions as well as firm fixed
effects, i.e., β̂1 > 0.6 Hence, the expectations of firms in all industry surveys of the IBS
contain a substantial degree of information about future business conditions available at
t which is in line with and discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
The estimation of model (2.1) delivers a strongly positive correlation between industry-
specific market volatility and the information content of expectations that is robust for
firms in all sector-specific surveys of the IBS, see Columns (2) and (3) of each panel.7 In
the manufacturing survey, expectations of firms at the 90th percentile of the distribution
of the respective volatility measure reflect variation in ex post realized conditions by
roughly 60% more than firms at the 10th percentile, i.e., γ̂1/β̂1 = 0.57 (0.62) using σRevenuesi∈s
(σIFO Indexi∈s ). For the subset of retail and wholesale firms, the estimated volatility effects
are of comparable size as the interaction term γ̂1 takes the values of 0.14 and 0.16 for the
measures σRevenuesi∈s and σIFO Indexi∈s , respectively.
The estimated effects are more heterogeneous for firms in the services survey. Using the
survey-based market volatility measure σIFO Indexi∈s delivers a significant and strongly posi-
6The standard deviations of Expectations+6mi,t and Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) are of comparable size. Hence,
a one standard deviation increase in Conditionsi,(t+1,t+6) is ceteris paribus associated with an appreciation
of expectations by β̂1 standard deviations.
7Potentially, the documented effects could reflect a mechanical artifact of the trichotomous nature
of the survey data if (a) the composition of survey responses differed substantially between firms in
highly volatile and less volatile markets and (b) a higher share of extremely positive or negative business
conditions resulted in a higher estimated correlation between expectations and ex post realized business
conditions. As documented in Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix, the fraction of reported non-neutral business
conditions is not robustly higher for firms in markets with high volatility compared to their counterparts
in more stable markets. It is thus very unlikely that the results are driven by the categorical nature of
the data.
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Table 2.1: Effect of Market Volatility on the Information Content of Firms’ Expectations
Dependent Variable: Expected Business Conditions in Next 6 Months
Panel A: Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.37∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σRevenuesi∈s 0.17∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σIFO Indexi∈s 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σBacklogi 0.11
∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 370283 370283 370283 370283 127365 370283 370283
Firms 2574 2574 2574 2574 492 2574 2574
R2 0.235 0.237 0.238 0.236 0.225 0.238 0.238
Control for Current & Past Realiz. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firms in Sample: 1992-2015 no no no no yes no no
Panel B: Retail & Wholesale Panel C: Services
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.30∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σRevenuesi∈s 0.14∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.026) (0.022)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σIFO Indexi∈s 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.027)
Observations 130122 130122 130122 125337 125337 125337
Firms 1642 1642 1642 2044 2044 2044
R2 0.362 0.365 0.366 0.345 0.345 0.346
Control for Current & Past Realiz. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post realized business conditions in the following six months.
Market volatility measures refer to volatility at the levels of industries (σRevenuesi∈s and σIFO Indexi∈s ) as
well as firms (σBacklogi ) and are constructed as described in the main text. All specifications control for
current and past realized business conditions interacted with the respective volatility measures in line
with the empirical model (1). Standard errors are twoway-clustered at levels of firms and dates. Level of
significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
tive volatility effect of γ̂1 = 0.14. According to this estimate, service providers in highly
volatile industries (90th percentile of σIFO Indexi∈s ) form expectations that reflect variation
in ex post realized conditions by roughly 70% more than firms in very stable industries
(10th percentile). In contrast, the volatility effect is estimated to be only slightly positive
(γ̂1 = 0.033) and statistically indistinguishable from zero when using σRevenuesi∈s as volatility
measure. As the revenue data for the service sector are only available at quarterly fre-
quency and at the more aggregated level of two-digit industries, σRevenuesi∈s might probably
fail to closely track the market volatility that is perceived by firms. Hence, the estimate
is most plausibly attenuated due to measurement error.
Moreover, the information content of expectations regarding their future business con-
ditions is also strongly correlated with the firm-specific market volatility measure σBacklogi .
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As displayed in Column (4) of Panel A, the volatility effect is estimated to γ̂1 = 0.11.
In the baseline specification, however, manufacturing firms are in the sample during dif-
ferent periods of time. Hence, σBacklogi does not allow to distinguish different degrees of
market volatility firms are generally exposed to from time-varying market volatility that
is potentially correlated across firms. To accommodate this concern, I further restrict the
sample to manufacturing firms that have been in the sample throughout the entire period
between 1992 and 2015. Interestingly, the results for the remaining 492 firms displayed in
Column (5) indicate an even stronger relationship between firm-specific market volatility
and the information content of firms’ expectations (γ̂1 = 0.14).
Taking the results based on firm-specific as well as industry-specific market volatil-
ity measures together delivers additional interesting insights. Despite the fact that both
types of measures arguably capture different dimensions of the market volatility firms
are exposed to, which manifests in a low correlation of 0.26 (0.32) between σBacklogi and
σRevenuesi∈s (σIFO Indexi∈s ), the information content of expectations increases significantly in
both measures.8 Moreover, the estimated volatility effects stay significantly positive once
each industry-level volatility measure competes in a horse-race with the firm-specific mea-
sure σBacklogi , see Columns (6) and (7) of Panel A. Arguably, all volatility measures thus
only capture the volatility in market conditions that is actually perceived by firms with
(classical) measurement error. The results should hence be interpreted as a lower bound
of the “true” volatility effect.
The results are robust to various robustness checks that are summarized in Table
2.2. First, the results do not appear to be mainly driven by the global financial crisis
starting in 2008 that depressed business conditions differently across firms and industries.
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) find evidence that information frictions decrease dur-
ing recessions because economic agents have higher incentives to become better informed
about economic conditions. If the degree to which firms were affected by the crisis on
the one hand was correlated with this increase in attentiveness and on the other hand
largely explained the heterogeneity in the market volatility measures constructed above,
the volatility effect documented in Table 2.1 could be largely associated to the financial
crisis rather than to differences in the market volatility firms generally face throughout
the entire time period. To mitigate this concern, the analysis is restricted to volatility
8On the one hand, σBacklogi might capture each firm’s market volatility more precisely than the
industry-specific measures as their market conditions might only be imperfectly correlated with over-
all conditions in their industry. On the other hand, σBacklogi is based on self-reported assessments
of firms’ backlog of orders which are likely to describe their market conditions only with error. In
contrast, the industry-level market volatility measures are usually strongly correlated with each other
(ρ(σIFO Indexi , σRevenuesi∈s ) = 0.7 for manufacturing firms and 0.96 for retail and wholesale firms) and hence
seem to incorporate roughly comparable components of firms’ market volatility. For firms in services,
this correlation is substantially lower (ρ(σIFO Indexi , σRevenuesi∈s ) = 0.47) which is most likely due to the low
quality of administrative revenue data.
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Table 2.2: Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: Expected Business Conditions in Next 6 Months
Manufacturing Retail & Wholesale Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Sample Excluding Financial Crisis 2008-2010
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.30∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σRevenuesi∈s 0.089∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ -0.028∗
(0.015) (0.027) (0.015)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σIFO Indexi∈s 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.019) (0.028) (0.022)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σBacklogi 0.11
∗∗∗
(0.014)
Observations 334246 334246 334246 111920 111920 86072 86072
R2 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.371 0.372 0.368 0.368
Panel B: Sample Restricted to 2005-2015
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σRevenuesi∈s 0.096∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.019) (0.036) (0.022)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σIFO Indexi∈s 0.13∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.036) (0.027)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σBacklogi 0.097
∗∗∗
(0.019)
Observations 120970 120970 120970 72499 72499 125337 125337
R2 0.283 0.284 0.282 0.390 0.389 0.345 0.346
Panel C: σRevenuesi∈s and σ
IFO Index
i∈s Constructed at Three-Digit Level
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.30∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.023)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σRevenuesi∈s 0.13∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σIFO Indexi∈s 0.15∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.029)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σBacklogi 0.089
∗∗∗
(0.011)
Observations 533589 533589 533589 261706 261706 135918 135918
R2 0.237 0.237 0.236 0.390 0.389 0.339 0.340
Panel D: Number of Firms per Industry and Date ≥ 10
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.32∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.022)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σRevenuesi∈s 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.014) (0.024) (0.025)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σIFO Indexi∈s 0.15∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.020) (0.027)
Conditionst+1,t+6 × σBacklogi 0.087
∗∗∗
(0.012)
Observations 527163 527163 527163 173847 173847 135404 135404
R2 0.238 0.239 0.237 0.382 0.381 0.345 0.346
Control for Current & Past Realiz. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of realized conditions in the following six months. If not stated
otherwise, σRevenuesi∈s , σIFO Indexi∈s , and σ
Backlog
i are constructed as described in the main text, i.e., (1)
based on the entire time period covered by each sector-specific survey, (2) at the four-digit industry
level (exemption: σRevenuesi∈s in services), (3) σIFO Indexi∈s is constructed for four-digit industries with at
least 20 firms at any date. All specifications control for firm fixed effects as well as current and past
realized conditions interacted with the respective volatility measures as in model (1). Standard errors
are clustered at levels of firms and dates. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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measures calculated based on data prior to January 2008 and after December 2010. More-
over, business expectations reported to the IBS during this period are excluded from the
regression. The results displayed in Panel A show that the effect of market volatility on
the information content of firms’ expectations is of comparable magnitude, albeit slightly
smaller, once the period of the financial crisis is excluded from the analysis.
Second, the estimated volatility effects for firms in the manufacturing survey as well as
in the retail/wholesale survey stay highly significant once their samples are restricted to
the shorter time period that is covered by the services survey (2005-2015). The fact that
the coefficients displayed in Panel B are slightly lower than in the baseline specification is
potentially due to the shorter time series that are used for the calculation of the market
volatility measures which hence might capture the volatility that is generally perceived
by the firms with relatively more measurement error.
Third, the results are robust to the choice of less restrictive requirements for the
calculation of the market volatility measures. Panel C summarizes the estimated volatility
effects if the industry-level volatility measures are calculated based on time series at the
more aggregated level of three-digit industries, while Panel D covers firms that are in four-
digit industries with at least 10 firms at each date. Despite the fact that the underlying
time series potentially do not track the actual market conditions of the firms as closely as
in the baseline scenario, the estimated volatility effects for both robustness specifications
are only slightly attenuated, but still of comparable size.9
2.4 Discussion
The findings have important implications as they highlight the relevance of information
frictions for the expectation formation process of firms and provide empirical support
for models that implicitly or explicitly take these frictions into account. Seen through
the lens of this class of models in the tradition of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Sims
(2003), firms in more volatile markets rationally invest more resources (or a larger part of
their limited attention) into the costly collection and processing of information about their
future business conditions resulting in increased information content of their expectations.
Although this pattern is robustly documented for all important sectors of the economy and
a wide range of different specifications, the results suggest the need for more research on
9The only notable exemption are the estimated volatility effects for retail and wholesale firms which
are still significantly positive, but drop by more than half of their respective magnitudes once σRevenuesi∈s
and σIFO Indexi∈s are calculated at the three-digit industry level. By the nature of the industry classification
system, the three-digit industry groups of retailers and wholesalers usually cover four-digit groups that
are much more heterogeneous compared to their counterparts in manufacturing or services sectors. Hence,
the market volatility measures capture the actual volatility the respective firms face with relatively more
error resulting in more strongly attenuated coefficients.
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the mechanisms behind the expectation formation process of economic agents. Using high-
frequency data on market conditions at very disaggregate levels of even higher quality,
which hopefully become available in the future, should hence highlight the importance of
information frictions for expectation formation even further.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Table 2.A.1: Composition of Reported Conditions: High vs. Low Volatility Markets
Manufacturing Retail and Wholesale Services
Volatility Measure xi σRevenuesi∈s σ
IFO Index
i∈s σ
Backlog
i σ
Revenues
i∈s σ
IFO Index
i∈s σ
Revenues
i∈s σ
IFO Index
i∈s
Frac. “Neutral” if xi ≤ Median 0.5391 0.5459 0.5322 0.4908 0.4553 0.4672 0.4486
Frac. “Neutral” if xi > Median 0.5004 0.4962 0.5071 0.5471 0.5459 0.5234 0.5283
Difference -0.0387∗∗∗ -0.0498∗∗∗ -0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0563∗∗∗ 0.0906∗∗∗ 0.0562∗∗∗ 0.0797∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0201) (0.0129) (0.016) (0.013)
Notes: Fraction of “neutral conditions” among the answers to Q2 of firms in markets with volatility
above the median compared to their counterparts with market volatility below the median according to
the volatility measure indicated above each column. Level of significance of a two-sided t-test on the
significance of the difference between both fractions: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
The Price and Employment Response
of Firms to the Introduction of
Minimum Wages
3.1 Introduction
In light of increasing wage inequality, minimum wages have become an increasingly pop-
ular tool for public policy during the last decades. However, its economic consequences
are still hotly debated. Spurred by the seminal paper of Card and Krueger (1994), who
cast doubt on the conventional wisdom that minimum wages inevitably destroyed jobs,
the literature has mainly focused on the question whether a negative effect on the overall
level of employment can be detected (e.g., Neumark and Wascher, 2000, 2008; Neumark
et al., 2014) or not (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1994, 2000; Dube et al., 2010; Allegretto
et al., 2011).1 Although being neglected in most papers on minimum wage effects, prices
have been perceived as an important margin of adjustment for firms (see, for example, the
seminal paper of Aaronson, 2001). However, previous studies mainly focused at the price
response to changes in existing minimum wages of firms in highly affected industries, such
as restaurants (e.g., Aaronson, 2001, Lemos, 2006, Aaronson et al., 2008, and Fougère
et al., 2010) and retailers (Leung, 2016 and Montialoux et al., 2017).
This chapter takes a step in this direction by examining the price and employment
response of firms in the manufacturing as well as services sector to the introduction of
statutory minimum wages in Germany in 2015. This policy intervention offers a unique
opportunity to take a broader perspective on these issues, as the new statutory minimum
wage was directly set to the average level of OECD countries, see OECD (2015). Thereby,
1See Neumark et al. (2014) and Card and Krueger (2015) for recent summaries and discussions of the
literature on employment effects of minimum wages.
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firms across a wide range of industries were affected by this policy which permits for a
more general analysis of minimum wage effects that goes beyond the restaurant and retail
sector.
Uncovering the response of firms to the introduction of minimum wages requires micro
data on employment and prices at the firm-level. As the availability of disaggregated pro-
ducer price data is limited, the price adjustment of firms to the introduction of statutory
minimum wages in Germany has not been studied in the literature, yet. I circumvent this
constraint by making use of the IFO Business Survey (IBS).2 This survey is unique in
repeatedly asking a large sample of approximately 5000 German manufacturing and ser-
vices firms about both their planned changes in employment and prices at high, monthly,
frequency. The IBS is thus ideally suited for an assessment of the minimum wage-induced
reaction of firms in different regions and sectors of the economy along two potentially
important margins of adjustment: their number of employees and their prices.
Moreover, the identification of each firm’s degree of affectedness by the minimum wage
introduction is essential for the analysis of their reaction. Following the “minimum wage
bite” approach proposed by Card (1992), I construct a firm-level treatment intensity mea-
sure based on regionally and sectorally disaggregated wage data: the fraction of full-time
employees that previously earned a gross wage below the newly introduced minimum wage
of €8.50 per hour in each firm’s industry and location. This treatment intensity measure
identifies a substantial degree of variation between firms within different industries and
regions that can be exploited empirically to assess the firm-level response to the minimum
wage.
I find striking evidence in favor of a minimum wage-induced effect on prices based
on a generalized difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Specifically, the probability
that firms planned to increase their prices during the period around the introduction in
January 2015 is strongly significantly associated with their relative degree of affectedness
by the new statutory minimum wage. Interestingly, the price reaction of affected firms is
found to be comparably strong in manufacturing and services as well as in West and East
Germany given the same degree of affectedness. Moreover, firms in the manufacturing
sector, which additionally provide information on realized price changes to the IBS, are
found to have stuck to their plans and indeed increased their prices in response to the
statutory minimum wage.
The price effect of the minimum wage introduction is considerably large. Exploiting
the fact that average reported price changes in the IBS closely track quantitative changes
2The IBS has already been used for the evaluation of industry-specific minimum wages in the con-
struction sector by Werner and Sell (2015). However, their identification of “treated” firms only relies
on the fact whether a minimum wage has been introduced in their industry or not. Hence, they neither
observe whether the minimum wage is binding for the firm, nor the intensity to which it is affected.
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in industry-level producer price indices, the minimum wage-induced effect on the overall
level of producer prices is approximated to roughly 0.2%. This effect is sizable in light
of the fact that average wages of full-time employees increased by approximately 0.6%.
Hence, price pass-through appears to have been an important margin of adjustment for
firms in response to the new minimum wage.
In contrast to the strong and sizable effect on prices, the minimum wage effect on
affected firms’ planned employment changes is estimated to be only very modestly negative
and insignificant. In light of potential measurement error in the firm-specific treatment
intensity measure, however, a negative employment reaction cannot be ruled out with
certainty. Irrespectively, the probability that firms increased their prices is much larger
compared to the probability that they planned to reduce their number of employees.
This chapter contributes to the most extensive part of the minimum wage literature
that is interested in net employment effects. Documenting that firms did not cut back
their employment plans substantially, my results point into the direction of a promi-
nent strand of papers including Card and Krueger (1994, 2000), Dube et al. (2010), and
Allegretto et al. (2011). Moreover, the chapter adds to first evidence on the German
introduction of statutory minimum wages that detected only moderately negative effects
on the total number of employees. Using data on employment relationships from the
Federal Employment Agency in a descriptive analysis, vom Berge et al. (2016) find a loss
of approximately 94,000 marginal employment relationships followed by a prolonged, but
attenuated downward trend until the third quarter of 2015.3 Comparably, Bossler and
Gerner (2016) estimate that 60,000 jobs were lost (marginally employed plus regular jobs)
based on the IAB Establishment Panel which equals to 0.18% of all German employees
and is only statistically significant for East Germany.
Interestingly, the documented employment effects of the minimum wage introduction
in Germany are much weaker than previously predicted by a series of studies. For exam-
ple, Knabe et al. (2014) predicted a job loss of up to 910,000 employees of which 251,000
were regular jobs prone to social security, while Arni et al. (2014) expected a total job
loss of 570,000. The discrepancy between ex ante simulated losses and ex post estimated
employment effects can potentially by explained by the fact that these models did not
incorporate any other adjustment mechanism besides the layoff of workers that allowed
firms to react to increased labor costs.4 In turn, my findings provide evidence for the
3Moreover, vom Berge et al. (2016) could not find negative effects for employment relationships prone
to social security in the short run. In turn, roughly 50% of the marginally employment relationships lost
were converted to “regular” jobs prone to social security. In addition, they find that the job loss was
greatest in industries and regions with the lowest average wages.
4Alternative explanations for this gap include that short-run elasticities of employment with respect
to minimum wage increases may differ from long-run elasticities as highlighted by Sorkin (2015), or that
the assumption of competitive, neoclassical labor markets in the models’ baseline specifications might
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importance of one particular margin of adjustment for affected firms that was not consid-
ered in these simulation models: firms appear to have compensated their increased labor
costs—at least partially and in the short run—by raising prices.
Providing the first credibly identified evidence for substantial price effects of the intro-
duction of statutory minimum wages in Germany, this chapter contributes to the literature
that aims to improve the general understanding of minimum wage effects and, in partic-
ular, the importance of pass-through on prices. During the last years, there has been
accumulating evidence that prices are an important margin of adjustment for firms that
face a minimum wage-induced increase in labor costs. So far, the price effect has almost
exclusively been documented for (fast food) restaurants or retailers based on disaggregated
city/region-level CPI data (Aaronson, 2001; Lemos, 2006) or store-level prices of different
products (Dube et al., 2007; Aaronson et al., 2008; Fougère et al., 2010; Allegretto and
Reich, 2016; Leung, 2016; Montialoux et al., 2017). For other sectors of the economy,
existing evidence on pass-through on prices is far less clear.5 For example, Wadsworth
(2010) does not find significant short-run effects on prices in several low-wage industries in
response to increases in the British national minimum wage based on industry-level price
data. In contrast, I use firm-level data and provide evidence that firms’ price response
does not differ substantially between the manufacturing and services sector given their
degree of affectedness by the minimum wage.
Moreover, this chapter contributes to an increasing literature that more generally high-
lights the relevance of additional channels of adjustment besides the extensive margin of
employment, such as labor market flows (Portugal and Cardoso, 2006; Brochu and Green,
2013; Dube et al., 2016; Meer and West, 2016), firm profitability (Draca et al., 2011),
tax evasion (Tonin, 2011), hygiene in fast food restaurants (Chakrabarti et al., 2017), or
substitutability of jobs by machines (Lordan and Neumark, 2017).6 For the case of the
German statutory minimum wage, there is evidence that affected firms also reacted along
various dimensions. For example, vom Berge et al. (2016) and Garloff (2016) document
that marginal employment relationships are substituted by regular jobs. Moreover, Bell-
mann et al. (2017) find that affected firms reduced employer-financed training programs,
while Gürtzgen et al. (2016) document that skill requirements for vacant and newly filled
low-wage positions increased after the introduction of the German statutory minimum
not be appropriate in the context of minimum wages as, e.g., argued by Manning (2003).
5There is one notable exemption: Harasztosi and Lindner (2015) find evidence for minimum wage-
induced increases in prices of Hungarian manufacturing firms, which are calculated based on an annual
survey covering volumes and values of production for different products. Moreover, Lemos (2008) provides
a survey of almost thirty studies on the price effect, which, however, usually rely on price data at rather
aggregated industry levels and thus cannot exploit heterogeneity in firms’ price reaction resulting from
within-industry variation in the degree to which firms are affected by minimum wages.
6See Metcalf (2008) and Schmitt (2015) for a more complete and more extensive overview of the
literature on the importance of different margins for firms’ reaction to minimum wages.
61
wage. Complementing these findings by highlighting the importance of firms’ price reac-
tion shows that an exclusive focus on employment outcomes steps short of telling the full
story of minimum wage effects.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides information
about the institutional background of the introduction of statutory minimum wages in
Germany in 2015. Section 3.3 describes the data as well as the identification of firms’
degree of affectedness by the minimum wage. Section 3.4 specifies the empirical strategy
and Section 3.5 documents the effect of the minimum wage introduction on the pricing and
employment policies of firms. Section 3.6 provides an approximation of the quantitative
size of the price effect. Finally, Section 3.7 performs diverse robustness checks and Section
3.8 concludes.
3.2 The New Statutory Minimum Wage in Germany:
Institutional Background
Accompanied by a controversial public debate, a statutory minimum wage of €8.50 came
into force in Germany on January 1, 2015. This introduction constituted a paradigm shift
in the history of German labor market policy as wages had previously been determined
almost exclusively through collective bargaining agreements between unions and employer
associations. Until then, minimum wages were only in force in a small number of indus-
tries provided that a wage floor, which was part of a collective bargaining agreement,
was declared as binding for the rest of the industry based on the “Posted Workers Act”
(“Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz ” AEntG).7
In contrast to the history of statutory minimum wages in other countries, which is
most extensively studied in the U.S., the U.K., and France, the German introduction of
2015 is unique with respect to the degree to which firms faced changes in labor costs.
According to the “OECD Employment Outlook 2015,” the German statutory minimum
wage was directly set to a level that resulted in a minimum-to-median wage ratio of 0.48.
This level is lower than in France (0.62), close to the U.K. and the average across OECD
countries (0.49), and much higher than in the U.S. (0.36), see OECD (2015). While the
level of the national minimum wage has been historically quite stable at low levels in the
U.S. and high levels in France, the British statutory minimum wage has been introduced
7Prior to 2015, industry-specific minimum wages had been in place for instance in the construction
and roofing sector, in commercial cleaning, security, and laundry services, as well as in a number of
handicraft sectors. These industry-specific minimum wages were allowed to differ between regions, e.g.,
between West and East Germany. Moreover, an industry-specific minimum wage had been introduced in
the care industry in 2010 that was not based on a collective bargaining arrangement, but implemented
following a proposal of a commission installed by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in
accordance with §12 AEntG.
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at lower levels (0.42) in 1999 and steadily increased to the current level. Hence, none
of these countries observed variation in national minimum wages during the last decades
that were comparable to the case of the introduction of statutory minimum wages in
Germany.
The new statutory minimum wage is set at a uniform level in (almost) all industries
and across all regions. The German system is hence different from the U.S., where the
national minimum wage can be trumped by higher rates set at the levels of states or
cities. Compared to other countries, the German system is most similar to the British, as
the wage floor is set at a national level and a commission decides on changes of its rate.
In Germany, this commission is composed of unions and employer associations and takes
advice from independent experts.
While the statutory minimum wage in general applies to all industries, there are
exemptions for sectors that previously agreed on industry-specific wage floors below the
level of €8.50 per hour. These sectors, including agriculture, forestry, gardening, the meat
industry, manufacturing of textiles and clothing, temporary work agencies, hair dressers,
and laundries, were conceded to delay their compliance to the statutory minimum wage
until the end of 2016.8 In order to prevent malpractice, the minimum wage law was
accompanied by strict obligatory requirements for firms to document daily working hours
of each employee with a gross monthly wage below €2,958.9
The introduction of the minimum wage was implemented in the following way: af-
ter the federal election (“Bundestagswahl ”) of September 22, 2013, the chairmen of the
conservative parties (CDU and CSU ) and the social democrats (SPD) signed a coali-
tion agreement on November 27, 2013 containing the intention to introduce a statutory
minimum wage of €8.50 on January 1, 2015. The Federal Cabinet proposed the min-
imum wage law (“Mindestlohngesetz ” MiLoG) on April 2, 2014, containing all relevant
regulations regarding its introduction and details on the exemptions. In light of the
overwhelming majority of the “Grand Coalition” in both chambers of parliament, Bun-
destag and Bundesrat finally approved the law on July 3 and July 11, 2014 without major
changes.
8Moreover, there are additional exemptions from the minimum wage for long-term unemployed during
the first six months of re-employment, employees below the age of 18 years without training qualification,
employees in vocational training, and internships compulsory for school programs, apprenticeship, or
academic studies.
9According to the National Regulatory Control Council (“Nationaler Normenkontrollrat”), the in-
troduction of the statutory minimum wage in 2015 and its first adjustment in 2017 imposed annual
compliance costs of €6.3 billion on firms (National Regulatory Control Council, 2017, p.19).
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3.3 Data and Identification of Firms’ Affectedness by
the Minimum Wage
3.3.1 Micro Data of the IFO Business Survey
The IFO Business Survey (IBS) has been conducted since 1949 in order to construct the
IFO Business Climate Index which is the most recognized lead indicator for economic
activity in Germany (see Becker and Wohlrabe (2008) for details of the survey). Each
month, firms from all sectors of the economy are, inter alia, asked for an assessment
of their expected changes in employment and prices of their products or services. The
IBS is divided into four industry surveys that cover the main sectors of the economy
(manufacturing, services, retail/wholesale, construction). In order to assess the firm-level
effects of the minimum wage introduction in the relevant sectors of the economy, I use
data of the two surveys covering (a) manufacturing firms (IBS-IND, 2015) and (b) service
companies (IBS-SERV, 2015).10 Furthermore, I exclude firms from the sample if they were
operating in industries that were allowed to pay wages below the statutory minimum wage
of €8.50 per hour during a transition phase until the end of 2016.11
Restricting the sample to the period between January 2010 and December 2015 as
well as to firms that responded at least 12 months to the survey, the dataset comprises
of approximately 5000 firms per month (on average 2550 manufacturers and 2400 service
companies).12 Attrition is very low in the restricted data set (firms are observed for almost
5 years on average) and response rates to the survey are relatively high despite of the fact
that participation is voluntary (firms answer the questionnaire in more than four out of
five months on average).
10I do not use data from the construction survey because these firms already had to adhere to an
industry-specific minimum wage of €11.15 (€10.75) per hour in West (East) Germany in January 2015.
Moreover, retailers and wholesalers are excluded—despite of the fact that especially retail firms were
strongly affected by the minimum wage—as the direct effect of minimum wages through higher labor
costs cannot be disentangled from price increases of the products they sell, which have potentially been
produced by firms affected by the minimum wage.
11Specifically, I exclude firms in the two-digit industries WZ08-13 “Manufacture of textiles,” WZ08-14
“Manufacture of wearing apparel,” WZ08-78 “Temporary employment agencies and other employment
activities,” WZ08-96 “Other personal service activities” (85% of all employees belong to WZ08-9602
“Hairdressing”) as well as the three-digit industry WZ08-101 “Processing and preserving of meat and
production of meat products.” Firms in these sectors do not constitute a valid control group as their
industry-specific minimum wages have been increased in steps during the treatment period to approach
the level of the statutory minimum wage by the end of 2016.
12The micro data do not allow to discriminate between subsidiaries of the same company in different
locations and other firms. The term “firm” used in this chapter hence refers to both types of entities.
Moreover, the manufacturing survey of the IBS is at the product level and not at the firm level. However,
only 0.4% of all observations between 2010 and 2015 refer to multiple products of the same firm at a
given point in time. Following the procedure described in Chapter 4, these observations are aggregated
to the firm level by taking means across products and rounding to the next integer.
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The anonymized micro data of the IBS allow to track firms over the entire time span in
the sample. The data contain information on firms’ main sector of business following the
standard German industry classification system of 2008 (WZ 08) which largely corresponds
to the European NACE Rev. 2 classification scheme.13 In addition, I gained access to
confidential information about the firms’ location at the level of counties. These regional
and sectoral identifiers permit to merge firms to wage statistics at the level of industries
and counties as described in Section 3.3.2.
The analysis of firms’ responses to the minimum wage mainly focuses on the following
questions regarding expected changes in prices and employment contained in the IBS:14
Q1 “Expectations for the next 3 months: The prices of our goods/services will [1] increase,
[0] stay the same, or [-1] decrease.”
Q2 “Expectations for the next 3 months: The number of employees will [1] increase, [0]
stay the same, or [-1] decrease.”
Clearly, realized changes in prices and employment would be preferable relative to the
expected changes stated in Q1 and Q2. While realized changes in prices and employment
are not covered in both industry surveys of interest, firms in the manufacturing survey are
asked to additionally state whether the prices of their products [1] increased, [0] stayed
the same, or [-1] decreased during the previous month. As the majority of affected firms
operate in the services sector, the baseline analysis is restricted to minimum wage effects
on the pricing plans of firms in both industry surveys. In turn, the price realizations are
used in Section 3.5.3 to demonstrate that—within the subset of manufacturing firms—
the effect of the minimum wage introduction on firms’ pricing plans is accompanied by a
comparably strong effect on realized price changes.
Moreover, the data is categorical and effects estimated based on these variables hence
cannot be interpreted quantitatively without further assumptions. However, there is no
dataset available that contains quantitative producer price data at the level of firms in
different industries. For example, the micro data underlying the German producer price
13Firms in the services survey have been coded with respect to the older “WZ2003” classification scheme
until March 2011. The assignment of these firms to identifiers according to the “WZ2008” classification
scheme is described in Chapter 4.
14The wording of the questions slightly differs between the manufacturing survey and the services
survey but is largely comparable. The translated questions in the respective surveys are listed in Ap-
pendix 3.A. Moreover, I use firms’ assessment of their current backlog of orders to control for the demand
they face which is also measured at a trichotomous scale (“[1] comparatively large, [0] sufficient (typical
for the season), or [-1] too small”). I further examine the effect of the minimum wage introduction on
firms’ reported current business conditions being either “[1] good, [0] satisfactory, or [-1] bad” as well as
their expectations regarding their business conditions in the next six months as part of the analysis in
Section 3.5.
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index hosted by the Federal Statistical Office are not available for research purposes. In
contrast, the micro data of the consumer price index are available at the “Research Data
Centers” of the Federal Statistical Office but the prices of goods and services cannot be
linked to the location of the producing firm or service provider, which is essential for the
identification of the degree to which firms are affected by the minimum wage. Hence, the
micro data of the IBS appear to be the best source of price data in order to study the
pass-through of minimum wages on prices at the firm-level in Germany.
In contrast to the outstanding nature of the price data, the IBS data on expected em-
ployment changes are inferior to employment data from other sources. For example, there
are quantitative micro data on firm-level employment available in the “IAB Establishment
Panel” hosted by the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg, which are used
in other studies on the effect of the introduction of the minimum wage in Germany, e.g.,
Bossler (2017) and Bossler and Gerner (2016). However, this dataset does not contain
data on prices and cannot be matched to the micro data of the IBS. Still, the employment
data in the IBS are useful enough to verify the finding of Bossler (2017) and Bossler and
Gerner (2016) that the effect of the statutory minimum wage on the employment level
was very weak and only slightly negative.15
Importantly, the qualitative expected price and employment changes as reported to
the IBS on average closely track actually realized price and employment changes observed
in administrative data. For the case of manufacturing firms, Figure 3.1 plots the time
series of average answers to Q1 and Q2 against the annualized percentage change in
producer prices and the number of employees relative to the level three months before,
respectively.16 As the time series are strongly correlated, the survey questions appear to
be useful indicators of firms’ pricing and employment policies. This close relationship is
exploited in Section 3.6 to approximate the quantitative size of the price effect documented
in Section 3.5.
15It is important to note that the survey question on expected employment changes (Q2) is asked
in a rather vague way and only refers to the “number of employees.” Hence, Q2 does not allow to
discriminate between different types of employment relationships, which is potentially an important
margin of adjustment for firms affected by the minimum wage as shown by other studies on the German
minimum wage, such as vom Berge et al. (2016) and Garloff (2016).
16The German Federal Statistical Office provides time series of producer price indices (PPIs,t) and the
number of employees (Empls,t) at the level of two-digit industries s which are downloaded from Destatis’
GENESIS database (prices: code “61241-0002;” employment: code “42111-0004”). Aggregated time series
on producer prices of service companies are not available for most sub-industries of the services sector.
As described in Section 3.6, the time series of industry-level indices are weighted by the average share of
manufacturing firms in the respective sectors of the IBS in order to get an aggregate time series that is
representative for the firms in the survey. The employment time series is purged by month fixed effects for
seasonal adjustment. During the time period of the baseline sample (January 2010 until December 2015),
the time-series correlation between realized price (employment) changes and average price (employment)
expectations in the IBS is highest at the first (second) lag of price (employment) expectations with
ρ = 0.87 (ρ = 0.90).
66
Figure 3.1: Average Employment and Price Expectations Compared to Quantitative Data
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Notes: The left (right) figure plots time series of the realized change in producer prices (in the number
of employees) in the manufacturing sector relative to three months before (solid line; left axis) against
time series of mean reported price expectations (employment expectations) of firms in the manufacturing
survey of the IBS (dashed line; right axis). The German Federal Statistical Office provides time series of
producer price indices and the number of employees at the two-digit industry level. For aggregation, the
time series are weighted by the average share of manufacturing firms in the respective sectors of the IBS.
The employment time series is purged using month fixed effects for seasonal adjustment.
3.3.2 Identification of Firms’ Affectedness by the MinimumWage
In order to evaluate the reaction of firms to the introduction of the statutory minimum
wage, the degree to which each firm is affected by this policy intervention needs to be
identified. Unfortunately, the IBS does not include any information about wages or labor
costs at the firm level. I circumvent this constraint by following the minimum wage “bite”
approach of Card (1992), a standard method for the identification of heterogeneity in
treatment intensity with respect to minimum wages. Utilizing data on the wage distri-
bution at disaggregated levels of industries and regions, I construct a treatment intensity
measure specific for each firm: the fraction of full-time employees that earned a gross
wage below the newly introduced minimum wage of €8.50 per hour in the firms’ industry
and location prior to its introduction.17
The underlying idea of the treatment intensity measure is that firms in industry-
region cells with a higher fraction of full-time employees that earned less than €8.50 in
2013 are plausibly more strongly affected by the minimum wage than their counterparts
in cells with a smaller fraction of affected full-time employees, ceteris paribus. Due to data
limitations described below, the treatment intensity measure is not based on wage data
of part-time employees and marginally employed workers despite of the fact that these
17Closest to my specification, Garloff (2016) uses administrative wage data of full-time employees at
the level of labor market regions, age-cohorts and gender in order to analyze the relationship between
(un-)employment growth and the “bite” of the German statutory minimum wage at the regional level.
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groups were more strongly affected by the minimum wage as for example documented by
Brenke (2014) and Falck et al. (2013).18 However, the relative wage levels of part-time
and full-time employees are plausibly strongly correlated across firms in different sectors
and regions. In turn, the treatment intensity measure should be strongly correlated
with the relative increase in labor costs faced by affected firms that wanted to leave the
composition and size of their workforce unchanged.19 In order to identify the ex ante
“bite” of the minimum wage introduction, I use data on wages in 2013 instead of 2014, as
affected firms might have adjusted their wages towards the new minimum wage of €8.50
already in the period prior to its introduction in January 2015.
Importantly, the treatment intensity measure only captures the direct effect on firms’
labor costs. In turn, it abstracts from other effects such as spillovers through potentially
more expensive inputs or additional costs for firms to comply with the administrative
requirements of the minimum wage law. Another indirect effect of the minimum wage
introduction which is beyond the scope of this chapter is its effect on labor supply.
The treatment intensity measure is calculated based on data of gross monthly wages
paid in each two-digit industry at the level of counties (NUTS-3-regions) as well as labor
market regions in 2013.20 The Federal Employment Agency provides this data along with
information on wages at the following percentiles: p ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80} (Federal
Employment Agency, 2016). The data is collected via the reporting procedure of the
social security system (“Meldeverfahren zur Sozialversicherung”) in order to determine
unemployment benefits and social security contributions. Every firm is required by law
to report the gross wage that each of its employees earned in a given year. In addition,
firms need to provide information about the duration of the employment relationship
and whether the employee worked full-time or part-time.21 As the reports do not con-
tain detailed information on hours worked, the analysis needs to be restricted to gross
monthly wages for full-time workers. Moreover, distributional parameters of wages are
only available for sector-region combinations with at least 1000 full-time employees due
18Relatedly, Müller and Steiner (2013) show that the relative ordering in the “bite” of the minimum
wage introduction between different skill groups, gender, and the employment types of full-time, part-
time, and marginally employed workers is largely unaffected by the choice of hypothetical levels of the
wage floor using SOEP data.
19In order to capture firms in industry-region cells that paid full-time employees more than €8.50
per hour but arguably needed to increase the wages of part-time employees and marginally employed
workers, I also construct the treatment intensity measure based on thresholds above €8.50. The results
are presented in Section 3.7.
20There are 96 labor market regions (“Raumordnungsregionen”) in Germany that typically describe
commuting zones. On average, they consist of approximately 4 out of a total number of 402 counties
(295 “Landkreise” and 107 “kreisfreie Städte”).
21The reporting procedure only refers to employees prone to social security and does hence not include
wages of marginally employed workers (“Mini-Jobs”) as well as self-employed. Unfortunately, data on
wages in these groups are not available at disaggregated levels of industries and regions.
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to data protection issues. Despite of this restriction, wage data at the levels of two-digit
industries and counties cover 72.1% of all full-time employed workers in Germany. At the
level of labor market regions, 93.0% of full-time employed workers can be assigned to the
wage distribution in their two-digit industry. In the baseline specification, I therefore use
the industry-specific wage distribution at the county-level and replace missing values by
wage data at the level of labor market regions. In addition, robustness checks solely using
wage data at the levels of labor market regions or counties are presented in Section 3.7.
Next, monthly wages are converted to hourly wages by means of the number of paid
working hours per month collected by the Quarterly Earnings Survey (“Vierteljährliche
Verdiensterhebung”). This survey, which is conducted by the statistical offices of the
federal states, covers 40,500 German firms (7.4% of all firms) and is representative at
the level of two-digit industries in both East and West Germany.22 After calculating the
average amount of monthly working hours in 2013 for each industry in West and East
Germany, the monthly wages at each percentile are transformed to an hourly basis for
each sector-region cell, i.e., to ws,r(p) which denotes the pth percentile of hourly wages in
sector s and region r (counties or labor market regions).
Then, the fraction of full-time employees that earned a gross hourly wage of less than
€8.50 is calculated for each sector-region combination. Figure 3.2 provides an illustration
of the procedure that is based on two assumptions about the shape of the wage distribu-
tion: first, the wage level of employees between any two percentiles for which wage data are
available is approximated by linear interpolation. Second, the wage level at the minimum
of the wage distribution ws,r(0) is assumed to be related to the wage at the 10th percentile
similarly as ws,r(10) is related to ws,r(20), i.e., ws,r(0)/ws,r(10) = ws,r(10)/ws,r(20). Ac-
cordingly, the wage level at the maximum of the wage distribution is assumed to be
ws,r(100)/ws,r(80) = ws,r(80)/ws,r(60).23 Given these assumptions, the fraction of full-
time employees that earned less than €8.50 per hour in 2013 in each sector-region cell—
22The quality of the data on working hours is perceived to be very high as re-
sponse to the survey is compulsory. The data is available online through the GENE-
SIS database of the Federal Statistical Office (code 62321) and described in more de-
tail here: https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/Earn-
ingsLabourCosts/Methods/QuarterlyEarningsSurvey.html.
23It is important to note that the relative ordering of sector-region combinations with respect to their
fraction of full-time employed that earned less than €8.50 does not hinge on the choice of ws,r(0) and
ws,r(100). I also computed TIi assuming that ws,r(0) = 0.9 ∗ ws,r(10) or ws,r(0) = 0.7 ∗ ws,r(10) and
the relative ordering of sector-region cells did not change substantially. Moreover, robustness checks
presented in Section 3.7 show that the main effects of this study do not hinge on the assumptions about
ws,r(0).
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the Identification of Firms’ Affectedness by the Minimum Wage
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Notes: This diagram illustrates the identification of firms’ affectedness by the minimum wage indicated by
the red line (“Treatment Intensity”) for the example of firms in industry “55 Accommodation/Lodging” in
county “09180 Garmisch-Partenkirchen.” The black rhombi refer to the deciles of the wage distribution
of full-time employees in 2013 after conversion to hourly wages. The wage levels between the deciles
given in the data are linearly interpolated, while the values for the minimum and maximum of the wage
distribution are calculated as described in the main text.
henceforth denoted as TIs,r—can be derived from the intercept theorem:
TIs,r =

0 if w̄min ≤ ws,r(0)
p+ 0.1 ∗ w̄min−ws,r(p)ws,r(p+10)−ws,r(p) if ws,r(p) < w̄min ≤ ws,r(p+ 10) ∧ p ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}
p+ 0.2 ∗ w̄min−ws,r(p)ws,r(p+20)−ws,r(p) if ws,r(p) < w̄min ≤ ws,r(p+ 20) ∧ p ∈ {60, 80}
1 if ws,r(100) ≤ w̄min
(3.1)
where w̄min denotes the level of the new statutory minimum wage of €8.50 per hour.
Weighting the treatment intensity measure TIs,r by the number of full-time employees
in each sector-region cell yields that 4.0% of all full-time employees in West Germany and
15.6% in East Germany earned less than €8.50 per hour prior to the introduction of the
statutory minimum wage.24 These numbers are remarkably close to Falck et al. (2013),
24Within the manufacturing and services industries relevant for this study, i.e., industries that were
not conceded to delay their compliance to the federal level of €8.50 per hour until the end of 2016,
these numbers are still 2.4% and 12.1% of full-time employees in West and East Germany, respectively.
Throughout the chapter, the term “East Germany” refers to the federal states of Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, and Thuringia, while “West Germany” covers the area
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Table 3.1: Variation in Treatment Intensity
Total Manufacturing Services West Germany East Germany
# Firms % # Firms % # Firms % # Firms % # Firms %
Firms 3825 . 2039 . 1786 . 3292 . 533 .
TI = 0 2733 71.5 1668 81.8 1065 59.6 2588 78.6 145 27.2
TI ∈ (0, 0.1) 545 14.2 212 10.4 333 18.6 382 11.6 163 30.6
TI ∈ (0.1, 0.2) 339 8.9 121 5.9 218 12.2 211 6.4 128 24.0
TI ∈ (0.2, 0.3) 85 2.2 11 0.5 74 4.1 53 1.6 32 6.0
TI ∈ (0.3, 0.5) 96 2.5 18 0.9 78 4.4 53 1.6 43 8.1
TI ∈ (0.5, 1) 27 0.7 9 0.4 18 1.0 5 0.2 22 4.1
Notes: Distribution of firms (in January 2015) across different groups of treatment intensity as captured
by the percentage of full-time employees in their two-digit industry and region that earned less than
e8.50 per hour in 2013.
who find that 4.2% and 15.5% of all full-time employees earned less than €8.50 per hour
in 2013 in West and East Germany, respectively, based on individual-level wage data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Finally, each firm i in the IBS is matched to the respective level of treatment inten-
sity of its sector-region cell TIi∈SR (henceforth denoted as TIi). Overall, 84.5% of all
manufacturing firms and service companies in the IBS can be matched to a measure that
proxies the degree of affectedness by the minimum wage introduction. Moreover, the
frequency of matches is relatively homogeneous across sectors (86.1% of manufacturing
firms vs. 82.7% of service companies) as well as between West Germany (85.3%) and East
Germany (80.0%).
The treatment intensity measure captures a substantial degree of variation in the
degree to which firms were affected by the minimum wage. As summarized in Table 3.1,
approximately three out of ten firms in the sample had to increase wages of full-time
employees by at least some degree due to the minimum wage if they wanted to leave
the number and composition of their workforce unchanged. In turn, approximately seven
out of ten firms are perceived as unaffected in the baseline specification of TIi. Among
firms with TIi > 0, roughly half of the affected firms had to increase wages of more than
10% of their full-time employees due to the minimum wage, ceteris paribus. Moreover, a
group of approximately 210 (120) firms had been very strongly affected as they operated
in sector-region cells in which more than 20% (30%) of full-time employees were affected
by the minimum wage.
Moreover, there is a sufficient degree of variation in TIi that allows for separate analy-
ses of the response of manufacturing firms relative to service companies as well as firms in
of the Federal Republic of Germany prior to the reunification in 1990 plus Berlin, which is organized as
a single county.
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West Germany relative to their counterparts in the East. In general, service providers—
of which approximately 40% are perceived as being affected—have been affected more
strongly by the minimum wage than manufacturing firms (roughly 20%).25 In addition,
one out of five firms in West Germany was affected according to TIi, while almost three
out of four East German firms were affected to at least some degree. Conditional on being
affected (TIi > 0), however, the variation in TIi is roughly comparable between firms in
the different subsets as the mean treatment intensity among affected firms is 0.113 and
0.150 in the subset of manufacturing firms and service companies as well as 0.123 and
0.165 for firms East and West Germany, respectively.
The plausibility of the firm-specific treatment intensity measure is confirmed by mak-
ing use of firms’ responses to a series of special questions in the IBS regarding their
assessment of the upcoming introduction of the statutory minimum wage that has been
conducted in November 2014. In these supplementary questions, firms were asked whether
their company is affected by the new regulation and how they planned to react in case of
being affected, e.g., whether they planned to reduce their workforce or working hours, to
cut bonus payments or investment volumes, or to increase prices.26
As sketched in Table 3.2 and documented in further detail in Appendix 3.B, the prob-
ability that firms stated to be affected by the minimum wage increases substantially in
TIi. While only 17% of firms stated to be affected if they operated in sector-region com-
binations in which no full-time employee earned less than €8.50 in 2013, this probability
increases to 81% for firms in sector-region cells with more than 30% of full-time employees
being treated. At the same time, firms that were affected to a larger degree as captured by
TIi appear to be hit differently by the minimum wage: once stating to be affected, they
are substantially more likely to take action through decreases in employment, increases
in prices, reductions in investment, or cuts in special payments. In contrast, the majority
of firms that reported to be affected by the minimum wage despite of TIi = 0 did not
plan to react to the minimum wage introduction. Arguably, these firms were only affected
indirectly by the minimum wage or perceived themselves as being affected because of the
25Furthermore, there is also substantial variation in firms’ proxied treatment intensity within the
different two-digit industries of the manufacturing and services sector, see Table 3.D.1 in Appendix 3.D.
26The question about firms’ affectedness neither provides any information about the intensity to which
firms are affected, nor contains any information about the channels through which firms are affected, as
can be inferred from the English translation of the supplementary questions in Appendix 3.B. Moreover,
the questions regarding firms’ planned reaction to the introduction of the minimum wage are restricted
to affected firms and one direction. For example, affected firms could only state whether they planned
to reduce their number of employees or not. If firms were operating in monopsonistic labor markets,
however, they should be expected to increase their labor demand in response to a binding minimum
wage at sufficiently low levels as argued by Manning (2003). Hence, the supplementary questions on the
minimum wage introduction themselves do neither permit an identification of firms’ kind and degree of
affectedness, nor allow for causal inference on the firm-level response of the minimum wage introduction
due to missing counterfactuals as well as one-sided questions.
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Table 3.2: Plausibility Check of the Treatment Intensity Measure
Treatment Intensity (TI)
Treatment Intensity TI ∈ [0%] (0%,20%] (20%,30%] (30%,100%)
prob(“Affected” = 1) 0.171 0.374 0.597 0.811
prob(“Plan to Adjust Business” = 1|“Affected” = 1) 0.455 0.525 0.739 0.833
prob(“Do Not Plan to React” = 1|“Affected” = 1) 0.545 0.475 0.261 0.167
Notes. “Treatment Intensity” refers to the fraction of full-time employees that earned an hourly gross
wage of less than €8.50 in 2013 in each firm’s two-digit industry and region. prob(“Affected” = 1)
displays the probability that a firm responded to be “affected” by the minimum wage in the special
questions of the IBS in November 2014 depending on its proxied treatment intensity as indicated at the
top of each column. prob(“Plan to Adjust Business” = 1|“Affected” = 1) captures the probability that
“affected” firms stated to plan to react in at least one of the following ways: reduction in staff, reduction
in working hours, price increases, decreased investment volume, cuts in bonus payments, or other action.
prob(“Do Not Plan to Adjust Business” = 1|“Affected” = 1) is defined accordingly.
obligatory and time-consuming documentation requirements. Overall, this evidence con-
firms that TIi plausibly captures the degree to which firms are directly affected by the
introduction of the minimum wage through the channel of increased labor costs.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The goal of the empirical strategy is to evaluate whether firms that were more strongly
affected by the introduction of the statutory minimum wage in Germany were more likely
to increase prices or to change their number of employees. For this purpose, I use a gen-
eralized difference-in-differences (DiD) framework to estimate how strongly the intensity
to which firms are affected by the minimum wage introduction (TIi) is associated with
firms’ pricing and employment plans, denoted β. Before examining the dynamic response
of firms, I start with the estimation of the average effect of the minimum wage on firms’
price and employment expectations during the year around its introduction in January
2015, relative to “normal” times outside this window.
The estimation of β is based on the following empirical model
Y +3mi,t = β × TIi × 1(t ∈ (2014m7, 2015m6))
+ γ × Demandi,t + αi + δt × 1(Sectori) + δt × 1(Statei) + εi,t, (3.2)
where the dependent variable Y +3mi,t denotes either firm i’s expected change in the price
of its products (or provision of its services) in the next three months (“Price Exp.+3mi,t ”)
or firm i’s expected change in employment (“Empl. Exp.+3mi,t ”) as reported to the IBS
questions Q1 and Q2 in month t. As described in Section 3.3.1, both variables take values
on a trichotomous scale ([1] “increase”, [0] “stay the same”, [-1] “decrease”).
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To estimate the minimum wage effect, I interact the firm-specific treatment intensity
measure TI i with a dummy variable for the treatment period between six months before
and after the introduction of the minimum wage in January 2015. This standard method
for the identification of the treatment effect of an intervention in a DiD design delivers
an estimate of β, relative to the dates outside the treatment period and after controlling
for all other covariates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
The set of control variables in the baseline specification of model (3.2) includes current
demand of each firm (Demandi,t) as reported to the IBS, firm fixed effects αi, and date
fixed effects δt at the levels of two-digit industries as well as federal states. Firm-specific
demand controls for the fact that price or employment changes are potentially demand-
driven. As documented in Section 3.5, Demandi,t itself is not affected significantly by the
introduction of statutory minimum wages. In addition, firm fixed effects capture time-
invariant firm-specificities such as persistent optimism or pessimism of firms that has been
found to be important for the understanding of expectations in the IBS by Bachmann and
Elstner (2015). Furthermore, date fixed effects at the levels of two-digit industries as well
as federal states flexibly control for industry-specific and state-specific fluctuations that
similarly influence the pricing and employment policies of all firms in each industry or
region irrespective of TIi. Notably, the date fixed effects also eliminate the entire variation
in firms’ price and employment plans due to aggregate fluctuations or other policies at
the national level.
After evaluating the average effect of the minimum wage on firms’ price and employ-
ment policies by means of model (3.2), I estimate the dynamic response of firms along
these margins over time. Specifically, the price and employment effects induced by the
minimum wage, denoted βt, are estimated for each month relative to September 2013,
the month of the federal election. For this purpose, the DiD framework of model (3.2) is
augmented in a standard way given by
Y +3mi,t =
∑
t:t6=2013m9
βt × TIi × 1(Datet)
+ γ × Demandi,t + αi + δt × 1(Sectori) + δt × 1(Statei) + εi,t, (3.3)
where the treatment intensity measure TIi is interacted with date dummies (1(Datet)).
The empirical model (3.3) delivers estimates of βt both for the dates before and after
September 2013. Consequently, the sequence of estimates after September 2013 should
capture the effects of the statutory minimum wage on price and employment plans of
firms. In contrast, estimates for the dates prior to the federal election in 2013 should be
equal to zero because the introduction of the statutory minimum wage was not expected
at that time.
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Despite of the discrete and ordinal nature of the data, both empirical models (3.2)
and (3.3) are estimated using ordinary least squares. This choice is due to the fact
that standard methods for the estimation of generalized DiD models with fixed effects
and non-binary ordinal data are not established in the literature, yet. However, Riedl
and Geishecker (2014) find that linear panel data models generally perform quite well in
comparable settings with large cross-sections and long time series. In addition, standard
errors are multi-way clustered at the levels of counties, two-digit industries and dates.27
3.5 Minimum Wage Effects at the Firm Level
This section presents the main findings of the study. The empirical analysis in Section
3.5.1 shows that the introduction of the statutory minimum wage went along with sub-
stantial increases in the probability that affected firms planned to increase their prices
which is accompanied by at most very weak adjustments of their employment policies. In-
terestingly, the minimum wage effect on pricing and employment plans are homogeneous
across firms in the manufacturing and services sectors as well as between firms in West and
East Germany, as documented in Section 3.5.2. Importantly, estimating the price effect
based on realized price changes of firms in the subsample of manufacturing firms delivers
results that are comparable to the baseline specification that uses price expectations, as
demonstrated in Section 3.5.3.
3.5.1 Firms’ Adjustment of Price and Employment Plans
The estimation of the baseline model (3.2) reveals a strongly positive relationship between
the degree to which firms were affected by the minimum wage introduction and their
probability to plan price increases during the next three months. The results for the
baseline specification are displayed in Column (1) of Table 3.3. The average treatment
effect on planned price changes reported between July 2014 and June 2015 is estimated
to β̂ = 0.4. This price effect is not only statistically significant at the 1%-level, but also
economically substantial and quantitatively large, as will be shown in the quantification
exercise conducted in Section 3.6.
27As highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2004), serially correlated error terms might cause severe incon-
sistencies in the estimated coefficients even after controlling for fixed effects. In my setting, the OLS
standard errors are subject to different sources of possible bias which are taken into account via multi-
way clustering as proposed by Dube et al. (2010) and Cameron et al. (2011). First, the treatment intensity
measure (TIi) varies between two-digit industries and counties only. Hence, error terms are clustered at
the level of two-digit industries and counties. Moreover, there might be a concern that common shocks
lead to a downward bias in standard errors which is controlled for by additionally clustering along the
time dimension.
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Table 3.3: Minimum Wage Effects at the Firm-Level: Baseline Results
Planned Price Change Next 3 Months Planned Empl. Change Next 3 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6}) 0.40∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ -0.0100 -0.019 -0.062 0.00082
(0.10) (0.11) (0.074) (0.11) (0.070) (0.079) (0.051) (0.082)
R2 0.331 0.321 0.328 0.347 0.350 0.311 0.348 0.365
Control for Demandi,t yes no yes yes yes no yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes no no yes yes no no
Time*Region FE no no no yes no no no yes
Observations 280541 287020 280541 280447 280500 287035 280500 280407
Notes: The dependent variables are planned price or employment changes during the next 3 months
as reported to the IBS. “TI” is the proxy of each firm’s degree of affectedness by the minimum wage
introduction and “1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})” is a dummy that is one during the treatment period.
“Demandi,t” is firms’ current backlog of orders as reported in the IBS. “Time*Sector FE,” “Time*State
FE,” and “Time*Region FE” are time fixed effects at the levels of two-digit industries, federal states, and
labor market regions, respectively. Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector, county, and date
levels. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The estimated minimum wage effect on firms’ price expectations of β̂ = 0.4 can be
interpreted as follows: Suppose a firm is located in a sector-region cell in which 25% of
all full-time employees earned an hourly wage of less than €8.50 in 2013, i.e., TIi = 0.25.
Relative to the time period before and after the twelve-month window around January
2015, this firm reported planned price changes—scaled as “[1] increase,” “[0] stay the
same,” “[-1] decrease”—that were ceteris paribus increased by 0.1 on average (β̂ × TIi =
0.4 × 0.25 = 0.1). Within the 1-year window around January 2015, the average number
of months in which affected firms reported planned price changes of a one-step higher
category—i.e., increased instead of constant or constant instead of decreased prices—
compared to the counterfactual scenario in absence of the minimum wage is given by
β̂ × TIi × 12 months. Hence, firms with TIi = 0.25 reported planned price changes of a
one-step higher category in on average 1.2 months compared to the planned price changes
they would have reported if the minimum wage was not affecting them.
The estimated effects of the introduction of minimum wages on firms’ pricing plans
are constant for different specifications of the baseline empirical model (3.2): neither
dropping the control for firm-specific demand in Column (2), nor controlling for time-
specific fluctuations at the more aggregate federal level in Column (3) as well as at the
more disaggregate level of labor market regions in Column (4) substantially affects the
results.
In contrast, the relationship between the intensity to which firms were affected by the
minimum wage introduction and their probability to report planned employment changes
is not found to differ relative to other time periods. As documented in Column (5) of Table
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Table 3.4: Minimum Wage Effects at the Firm-Level: Increases vs. Decreases
Price Exp.+3mt Employment Exp.
+3m
t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline = 1 6= −1 Baseline = 1 6= −1
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6}) 0.40∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ -0.0100 -0.051 0.041
(0.10) (0.085) (0.036) (0.070) (0.032) (0.048)
Demandi,t yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.331 0.303 0.334 0.350 0.334 0.285
Observations 280541 280541 280541 280500 280500 280500
Notes: The dependent variables are planned price or employment changes during the next 3 months as
reported to the IBS. In Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) the respective dependent variable is binarized as
indicated above each column. “TI” is the proxy of the firm’s degree of affectedness by the minimum
wage introduction and “1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})” is a dummy that is one during the treatment period.
“Demandi,t” is firms’ current backlog of orders as reported in the IBS. “Time*Sector FE,” “Time*State
FE,” and “Time*Region FE” are time fixed effects at the levels of two-digit industries, federal states, and
labor market regions, respectively. Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector, county, and date
levels. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.3, the average treatment effect on planned employment changes reported between July
2014 and June 2015 is only slightly negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Again, the results are robust to the different specifications summarized in Columns (6)
through (8). Notably, the estimated effect on planned employment changes is more nega-
tive in the specification that does not control for variation at regional levels, see Column
(7). However, the estimated effect of β̂ = −0.062 is still insignificant (p-value=0.21).
The minimum wage-induced effect on pricing plans mostly stems from additional price
increases. Table 3.4 summarizes the results of estimating model (3.2) separately for bi-
narized dependent variables that either capture planned increases in prices, i.e., using a
dummy 1(Price Exp.+3mt = 1), or refer to planned changes that are non-negative, i.e.,
1(Price Exp.+3mt 6= −1). As displayed in Columns (2) and (3), three quarters of the price
effect can be attributed to additional reports of planned price increases, while one quarter
of the effect is due to the fact that firms planned to decrease their prices less frequently
compared to the counterfactual scenario without the minimum wage. In turn, affected
firms appear to have reported to plan to increase as well as decrease their number of
employees less frequently in response to the minimum wage introduction. As documented
in Columns (5) and (6), both effects are not statistically different from zero, however, and
almost perfectly cancel each other out.
Furthermore, the minimum wage introduction does not appear to have had a strong
effect on firms’ realized and expected revenues as well as current demand. Table 3.5
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Table 3.5: Minimum Wage Effects at the Firm-Level: Other Dependent Variables
Conditionst Expectations+6mt Demandt
TI × 1(t ∈ {t, t}) 0.0043 -0.099 -0.059
(0.10) (0.12) (0.068)
Begin Treatment Period (t) 2014m10 2014m7 2014m10
End Treatment Period (t) 2015m9 2015m6 2015m9
Control for Demandi,t yes yes no
Firm FE yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes yes
R2 0.632 0.359 0.454
Observations 281823 280482 282178
Notes: The dependent variables are current business conditions, expected business conditions for the next
six months, as well as current backlog of orders as reported to the IBS. “TI” is the proxy of each firm’s
degree of affectedness by the minimum wage introduction and “1(t ∈ {t, t})” is a dummy that is one
during the treatment period between t and t. “Time*Sector FE”, “Time*State FE”, and “Time*Region
FE” are time fixed effects at the levels of two-digit industries, federal states, and labor market regions,
respectively. Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector, county, and date levels. Level of
significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
summarizes the results of the estimation of model (3.2) using additional variables from
the IBS as dependent variable. On the one hand, TIi is not associated with differences
in firms’ current business conditions (Conditionsi,t) during the period around the intro-
duction of the minimum wage, which are very closely related to the level of revenues as
demonstrated in Chapter 4. On the other hand, firms reported slightly more negative ex-
pected business conditions for the next six months (Expectations+6mi,t ) as well as current
backlog of orders (Demandi,t) if they were more heavily affected by the minimum wage.
However, these effects are not statistically significant irrespective of using the baseline
specification presented in Table 3.5 or alternative specifications displayed in Table 3.D.3
in Appendix 3.D.
Dynamic Response of Price and Employment Plans
Next, I estimate the dynamic response of firms’ price and employment plans over time
by means of model (3.3). The estimated sequences of treatment effects βt relative to the
baseline period in September 2013 are plotted in Figure 3.3 along with the 95%-confidence
intervals.
The positive effect on planned price changes is clearly concentrated in the time period
around the introduction of the minimum wage in January 2015, as can be inferred from the
left-hand graph of Figure 3.3. Overall, the price expectations of firms are not correlated
with the treatment intensity measure prior to the federal election in September 2013.28
28Comparably, placebo tests based on the empirical model (3.2) do not deliver any statistically signif-
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Figure 3.3: Dynamic Response of Minimum Wage Effects at the Firm-Level
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Notes: The figure plots the coefficients of the dynamic treatment effect of the minimum wage introduc-
tion in January 2015 as estimated in model (3.3). The dependent variables are firms’ planned price or
employment changes during the next 3 months as reported to the IBS. The effects are estimated relative
to September 2013, the month of the federal election. The vertical lines in April 2014 and January 2015
indicate the months of the decision of the federal cabinet containing the relevant details of the minimum
wage law and the month of its introduction, respectively. The shaded areas indicate the treatment pe-
riod used in model (3.2). The thin lines display the 95%-confidence intervals based on standard errors
clustered at the sector, county, and date levels.
Hence, affected firms did not follow a different pre-trend in their pricing plans relative to
their unaffected counterparts and after controlling for firm-specific demand as well as firm
fixed effects and industry-specific as well as state-specific trends. Moreover, the coalition
agreement of November 2013 stating the introduction of the statutory minimum wage by
January 2015 does not seem to have had an immediate effect on price expectations of
affected firms. Instead, the treatment effect on firms’ pricing plans has been appreciating
over the course of 2014 as more details about the minimum wage law, which was proposed
by the federal cabinet in April 2014 and finally approved in July 2014, became available
and the introduction date approached. Unsurprisingly, the treatment effect on pricing
plans has been strongest between the last quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015.
Finally, the pass-through on prices appears to have been completed during the second half
of 2015 when the estimated effect of the minimum wage on firms’ planned (additional)
price changes for the next three months approached zero again.
In contrast, the dynamic response of firms’ employment plans to the introduction of
statutory minimum wages does not deliver a comparably strong pattern. As displayed in
the right-hand graph of Figure 3.3, firms that were affected more strongly did not report
employment plans that were significantly deteriorated relative to September 2013 after
controlling for firm-specific demand, firm fixed effects as well as general trends in their
icant relationship between TIi and average pricing plans during the twelve months around January 2012,
January 2013, and January 2014 relative to all other dates, see Table 3.D.2 in Appendix 3.D.
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industry and federal state. Interestingly, a significantly negative treatment effect can be
detected in October 2014—exactly three months prior to the introduction of the minimum
wage. In all remaining months around January 2015, however, the estimated treatment
effects are insignificant. Moreover, employment expectations of affected firms generally
tended to deteriorate during autumn in all previous years. The negative coefficient in
October 2014 could thus just capture a degree of seasonality in employment plans that is
not captured by the control variables of model (3.3).
In opposition to the case of estimated price responses, the choice of the baseline date
is crucial for the estimation of the dynamic employment effects. The reason is that the
estimated relationship between employment expectations and firms’ treatment intensity
had been very volatile in the period before the minimum wage was announced.29 The
results presented in Figure 3.3 show that the planned employment changes of firms were
positively—and compared to all other periods unusually strongly—associated with TIi
during the months prior to the federal election in September 2013 although the minimum
wage could not have been expected by then. In contrast, choosing November 2013—the
month of the signing of the coalition treaty—as baseline period, the estimated treatment
effect on employment responses would be positive at almost all dates during 2014 and
2015. Hence, a negative employment reaction of firms in response to the introduction
of minimum wages cannot be ruled out with certainty, but can only be detected using
baseline dates that are arguably less realistic than in the benchmark scenario.
Note on Measurement Error
It is important to note that the estimated coefficients regarding the treatment effect are
likely to be biased towards zero due to measurement error in the treatment intensity
measure. TIi only imperfectly captures the degree to which firms are affected by the
minimum wage for various reasons. First, measurement error originates from the fact
that TIi is constructed from wage data of full-time employees at the levels of two-digit
industries as well as counties or labor market regions. Thus, labor costs for part-time
employees and marginally employed workers as well as heterogeneity in payment schemes
between firms within each sector-region cell is not reflected in TIi. Second, TIi only
captures the direct effect of the minimum wage introduction on the wage bill of firms
and thereby abstracts from additional effects such as spillovers through potentially more
expensive inputs or compliance costs originating from the documentation requirements
formulated in the minimum wage law.
29Importantly, firms’ employment plans were on average not related to TIi prior to the policy inter-
vention. As shown in Table 3.D.2 in Appendix 3.D, placebo tests based on the empirical model (3.2) do
not deliver any statistically significant relationship between the treatment intensity measure and average
employment plans during the twelve months around January 2012, January 2013, and January 2014.
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In light of the resulting attenuation bias, the estimated coefficients should be viewed
as a lower bound of the “true” size of the treatment effects on planned employment and
price changes. Hence, the insignificant (but throughout most specifications negative) coef-
ficient on employment expectations does not generally rule out that negative employment
effects could be detected if firms’ affectedness to the minimum wage introduction was
observed without measurement error. Importantly, the relative magnitude of the price
and employment effect should be largely unaffected by the fact that TIi is measured with
error.
3.5.2 Minimum Wage Effects in Different Sectors and Regions
The existing literature on the price effect of minimum wages is mainly drawing on evidence
from highly affected industries such as fast food restaurants (e.g., Aaronson, 2001 and
Aaronson et al., 2008 for the U.S., Lemos, 2006 for Brazil, and Fougère et al., 2010 for
France) or retailers (Leung, 2016 and Montialoux et al., 2017). The main advantage of
these studies is that they can exploit a large number of changes in (already existing)
minimum wages in order to identify price effects. At the same time, the analysis is
naturally restricted to industries with a high fraction of minimum wage workers because
changes in minimum wages are usually small and thus do not strongly affect firms in other
industries.
In contrast, the introduction of statutory minimum wages in Germany offers scope for
a separate analysis of firm-level minimum wage effects in the services sector compared to
the less strongly affected manufacturing sector. As documented in Section 3.3.2, there is
a large degree of variation in the treatment intensity measure in both sectors which allows
to investigate whether the reaction to the minimum wage introduction differed between
manufacturing firms and service companies given their level of TIi. In order to estimate
the minimum wage-induced adjustment of pricing and employment plans separately for
firms in manufacturing and services, denoted βM and βS, the baseline empirical model
(3.2) is adjusted as follows
Y +3mi,t = β
M × TIi × 1(t ∈ (2014m7, 2015m6)) × 1(Manuf.i)
+ βS × TIi × 1(t ∈ (2014m7, 2015m6)) × 1(Servicesi)
+ γ × Demandi,t + αi + δt × 1(Sectori) + δt × 1(Statei) + εi,t, (3.4)
where the dummies 1(Manuf.i) and 1(Servicesi) equal one if firm i operates in the manu-
facturing or services sector, respectively. The results are summarized in Table 3.4, where
Columns (1) and (4) replicate the results for the baseline estimation and Columns (2)
and (5) provide the estimated treatment effects in the adjusted empirical model (3.4).
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Table 3.6: Minimum Wage Effects at the Firm-Level in Different Sectors and Regions
Price Expectations+3mt Empl. Expectations
+3m
t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6}) 0.40∗∗∗ -0.0100
(0.10) (0.070)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})× 1(Manuf.) 0.41∗∗∗ 0.079
(0.13) (0.091)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})× 1(Services) 0.39∗∗ -0.084
(0.15) (0.096)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})× 1(West) 0.41∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.14) (0.17)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})× 1(East) 0.40∗∗∗ -0.0095
(0.10) (0.070)
R2 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.350 0.351 0.351
Control for Demandi,t yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
H0: Coefficients Equal: p-value 0.928 0.948 0.202 0.576
Observations 280541 280541 280541 280500 280500 280500
Notes: The dependent variables are planned price or employment changes during the next 3 months
as reported to the IBS. “TI” is the proxy of each firm’s degree of affectedness by the minimum wage
introduction and “1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})” is a dummy that is one during the period between July
2014 and June 2015. “1(Manuf.),” “1(Services),” “1(West),” and “1(East)” are dummies for firms in
manufacturing, services, West Germany, and East Germany, respectively. “Demandi,t” is firms’ current
backlog of orders as reported in the IBS. “Time*Sector FE” and “Time*State FE” are time fixed effects at
the levels of two-digit industries and federal states. Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector,
county, and date levels. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The results show that manufacturing firms and service providers responded to the
introduction of the statutory minimum wage in a comparable way. In both sectors, affected
firms planned to increase prices significantly more often than they would have done if
they were not affected. The estimated adjustment of pricing plans of manufacturing firms
induced by a given degree of treatment intensity is β̂M = 0.41. Despite of being treated
less on average, the treatment effect is not statistically different from the price reaction
of service companies (β̂S = 0.39). Ceteris paribus, manufacturing firms thus planned
to increase prices with roughly the same probability as service firms that were affected
to a comparable degree. Moreover, the minimum wage introduction did not result in
significantly depreciated employment plans of firms in both samples as can be inferred
from the insignificant coefficients in Column (5) of Table 3.1 which are not statistically
different from each other at the 10% level.
Next, I evaluate whether the reaction to the minimum wage introduction differed
between firms in West and East Germany given their level of TIi. As documented in
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Table 3.1, firms in West Germany were on average less strongly affected by the introduc-
tion of statutory minimum wages than their counterparts in the East. However, there is
sufficient variation in TIi across firms in both regions that allows for the estimation of
minimum wage effects separately for firms in West and East Germany. Along the lines
of model (3.4), the treatment interaction term is multiplied with dummies indicating
whether firms are located in West or East Germany.
The results show that the reaction of affected firms regarding their pricing and employ-
ment plans did not differ between firms in East and West Germany given their degree of
affectedness. As displayed in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 3.4, the respective coefficients
of the treatment effects are of comparable size for firms in both regions. For the same
degree of TIi, the probability to plan to increase prices due to the minimum wage was
hence comparably strong for firms in the East and the West. Moreover, a significantly
negative effect on firms’ employment plans cannot be detected for firms in any of the two
regions.
3.5.3 Realized Price Changes of Manufacturing Firms
The previous analysis documented a strongly positive effect on the probability that af-
fected firms planned to increase the prices of their goods or services in response to the
introduction of minimum wages in Germany in January 2015. As described in Section
3.3.1, the focus on expected rather than realized price changes results from the design
of the IBS: While firms in both surveys covering manufacturers and service companies
are asked about their expected price changes in the next three months, realized price
changes are only extracted from firms in the manufacturing survey. As the majority of
firms that are affected by the minimum wage introduction operate in the services sector,
it is reasonable to include them into the baseline sample and restrict the main analysis
to firms’ pricing plans. However, it is a priori not clear whether firms indeed realized
the price changes they previously planned in response to the minimum wage. In order to
accommodate this concern, I make use of the realized price changes reported by firms in
the manufacturing survey of the IBS.
Before estimating the effect of the minimum wage introduction on realized prices of
manufacturing firms, the general relationship between firms’ realized and expected price
changes is assessed. While firms are asked whether they plan to change their prices
during the next three months, the question on price realizations refers to the change in the
previous month. Unsurprisingly, firms report to expect price changes (20.4% of reports)
during the next three month more often than they state to have changed prices during the
previous month (16.9%). Consequently, the variation in price expectations is larger than
in reported price realizations, which is important for the interpretation of the estimated
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Table 3.7: Price Expectations and Realized Price Changes in the Subsequent 3 Months
Fractions of Mean Realized
Obs. Price Changes b/w t+ 1 & t+ 3 Sum
> 0 = 0 < 0
Price Exp.+3mt = 1 15975 0.64 0.33 0.03 1
Price Exp.+3mt = 0 93079 0.10 0.82 0.08 1
Price Exp.+3mt = −1 7447 0.04 0.28 0.68 1
Notes: This table contrasts the micro data of expected price changes during the next three months stated
in t with the mean reported (monthly) price changes during the following three months, i.e., between
t+ 1 and t+ 3. The sample is restricted to manufacturing firms that reported price expectations in t as
well as price realizations in the subsequent three months.
treatment effects.
In general, firms are relatively good in predicting changes of their prices during the next
three months. This can be inferred from Table 3.7 that contrasts the price expectations
reported by manufacturing firms in month t and their average reported price changes in
the subsequent three months.30 In total, firms stick to their pricing plans in 79% of the
cases. Specifically, if firms planned to increase (decrease) their prices, they reported price
increases (decreases) thereafter in 64% (68%) of all periods, while they did not change
their prices during 82% of the periods after reporting that they did not plan to change
prices. These descriptive results are in line with Pesaran and Timmermann (2009) who
find evidence for a high degree of predictability in the price data of the IBS using more
involved statistical tests. Hence, it is very likely that affected firms stuck to their plans
and increased prices in response of the introduction of minimum wages.31
Next, the effect of the minimum wage introduction on realized price changes of manu-
facturing firms is estimated along the lines of the baseline empirical model (3.2). Besides
using the respective reports to the IBS as dependent variable, the window of the treat-
ment period is forwarded by three months in order to accommodate for the different time
period covered by the survey question.
The results presented in Table 3.8 demonstrate that manufacturing firms reported to
have indeed increased their prices in response to the introduction of minimum wages in
30This comparison assumes that positive and negative changes are of comparable size and can hence
be weighted equally. This assumption is not too restrictive given the fact that less than 1% of all price
expectations are followed by realizations in the subsequent three months that contained at least one
positive and one negative realized price change.
31Furthermore, the number of “unexpected” price increases (in total 10,224 observations consisting
of 10% of the cases following a “neutral” price expectation and 4% of those following “negative” plans)
strongly outweighs the 5751 cases in which firms previously planned to increase prices without sticking to
their plans. Hence, it is likely that some firms increased their prices due to the minimum wage although
they did not plan to do so.
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Table 3.8: Minimum Wage Effect on Realized Price Changes of Manufacturing Firms
Change in Prices−1mt
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m10, 2015m9}) 0.34∗∗
(0.15)
R2 0.288
Control for Demandi,t yes
Firm FE yes
Time*Sector FE yes
Time*State FE yes
Observations 150051
Notes: The dependent variable is the realized price change during the previous month as reported by
firms in the manufacturing survey of the IBS. “TI” is the proxy of each firm’s degree of affectedness
by the minimum wage introduction and “1(t ∈ {2014m10, 2015m9})” is a dummy that is one during
the period between October 2014 and September 2015. “Demandi,t” is firms’ current backlog of orders
as reported in the IBS. “Time*Sector FE” and “Time*State FE” are time fixed effects at the levels of
two-digit industries and federal states, respectively. Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector,
county, and date levels. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
January 2015. The estimated coefficient of the treatment effect of β̂ = 0.34 is significant at
the 5%-level. Relative to all other periods when the minimum wage was not affecting them,
a hypothetical firm with TIi = 0.25 reported realized price changes of a one-step higher
category—i.e., increased instead of constant or constant instead of decreased prices—in
one additional month on average (β̂ × TIi × 12m = 0.34 × 0.25 × 12m = 1.02m) between
October 2014 and September 2015.
This estimate of the minimum wage effect on realized price changes is remarkably
close to the effect on expected price changes during the next three months (β̂ = 0.41)
documented in Section 3.5.1. In light of less variation in one-month realized price changes
compared to three-month price expectations, it is not surprising that the estimated min-
imum wage effect on realized price changes is slightly smaller than the effect on expecta-
tions. As shown in the next section, however, the quantitative size of the overall effect on
producer prices in the manufacturing sector is the same irrespectively of being estimated
based on price changes in the previous month or price expectations.
Hence, firms appear to have increased their prices in response to the introduction of
minimum wages to the same degree as they had previously planned. As survey data on
realized price changes are not available for service firms in the IBS, this finding can only be
verified for the subset of manufacturing firms. However, it is very unreasonable to assume
that service companies differed from their counterparts in the manufacturing sector with
respect to the degree to which their minimum wage-induced adjustment of pricing plans
resulted in actual price increases.
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3.6 Quantification of the MinimumWage Effect on Pro-
ducer Prices
In order to gain insights about the economic dimension of the price effect documented
previously, this section provides an approximation of the quantitative size of the increase
in producer prices. As the micro data of the IBS do not contain information about the
size of price changes, I exploit the fact that aggregated survey responses regarding price
changes closely track quantitative changes in price indices from administrative sources.
As aggregated time series on producer prices in most sub-industries of the services
sector are not available, a quantitative counterpart to the reported price changes in the IBS
based on administrative producer price data can only be constructed for manufacturing
firms. For this subset, I use monthly time series of producer price indices (PPIs,t) at
the level of two-digit industries s provided by the German Federal Statistical Office.32 In
order to track the average reported prices of firms as closely as possible, the industry-level
time series are weighted by the share of manufacturing firms in the respective sectors of
the IBS (ωs), i.e., PPI t =
∑
s ωsPPIs,t.
The time series of average expected and realized price changes of manufacturing firms
reported to the IBS (Price Exp.+3mt and Price Realiz.
−1m
t ) are strongly correlated with
annualized changes in the time series of weighted producer prices (∆PPI t), see Figure
3.4. As documented in Table 3.D.4 in the Appendix, the time series correlation between
∆PPI t and average price expectations in the IBS is highest if price expectations are lagged
by one month (ρ(Price Exp.+3mt ,∆PPI t) = 0.87), while the correlation with average price
realizations is highest at contemporaneity (ρ(Price Realiz.−1mt ,∆PPI t) = 0.86).33
Based on these time series, I estimate semi-elasticities that map qualitative survey
32For the manufacturing sector, price data are available at Destatis’ GENESIS database (code “61241-
0002”). If anything, time series on producer prices in the services sector are only available for very
few, mostly industry-related services. In these cases, however, the data are only available at quarterly
frequency and at inhomogeneous aggregation levels. Moreover, price data for services that enter the
consumer price index are available. These time series are not useful for my analysis because they are not
necessarily limited to domestic service providers and because they are coded according to a classification
system that cannot directly be linked to two-digit industries of the WZ2008 classification.
33Note that the aggregate price change used here (∆PPIt) is the annualized percentage change of
the current price level relative to three months in the past, which fits the average survey data on price
realizations better than monthly changes in producer price indices, see Table 3.D.4 in Appendix 3.D. It
is important to note that it is not reasonable to estimate a semi-elasticity mapping qualitative survey
responses to changes in producer price indices separately for each industry because the number of firms
in the IBS is too low in most two-digit industries. Consequently, the changes in industry-level producer
price indices do not fit with the mean reported price changes of firms in the respective sectors due to the
trichotomy of the survey data.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison between Expected/Realized Price Changes and Quantitative Data
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Notes: The figure plots time series of the realized change in producer prices in the manufacturing sector
relative to three months before (black solid line) against time series of average realized price changes
(blue dashed line) and expected price changes (red dotted line) reported by firms in the manufacturing
survey of the IBS. The German Federal Statistical Office provides time series of producer price indices
at the two-digit industry level. For aggregation, the industry-specific price indices are weighted by the
average share of manufacturing firms in the respective sectors of the IBS.
responses to quantitative changes in producer price indices, which are defined as follows
ψ̂Exp :=
d∆PPI t
dPrice Exp.+3mt
= 0.147 and ψ̂Realiz:=
d∆PPI t
dPrice Realiz.−1mt
=0.169. (3.5)
Reflecting the lower volatility in average price realizations, the semi-elasticity that links
reported price changes to changes in producer prices is higher (ψ̂Realiz = 0.169) than
for the case of price expectations (ψ̂Exp = 0.147). Hence, an appreciation of average
price expectations (realizations) in the IBS by 0.1 over the course of 12 months can be
associated with an increase in producer prices by roughly 1.5 (1.7) percent.
The estimated semi-elasticities ψ̂Exp and ψ̂Realiz can be used to approximate the quan-
titative size of firms’ price increases in response to the introduction of minimum wages.
Assuming (a) that the average size of price changes due to the minimum wage introduction
did not differ from “normal” price changes and (b) that price changes of manufacturing
firms and service providers are on average of similar size, the minimum wage-induced
price reaction of each firm (∆Pi) can be quantified using the following relationship:
∆Pi = ψ̂ × β̂ × TIi, (3.6)
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where ψ̂ refers to either ψ̂Exp or ψ̂Realiz and β̂ is the treatment effect on firms’ planned
(or realized) price changes estimated in the previous section based on model (3.2).
The approximated price effect is considerably large. For example, firms that operate
in sector-region combinations in which one out of four full-time employees was affected
by the minimum wage (TIi = 0.25) increased their prices by approximately 1.5% in
response to the minimum wage. In line with the results in Section 3.5.3, the price effect
of manufacturing firms does not differ substantially once it is approximated using survey
data on expected or realized price changes.34
3.6.1 Average Price Effect Across All Firms in the Sample
Next, the average size of price increases of all firms in the sample is approximated. Plug-
ging the average degree of treatment intensity of all firms (TI = 0.039) into equation (3.6)
delivers an average price increase of 0.23%. As the average degree to which firms were
affected by the minimum wage largely differed between West and East Germany as well
as between manufacturing firms and service providers, the average price effect is het-
erogeneous among these groups. As displayed in Panel A of Table 3.9, firms in West
Germany are estimated to have increased their prices by only 0.15% in response to the
minimum wage introduction, while the price reaction of East German firms was much
stronger (+0.71%). Moreover, manufacturing firms (+0.12%) appear to have raised their
prices less strongly than firms in services (+0.35%). Again, estimating the overall price
effect for manufacturing firms based on realized price changes rather than expectations
delivers comparable results.
Comparing these estimates to the approximate extent of the wage increase in response
to the minimum wage introduction indicates that firms passed through a substantial share
of their increased labor costs to the prices of their products and services. Assuming that
the number and composition of workers did not change, the average increase in total
wage costs of all firms in the sample induced by the minimum wage can be approximated
to 0.70%.35 Admittedly, this calculation only delivers a very rough estimate of the true
increase in labor costs firms faced on average. On the one hand, the estimate provides
a lower bound of the true increase in the wage bill because the more strongly affected
wages of part-time employees and marginally employed workers are not considered. On
34Inserting the estimated coefficients of the price effect for manufacturing firms from Tables 3.6 and 3.8
to equation (3.6) gives ∆PExpi = 0.147× 0.409×TIi = 0.060×TIi and ∆PRealizi = 0.169× 0.338×TIi =
0.057 × TIi.
35Each firm’s approximate increase in wage costs is calculated based on the wage data presented in
Section 3.3.2, i.e., the wage distribution of full-time employees in each firm’s two-digit industry and region
in 2013. In Figure 3.2, the minimum wage-induced increase in the wage bill corresponds to the fraction
of (a) the area between the wage distribution of 2013 in each firm’s sector-region combination and the
new minimum wage of €8.50/hour and (b) the integral below the entire support of the wage distribution.
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Table 3.9: Quantitative Effect of Minimum Wage on Overall Level of Producer Prices
Quantification of Price Effect Based on
Price Expectations Price Realizations
Total Manuf. Services West East Manuf.
PPI-Semi-Elasticity (ψ̂) 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.169
Treatment Effect (β̂) 0.400 0.409 0.392 0.407 0.400 0.338
Panel A: Average Price Effect of All Firms in Sample
Mean Treatment Intensity (TI) 0.039 0.02 0.06 0.024 0.121 0.02
Average Price Effect (∆P in %) 0.23 0.12 0.35 0.15 0.71 0.12
Panel B: Minimum Wage Effect on Revenue-Weighted Producer Price Index
Revenue-Weighted Treatment Intensity (T̃ I) 0.029 0.014 0.051 0.023 0.100 0.014
Overall Price Effect (∆P̃ in %) 0.17 0.08 0.31 0.14 0.59 0.08
Notes: This table summarizes the estimated minimum wage effect on the overall level of producer prices.
The “PPI-Semi-Elasticity (ψ̂)” refers to the degree to which changes in average price expectations in the
IBS translate to changes in producer price indices. ψ̂ can only be estimated for manufacturing firms and
is assumed to be constant across all sectors and regions. The “treatment effects (β̂)” correspond to the
estimated coefficients of Table 3.6 and 3.8. “TI” is the average treatment intensity of all firms in the IBS
and “T̃ I” refers to the revenue-weighted average treatment intensity of all industry-region combinations.
the other hand, the estimate is upward biased because of potential non-compliance of
firms and because of the fact that wage increases that would have taken place in absence
of the minimum wage are not taken into account. However, it is reasonable to argue
that the order of magnitude of the true increase in wage costs is roughly captured by
this estimate. In light of this, an average price increase of 0.23% appears to be relatively
strong and non-negligible.36
3.6.2 Minimum Wage Effect on Overall Producer Prices
In a next step, I examine the effect of the minimum wage introduction on the overall level
of producer prices in Germany. For this purpose, the average degree of treatment intensity
of all industry-region combinations (T̃ I) is inserted to equation (3.6). To capture the level
of overall producer prices as closely as possible, the treatment intensity of each industry-
region combination is weighted by revenues in each cell.37 Similarly to Section 3.6.1, T̃ I
36In order to calculate the exact share of firms’ additional labor costs that is passed through to prices,
additional information on other input costs besides labor as well as the development of firms’ revenues or
profits would be needed. Unfortunately, this additional information is not available at the corresponding
level of analysis.
37Revenue data are received from Destatis’ GENESIS database (code “73321”) at the level of two-
digit industries and federal states. From this, revenue weights are calculated for each county-sector
combination using the county’s share of the total number of employees in the respective industry of its
federal state. Moreover, I adjust the revenue weights for the fact that wage data are missing more often
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is also calculated separately for the manufacturing sector and the services sector as well
as for West and East Germany.
The results of this quantification exercise presented in Panel B of Table 3.9 show that
overall producer prices in Germany increased by approximately 0.17 percent in response
to the introduction of statutory minimum wages in January 2015. Again, producer prices
were more strongly increased in East Germany (+0.59%) compared to West Germany
(+0.14%) as well as in the services sector (+0.31%) in relation to the manufacturing
sector (+0.08%). The estimated effect on the overall level of producer prices is slightly
lower than the average price effect across all firms in the IBS displayed in Panel A.
This difference can be rationalized by the fact that revenues are higher in industry-region
combinations which were less strongly affected by the minimum wage. However, the order
of magnitude of both estimates is comparable.
The estimated size of the minimum wage-induced increase in producer prices is re-
markably close to the prediction of the “German Council of Economic Experts.” In their
annual report to the federal government published two months prior to January 2015,
they predicted an additional increase in CPI inflation by 0.2 percentage points in re-
sponse to the introduction of the statutory minimum wage (c.f. Sachverständigenrat,
2014, p. 107).38 Hence, the back-of-the-envelope calculation of the price effect does not
seem to deliver unreasonable results despite of the very strong assumptions needed to
interpret the effects found in the qualitative survey data in a quantitative way.
3.7 Robustness
This study documents that affected firms increased their prices in response to the intro-
duction of the statutory minimum wage in Germany, while their employment reaction
appeared to be—if anything—only very modestly negative on average and insignificant.
Besides providing additional insights about the firms’ reaction, this section conducts sev-
eral robustness checks that confirm the main findings with respect to firms’ adjustment
of pricing and employment plans. In addition, Table 3.D.5 in Appendix 3.D summarizes
the results of all robustness checks with respect to realized price changes in the subset of
manufacturing firms which are comparable to the findings presented in the following.
First, the results do not change once I control for attrition. If dropout of firms from the
sample was correlated with the degree to which they were affected by the minimum wage
introduction, the results of the baseline specification could be biased. To accommodate
this concern, I restrict the sample to firms that stay in the dataset until December 2015.
in East Germany compared to West Germany. For details, see Appendix 3.C.
38Unfortunately, the report only includes a prediction for consumer prices rather than producer prices
and does not provide details on how the prediction of the minimum wage effect is performed.
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The estimated minimum wage effect on firms’ price and employment expectations are
very close to the results of the baseline regression as shown in Columns (1) and (2) of
Tables 3.10 and 3.11.
Second, the results are robust to the choice of the aggregation level in the wage data
used for the construction of the treatment intensity measure. As described in Section 3.3.2,
53.9% (84.5%) of all firms in the manufacturing and services surveys of the IBS can be
matched to administrative, industry-specific wage data at the level of the county (labor
market region) they are located in. Trading off the higher coverage of wage data at the
level of labor market regions and the fact that firm-level wages are better reflected by
the county level data, the baseline specification uses county-level wage data once they are
available and replaces missing values by wage data at the more aggregated level of labor
market regions. If wage data at the level of labor market regions are used to determine
TIi for all firms instead, the results do not change substantially. As can be inferred from
Column (3) of Tables 3.10 and 3.11, the estimated coefficient on the treatment effect on
pricing and employment plans is slightly smaller in absolute value in both cases. This can
be attributed to additional measurement error in TIi.
As expected, the estimated minimum wage effects on firms’ pricing and employment
reaction are stronger if the construction of TIi is restricted to industry-specific wage
data at the county level. Capturing the actual treatment intensity of firms with less
measurement error reduces the attenuation bias in the estimated coefficient. Regarding
the price reaction of firms, the treatment effect is estimated to β̂ = 0.56, see Column
(4) of Table 3.10. Consequently, the approximated effect on the level of overall producer
prices is stronger (+0.21%) compared to the baseline specification (+0.17%). For the case
of employment expectations, the estimated treatment effect increases in absolute value to
β̂ = −0.06, see Column (4) of Table 3.11. Although the estimate is still insignificant, I
cannot rule out that firms’ employment reaction would be estimated to be significantly
negative if firms’ treatment intensity was observed without measurement error. Hence,
the results of the baseline specification are likely to reflect a lower bound of the true extent
of firms’ price and employment reaction to the introduction of minimum wages.
Third, the results are robust to the choice of different “virtual” minimum wage levels
w̄min for the construction of TIi. If TIi measures the fraction of all full-time employees that
earned less than €6.50 or €7.50 in 2013, the treatment intensity measure only captures
firms that are affected very strongly by the introduction of a minimum wage of €8.50 per
hour. Unsurprisingly, the estimated effect on the overall price level is smaller (+0.08% for
w̄min = €6.50 and +0.12% for w̄min = €7.50) because fewer firms are considered as being
affected. Further, the estimated employment reaction among these highly treated firms
is more negative than in the baseline specification (β̂ = −0.15 and β̂ = −0.08) but still
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Table 3.10: Firms’ Price Response to the Minimum Wage Introduction: Robustness
Planned Price Change in Next 3 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Specification Baseline No Attrition Wage Data Threshold w̄ w(p0)
Region County 6.50e 7.50e 9.50e 10.50e 0.7w(p10) 0.9w(p10)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6}) 0.40∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.098) (0.10) (0.15) (0.24) (0.14) (0.092) (0.075) (0.12) (0.10)
Demandi,t yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.331 0.325 0.331 0.332 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.331
Observations 280541 227216 280541 173051 280541 280541 280541 280541 280541 280541
PPI-Semi-Elasticity (ψ̂) 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147
Mean Treatment Intensity (TI) 0.039 0.039 0.04 0.031 0.007 0.018 0.068 0.105 0.064 0.037
Average Price Effect (∆P in %) 0.231 0.238 0.222 0.256 0.095 0.157 0.264 0.262 0.438 0.211
Revenue-Weighted TI (T̃ I) 0.029 0.029 0.03 0.026 0.006 0.014 0.048 0.073 0.035 0.026
Overall Price Effect (∆P̃ in %) 0.168 0.175 0.165 0.209 0.075 0.12 0.186 0.181 0.236 0.148
Notes: The dependent variable is expected price changes during the next 3 months as reported to
the IBS. “TI” is the proxy of firms’ degree of affectedness by the minimum wage introduction and
“1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})” is a dummy that is one during the treatment period. “Demandi,t” is firms’
current backlog of orders as reported in the IBS. “Time*Sector FE” and “Time*State FE” are time fixed
effects at the levels of two-digit industries and federal states, respectively. “ψ̂” denotes the semi-elasticity
that maps changes in average price expectations to quantitative producer prices. “TI” and “∆P ” refer to
the average treatment intensity and approximated minimum wage-induced price increase of all firms in
the sample. “T̃ I” and “∆P̃ ” reflect the overall treatment intensity in the economy and the overall effect
of producer prices based on revenue weights for each county-industry cell as described in Section 3.6.2.
Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector, county, and date levels. Level of significance: *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
insignificant, see Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.11. Despite of being insignificant, this
points into the direction that deteriorated employment plans were—if anything—more
likely to occur among very strongly affected firms.
If the treatment intensity measure is calculated based on minimum wage thresholds
above €8.50, TIi assigns a positive degree of affectedness to firms that operate in indus-
tries and regions where all full-time employees earned wages slightly above the minimum
wage prior to its introduction. However, it is reasonable to argue that these firms em-
ployed at least some part-time employees or marginally employed workers that previously
earned less than €8.50. The results in Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3.10 indicate that
price expectations in the period around the minimum wage introduction reacted less sen-
sitive to a given variation in TIi based on the thresholds of w̄min = €9.50 and €10.50
compared to the baseline specification. Naturally, the average degree of treatment in-
tensity across all firms TI(w̄min) as well as the revenue-weighted mean of overall treat-
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Table 3.11: Employment Response to the Minimum Wage Introduction: Robustness
Planned Employment Change in Next 3 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Specification Baseline No Attrition Wage Data Threshold w̄ w(p0)
Region County 6.50e 7.50e 9.50e 10.50e 0.7w(p10) 0.9w(p10)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6}) -0.0100 0.0035 -0.0040 -0.060 -0.15 -0.078 -0.0056 -0.00027 -0.026 -0.025
(0.070) (0.069) (0.076) (0.10) (0.15) (0.088) (0.055) (0.044) (0.075) (0.065)
Demandi,t yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.350 0.340 0.350 0.364 0.351 0.351 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350
Observations 280500 227248 280500 173019 280500 280500 280500 280500 280500 280500
Notes: The dependent variable is the expected employment change during the next 3 months as reported
to the IBS. “TI” is the proxy of firms’ degree of affectedness by the minimum wage introduction and
“1(t ∈ {2014m7, 2015m6})” is a dummy that is one during the treatment period. “Demandi,t” is firms’
current backlog of orders as reported in the IBS. “Time*Sector FE” and “Time*State FE” are time fixed
effects at the levels of two-digit industries and federal states, respectively. Standard errors are multiway
clustered at the sector, county, and date levels. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
ment intensity T̃ I(w̄min) is much larger in these specifications, i.e., TI(9.50) = 0.068 and
TI(10.50) = 0.105 as well as T̃ I(9.50) = 0.048 and T̃ I(10.50) = 0.073. Unsurprisingly,
the overall effect on producer prices is larger (+0.19% and +0.18%) compared to the base-
line scenario (+0.17%). This small difference indicates that the lion’s share of the price
effect is generated by firms that were already captured by the baseline specification of the
treatment intensity measure. Abstracting from firms that were affected by the minimum
wage only through higher wage costs for part-time employees or marginally employed
workers does hence not appear to be a major concern.
Fourth, the results are robust to different assumptions about the minimum of the wage
distribution w(0) which is not given in the wage data. The baseline specification is based
on the assumption that w(0) is related to the wage at the 10th percentile (w(10)) in the
same way as w(10) is related to wages at the 20th percentile. In this specification, the
minima of the wage distribution on average corresponded to approximately 85% of the
wage rates at the 10th percentile. As documented in Columns (9) and (10) of Tables 3.10
and 3.11, the results are very close to those of the baseline specification once the wage
curve below the 10th percentile is assumed to be either steeper (with w(0) = 0.7 × w(10))
or flatter (with w(0) = 0.9 × w(10)).
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter studies the response of manufacturing firms and service companies to the
introduction of statutory minimum wages in Germany in 2015. The analysis focuses
on two potential margins of adjustment for firms in response to minimum wage-induced
increases in labor costs: changes in the number of employees and pass-through on prices.
For this purpose, the study makes use of the micro data of the IFO Business Survey that
is unique in containing information on price changes at the level of firms across a wide
range of sectors and regions at high, monthly, frequency.
Identifying each firm’s degree of affectedness by means of sectorally and regionally
disaggregated wage data, I find strong evidence for price pass-through of affected firms.
Based on a generalized difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I find that the prob-
ability that firms increased their prices is strongly associated with the intensity to which
they were affected by the minimum wage introduction. Conditional on the same degree
of affectedness, the price effect does not differ between manufacturing firms and service
companies as well as between firms in West and East Germany. This provides evidence in
favor of the external validity of other studies that document strong minimum wage effects
on prices based on data from single sectors only, such as restaurants (e.g., Aaronson,
2001, Lemos, 2006, Aaronson et al., 2008, and Fougère et al., 2010) and retailers (Leung,
2016 and Montialoux et al., 2017). In addition, exploiting the strong correlation between
qualitative survey data and administrative producer price indices reveals that the mini-
mum wage-induced price reaction of affected firms is quantitatively large and increased
the overall level of producer prices in Germany by roughly 0.2%.
In contrast to the pronounced price reaction, I only find a very modestly negative
and insignificant effect of the minimum wage introduction on firms’ planned employment
changes. While a negative employment effect cannot be ruled out with certainty in light
of potential measurement error in the treatment intensity measure, this finding points into
the direction of a prominent strand of papers including Card and Krueger (1994, 2000),
Dube et al. (2010), and Allegretto et al. (2011) who find that minimum wages do not
inevitably destroy jobs. Moreover, the chapter adds to first evidence in favor of moderate
employment effects in response to the introduction of minimum wages in Germany by
Bossler and Gerner (2016) and vom Berge et al. (2016) that were much weaker than
previously predicted by Knabe et al. (2014) and Arni et al. (2014).
Overall, the results suggest that price pass-through is an important margin of adjust-
ment for firms in response to minimum wages because affected firms appear to have (at
least partially and in the short-run) compensated their increased labor costs more often
by raising prices than by reducing their number of employees. This highlights that the
joint assessment of different potential adjustment channels is a fruitful avenue of research
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to gain a comprehensive understanding of firms’ response to minimum wages. Ideally, this
approach would include quantitative micro data on producer prices at very disaggregated
levels, which hopefully become available in the future, along with firm-level data on em-
ployment stocks and flows as well as further important dimensions such as investment,
quality of outputs, and different characteristics of jobs and workers. While data on many
of these aspects are being collected, they are either not available or can only hardly be
matched to other sources of micro data, yet. I leave this challenge to future work.
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Appendices to Chapter 3
3.A Survey Questions Used in the Study
The following set of questions, which are asked regularly on a monthly basis in the IBS,
are used in this chapter (English translation of German original):
Services Survey (S):
S:Q1 Price Expectations:
“During the next 3 months, the prices of our services will [1] increase, [0] stay the same,
or [-1] decrease.”
S:Q2 Employment Expectations:
“During the next (2-3) months, the number of employees will [1] increase, [0] stay the
same, or [-1] decrease.”
S:Q3 Current Backlog of Orders:
“We evaluate our backlog of orders as [1] comparatively large, [0] sufficient (typical for the
season), or [-1] too small.”
S:Q4 Current Business Situation:
“We evaluate our current business situation as [1] good, [0] satisfactory (typical for the
season), or [-1] bad.”
S:Q5 Expected Business Situation:
“During the next six months, our business situation will be [1] more favorable, [0] stay the
same, or [-1] more unfavorable.”
Manufacturing Survey (M):
In the manufacturing survey, firms are asked for assessments regarding specific products.
However, only 0.43% of all observations between 2010 and 2015 refer to multiple products
for the same firm at a given point in time. Following the procedure described in Chapter 4,
these observations are aggregated to the firm level by taking means across products and
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rounding to the next integer.
M:Q1 Price Expectations:
“During the next 3 months, the domestic (net) sales prices for product X will—in consid-
eration of changes in conditions—probably [1] increase, [0] roughly stay the same, or [-1]
decrease.”
M:Q1a Realized Price Changes [only asked in manufacturing survey]:
“During the past month, the domestic (net) sales price for product X—in consideration of
changes in conditions— [1] increased, [0] stayed the same, or [-1] decreased.”
M:Q2 Employment Expectations:
“During the next 3 months, the number of employees for the production of product X will
[1] increase, [0] roughly stay the same, or [-1] decrease.”
M:Q3 Current Backlog of Orders:
“We evaluate our backlog of orders for product X as [1] comparatively large, [0] sufficient
(typical for the season), or [-1] too small.”
M:Q4 Current Business Situation:
“We evaluate the current business situation for product X as [1] good, [0] satisfactory, or
[-1] bad.”
M:Q5 Expected Business Situation:
“Expectations for the next six months: the business situation for product X will be [1] more
favorable, [0] stay the approximately same, or [-1] more unfavorable.”
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3.B Plausibility of the Treatment Intensity Measure:
Supplementary Evidence
This appendix complements the evidence presented in Section 3.3.2 regarding the plau-
sibility of the treatment intensity measure TIi by making use of firms’ responses to a
series of special questions in the IBS. Specifically, the IBS version of November 2014 has
been complemented by the following set of questions referring to firms’ assessments about
the upcoming introduction of the statutory minimum wage in January 2015 (English
translation of German original):39
SQ1: “The statutory minimum wage will be introduced on January 1st, 2015. Is your
company affected by this regulation? [1] yes, [0] no.”
“If yes, which actions are you going to undertake in reaction to the introduction of the
minimum wage (multiple answers possible)?
SQ2: No action planned: [1] yes.
SQ3: Reduction in staff: [1] yes.
SQ4: Reduction in working hours: [1] yes.
SQ5: Price increases: [1] yes.
SQ6: Decreased investment volume: [1] yes.
SQ7: Cuts in bonus payments: [1] yes.
SQ8: Other action: [1] yes.”
As the functional form of the relationship between TIi and the frequency to which
firms answered questions SQ1, SQ3, SQ4, and SQ5 in the affirmative is not clear a pri-
ori, I estimate a fractional polynomial of degree two of TIi without adding any further
covariates. Figure 3.B.1 plots the resulting curves of the mean probability to affirm to
the respective special question at different levels of TIi along with the 95%-confidence
39See Erthle et al. (2014) for a description and summary statistics of the minimum wage-related special
questions in the IBS of November 2014 as well as Sauer and Wojciechowski (2016) for a descriptive analysis
based on these data.
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Figure 3.B.1: Relationship between TIi and Firms’ Responses to Minimum Wage Related
Special Questions in the IBS
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Notes: The figure plots the predicted probabilities (green line) to affirm to the respective special question
indicated above each graph by estimating a fractional polynomial of degree two of TIi, i.e., the fraction
of full-time employees affected by the minimum wage, without adding any further covariates. The shaded
area covers the 95%-confidence interval of the predicted probabilities.
intervals. In addition, Table 3.B.1 summarizes the average frequencies of responses at
different levels of TIi. The question about firms’ affectedness (SQ1) neither provides any
information about the intensity to which firms are affected nor contains any information
about the channels through which firms are affected. As can be inferred from Figure
3.B.1 and Table 3.B.1, the probability that firms stated to be affected by the minimum
wage increases substantially in TIi. The majority among the 17% of firms that reported
to be affected by the minimum wage despite of TIi = 0 did not plan to react to the
minimum wage introduction. Arguably, these firms were only affected indirectly by the
minimum wage or perceived themselves as being affected because of the obligatory and
time-consuming documentation requirements.
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Table 3.B.1: Plausibility Check of the Treatment Intensity: Extended Results
Treatment Intensity (TI)
Treatment Intensity TI ∈ [0%] (0%,20%] (20%,30%] (30%,100%)
prob(“Affected” = 1) 0.171 0.374 0.597 0.811
prob(“No Action” = 1|“Affected” = 1) 0.545 0.475 0.261 0.167
prob(“Staff Reduction” = 1|“Affected” = 1) 0.176 0.165 0.261 0.322
prob(“Hours Reduction” = 1|“Affected” = 1) 0.07 0.123 0.239 0.389
prob(“Price Increase” = 1|“Affected” = 1) 0.152 0.272 0.565 0.644
prob(“Reduction in Investment” = 1|“Affected” = 1) 0.104 0.13 0.261 0.311
prob(“Reduction in Special Payments” = 1|“Affected” = 1) 0.156 0.215 0.326 0.411
Notes. “Treatment Intensity” refers to the fraction of full-time employees that earned an hourly gross
wage of less than €8.50 in 2013 in each firm’s two-digit industry and county. prob(“Affected” = 1) displays
the probability that a firm responded to be “affected” by the minimum wage in the special questions of
the IBS in November 2014 depending on its proxied treatment intensity as indicated at the top of each
column. prob(“No Action” = 1|“Affected” = 1), etc. are defined accordingly.
Moreover, the probability that “affected” firms according to SQ1 stated to react to the
minimum wage introduction increases along all margins covered by the supplementary
questions SQ3 through SQ7. Interestingly, the probability of stating to increase prices
(SQ5) increases most strongly in TIi. Albeit reacting less strongly compared SQ5, the
probabilities of affected firms to confirm to plan reductions in employment (SQ3), cuts in
working hours (SQ4), decrease investment (SQ6), or reduce special payments (SQ7) also
increases in TIi.
However, interpreting these correlations in a causal way is potentially misleading be-
cause the questions regarding firms’ planned reactions to the introduction of the minimum
wage (SQ3-SQ7) are restricted to affected firms and one direction. For example, affected
firms could only state whether they planned to reduce the number of employees or not. If
firms were operating in monopsonistic labor markets, however, they should be expected
to increase their labor demand in response to a minimum wage that is binding at suffi-
ciently low levels (Manning, 2003). If a non-negligible fraction of affected firms operated
in such monopsonistic labor markets, the fraction of firms that planned to decrease their
labor demand could hence be accompanied by a fraction of firms that planned to increase
labor demand resulting in a total employment effect that potentially cancels out. Hence,
the supplementary questions on the minimum wage introduction themselves do not allow
for causal inference on the firm-level response of the minimum wage introduction due to
missing counterfactuals as well as one-sided questions.
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3.C Revenue-Weighted Average Treatment Intensity of
the German Economy
This appendix presents the calculation of the revenue-weighted average treatment in-
tensity of all industry-region combinations (T̃ I) that is used for the quantification of
the minimum wage effect on the overall level of producer prices in Section 3.6.2. To
capture overall producer prices as closely as possible, the treatment intensity of each
industry-county combination is weighted by the revenues generated in each cell, denoted˜revenuess,c. As data on industry-specific revenues are not available at the level of counties
and the treatment intensity measure cannot be constructed for all industry-county combi-
nations due to data protection issues, the revenue weights are approximated as described
in the following.
Revenue data are received from Destatis’ GENESIS database (code “73321”) at the
level of two-digit industries s and federal states f (revenuess,f ) for 2013, the year used
for the construction of TIs,c. In order to put an appropriate weight on each TIs,c,
the state-level revenue weights revenuess,f are assigned to each county in proportion
to its relative size in the federal state.40 This relative size is approximated by the
share of full-time employees in each county working in the industry of interest, denoted
employeess,c. The employment data are included in the wage data set received from the
Federal Employment Agency (2016). From this, the total number of full-time employees
represented by industry-specific wage data can be calculated for each federal state, i.e.,
employeess,f =
∑
c∈f (employeess,c|ws,c /∈ {∅}).
Assuming that the industry-specific treatment intensity in counties not covered by
wage data is similar to the average treatment intensity in all other counties of the federal
state, the revenue weight for treatment intensities in counties for which wage data are
available (ws,c /∈ {∅}) is given by
revenuess,c = revenuess,f ×
employeesc,s
employeess,f
.
However, there are industry-federal state cells for which wage data are not available in
any county or labor market region. Specifically, federal state-level revenue data cannot be
matched to treatment intensity measures in at least one of the respective federal state’s
counties in 12.0% (7.4%) of all East (West) German industry-federal state combinations.
As workers were more strongly affected in East Germany, the calculated T̃ I would hence
be downward biased without adjustment of this asymmetry in the availability of wage
40As in the baseline specification, empty county-level cells are replaced by wage data at the level of
labor market regions.
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data. In order to correct this bias, the revenue weights (revenuess,c) of counties in East
German federal states are inflated by the inverse of the proportion of industry-specific
revenues in East Germany that can be assigned to wage data in any East German federal
state, i.e.,
ξs,East =
∑
f∈{East} revenuess,f∑
f∈{East}(revenuess,f |ws,f /∈ {∅})
,
where ws,f /∈ {∅} denotes that industry-specific wage data are available in at least one
county of state f . ξs,West is defined accordingly for the case of industry-federal state
combinations in West Germany.
The resulting revenue weight for TIs,c in each industry-county cell is hence given by
˜revenuess,c = revenuess,f × employeesc,s
employeess,f
× ξs,EW ,
where ξs,EW refers to ξs,East or ξs,West if county c is located in East or West Germany,
respectively.
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3.D Supplementary Tables
Table 3.D.1: Variation in Firms’ Treatment Intensity In Different Industries
% Firms with Fraction of
Affected Full-Time Employees
Two-Digit Industry (WZ 2008) # Firms =0% >0% >10% >20% >30% >50%
Panel A: Firms in Manufacturing Survey of IBS
10 Food products 66 1.5 98.5 71.2 34.8 30.3 9.1
11 Beverages 12 91.7 8.3 0 0 0 0
12 Tobacco products 2 100 0 0 0 0 0
15 Leather products (& related) 1 100 0 0 0 0 0
16 Wood & products of wood (excl. furniture) 57 87.7 12.3 3.5 1.8 1.8 0
17 Paper & paper products 76 81.6 18.4 15.8 0 0 0
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 97 79.4 20.6 7.2 0 0 0
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 1 100 0 0 0 0 0
20 Chemicals and chemical products 118 87.3 12.7 3.4 0 0 0
21 Basic pharmaceutical products & preparations 16 68.8 31.3 0 0 0 0
22 Rubber and plastic products 180 73.9 26.1 12.2 1.1 0 0
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 116 81 19 0 0 0 0
24 Basic metals 92 91.3 8.7 0 0 0 0
25 Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equipment 302 73.2 26.8 12.9 0 0 0
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 95 80 20 7.4 0 0 0
27 Electrical equipment 174 93.1 6.9 3.4 1.1 0 0
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 448 98 2 0 0 0 0
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 82 89 11 0 0 0 0
30 Other transport equipment 9 100 0 0 0 0 0
31 Furniture 44 75 25 9.1 6.8 6.8 0
32 Other Manufacturing 44 45.5 54.5 20.5 15.9 6.8 6.8
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 7 71.4 28.6 0 0 0 0
Panel B: Firms in Services Survey of IBS
35 Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply 7 100 0 0 0 0 0
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery 61 72.1 27.9 6.6 0 0 0
41 Construction of buildings 13 84.6 15.4 7.7 0 0 0
43 Specialised construction activities 14 71.4 28.6 7.1 0 0 0
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1 0 100 100 100 0 0
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 131 1.5 98.5 71.8 22.9 5.3 0
50 Water transport 2 100 0 0 0 0 0
51 Air transport 3 100 0 0 0 0 0
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 127 76.4 23.6 7.9 .8 0 0
53 Postal and courier activities 8 0 100 37.5 0 0 0
55 Accommodation 89 1.1 98.9 78.7 40.4 14.6 5.6
56 Food and beverage service activities 57 0 100 100 100 93 15.8
58 Publishing activities 14 92.9 7.1 7.1 0 0 0
59 Motion picture, video & TV programme production, sound recording & music publishing 10 0 100 10 0 0 0
60 Radio and Television 7 100 0 0 0 0 0
61 Telecommunications 6 100 0 0 0 0 0
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 247 91.5 8.5 1.2 0 0 0
63 Information service activities 15 73.3 26.7 0 0 0 0
64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 49 100 0 0 0 0 0
65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 1 100 0 0 0 0 0
66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 11 90.9 9.1 0 0 0 0
68 Real estate activities 61 26.2 73.8 24.6 0 0 0
69 Legal and accounting activities 72 25 75 22.2 8.3 0 0
70 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 90 87.8 12.2 1.1 0 0 0
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 350 88.3 11.7 0 0 0 0
72 Scientific research and development 39 97.4 2.6 0 0 0 0
73 Advertising and market research 61 70.5 29.5 6.6 0 0 0
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities 22 13.6 86.4 13.6 0 0 0
77 Rental and leasing activities 25 64 36 16 0 0 0
79 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities 36 52.8 47.2 0 0 0 0
80 Security and investigation activities 12 0 100 83.3 41.7 41.7 25
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities 55 0 100 100 40 23.6 0
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 47 0 100 55.3 17 6.4 0
84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 3 100 0 0 0 0 0
85 Education 14 92.9 7.1 0 0 0 0
86 Human health activities 5 0 100 40 40 0 0
87 Residential care activities 3 33.3 66.7 0 0 0 0
88 Social work activities without accommodation 2 0 100 50 0 0 0
90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities 9 55.6 44.4 0 0 0 0
92 Gambling and betting activities 2 0 100 100 100 100 50
93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 4 0 100 100 25 0 0
94 Activities of membership organisations 3 100 0 0 0 0 0
Notes. Distribution of firms in the IBS surveys covering the manufacturing and services sectors within
different two-digit industries with respect to their treatment intensity. As the composition of firms is
varying over time, this table displays the distribution of firms that reported to the IBS in January 2015.
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Table 3.D.2: Minimum Wage Effects at the Firm-Level: Placebo Tests
Price Exp.+3mt Employment Exp.
+3m
t
Placebo Treatment Placebo Treatment
Begin Period (t) 2011m7 2012m7 2013m7 2014m7 2011m7 2012m7 2013m7 2014m7
End Period (t) 2012m6 2013m6 2014m6 2015m6 2012m6 2013m6 2014m6 2015m6
TI × 1(t ∈ {t, t}) -0.053 -0.063 0.013 0.40∗∗∗ -0.15 0.052 0.042 -0.0100
(0.059) (0.081) (0.060) (0.10) (0.093) (0.053) (0.051) (0.070)
R2 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.351 0.351 0.350 0.350
Control for Demandi,t yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 280541 280541 280541 280541 280500 280500 280500 280500
Notes: This table summarizes the results of estimating the minimum wage effect in model (3.2) during
different placebo periods. The dependent variables are planned price or employment changes during the
next 3 months as reported to the IBS. “TI” is the proxy of each firm’s degree of affectedness by the
minimum wage introduction and “1(t ∈ {t, t})” is a dummy that is one during the time period between t
and t as indicated above each column. “Demandi,t” is firms’ current backlog of orders as reported in the
IBS. “Time*Sector FE” and “Time*State FE” are time fixed effects at the levels of two-digit industries
and federal states, respectively. Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector, county, and date
levels. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.D.3: Minimum Wage Effect on Other Variables - Robustness
Conditionsi,t Expectations+6mt Demandt
TI × 1(t ∈ {t, t}) 0.0043 -0.028 -0.0058 -0.0049 -0.099 -0.11 -0.068 -0.091 -0.059 0.019 -0.12
(0.10) (0.12) (0.070) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.099) (0.12) (0.068) (0.056) (0.086)
Begin Period (t) 2014m10 2014m10 2014m10 2014m10 2014m7 2014m7 2014m7 2014m7 2014m10 2014m10 2014m10
End Period (t) 2015m9 2015m9 2015m9 2015m9 2015m6 2015m6 2015m6 2015m6 2015m9 2015m9 2015m9
Control for Demandi,t yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Region FE yes yes yes
R2 0.632 0.508 0.630 0.640 0.359 0.351 0.356 0.373 0.454 0.451 0.466
Observations 281823 291683 281823 281728 280482 290263 280482 280386 282178 282178 282083
Notes: The dependent variables are current business conditions, expected business conditions for the
next six months, as well as current backlog of orders as reported to the IBS. “TI” is the proxy of the each
firm’s degree of affectedness by the minimum wage introduction and “1(t ∈ {t, t})” is a dummy that is one
during the treatment period between t and t. “Time*Sector FE,” “Time*State FE,” and “Time*Region
FE” are time fixed effects at the levels of two-digit industries, federal states, and labor market regions,
respectively. Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector, county, and date levels. Level of
significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.D.4: Cross-Correlation Between Time Series of Average Reports to IBS and
Changes in Quantitative Price Data
Panel A: Changes in PPI Relative to 3 Months Before
Lag i -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
ρ(Price Exp.+3mt−i ,∆PPIt) 0.554 0.678 0.782 0.858 0.870 0.781 0.579
ρ(Price Realiz.−1mt−i ,∆PPIt) 0.731 0.805 0.854 0.855 0.745 0.536 0.333
Panel B: Changes in PPI Relative to Previous Month
Lag i -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
ρ(Price Realiz.−1mt−i ,∆PPIt) 0.621 0.635 0.699 0.610 0.396 0.238 0.158
Notes: Cross-correlogram of time series of changes in weighted producer prices (∆PPIt) relative to three
months ago (Panel A) or one month ago (Panel B) and average expected price changes for the next three
months (Price Exp.
+3m
t ) or average realized price changes during the previous month (Price Realiz.
−1m
t )
as reported to the IBS. The sample is restricted to manufacturing firms between January 2010 and
December 2015.
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Table 3.D.5: Firms’ Price Response to the Minimum Wage Introduction: Robustness
Realized Price Change During Previous Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Specification Baseline No Attrition Wage Data Threshold w̄ w(p0)
Region County 6.50e 7.50e 9.50e 10.50e 0.7w(p10) 0.9w(p10)
TI × 1(t ∈ {2014m10, 2015m9}) 0.34∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.25 0.60∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.21 0.16 0.49∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.00072) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14)
Demandi,t yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time*State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.288 0.277 0.288 0.283 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288
Observations 150051 122576 150051 92479 150051 150051 150051 150051 150051 150051
PPI-Semi-Elasticity (ψ̂) 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169
Mean Treatment Intensity (TI) 0.02 0.021 0.02 0.018 0.002 0.007 0.041 0.07 0.045 0.019
Average Price Effect(∆P in %) 0.116 0.122 0.085 0.182 0.028 0.061 0.144 0.192 0.374 0.104
Revenue-Weighted TI (T̃ I) 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.001 0.005 0.026 0.041 0.018 0.012
Overall Price Effect (∆P̃ in %) 0.079 0.081 0.062 0.128 0.022 0.05 0.09 0.113 0.149 0.069
Notes: The dependent variable is the reported change in prices in the previous month as reported by man-
ufacturing firms. “TI” is the proxy of each firm’s degree of affectedness by the minimum wage introduction
and “1(t ∈ {2014m10, 2015m9})” is a dummy that is one during the treatment period. “Demandi,t” is
firms’ current backlog of orders as reported in the IBS. “Time*Sector FE” and “Time*State FE” are
time fixed effects at the levels of two-digit industries and federal states, respectively. “ψ̂” denotes the
semi-elasticity that maps changes in average price expectations to quantitative producer prices. “TI” and
“∆P ” refer to the average treatment intensity and approximated minimum wage-induced price increase
of all firms in the sample. “T̃ I” and “∆P̃ ” reflect the overall treatment intensity in the economy and
the overall effect of producer prices based on revenue weights for each county-industry cell as described
in Section 3.6.2. Standard errors are multiway clustered at the sector, county, and date levels. Level of
significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 4
Harmonization and Interpretation of
the IFO Business Survey’s Micro Data
4.1 Introduction
The micro data of the IFO Business Survey (IBS) provide a multitude of opportunities for
evidence-based research in various fields of economics. The survey is unique in asking a
large sample of firms that is representative for the German economy at monthly frequency
about, inter alia, current trends and expectations for the development of their general
business situation as well as their volume of production, demand situation, and changes
in employment and prices. The IBS is divided into four industry surveys that cover the
main sectors of the economy (manufacturing, services, retail/wholesale, construction),
with each being accompanied by regularly asked industry-specific special questions that,
for example, refer to constraints to business activity or credit supply by banks. At times,
the IBS is supplemented by questions about recent events such as the integration of
refugees into the German labor market or the introduction of statutory minimum wages
in 2015.1 The IBS is ideally suited for micro-econometric analysis as the response rate of
firms is high, attrition is low, and the anonymized micro data allow to track firms over
the entire time span in the sample.
Despite of these advantages, researchers usually restricted their analysis to the subset
of manufacturing firms instead of using the universe of firms covered by the IBS, e.g.,
Pesaran and Timmermann (2009), Bachmann et al. (2013b), Carstensen et al. (2013),
Strasser (2013), Fidrmuc and Hainz (2013), and Bachmann and Elstner (2015). This is
1The IBS has been conducted since 1949 in order to construct the IFO Business Climate Index which
is the most recognized lead indicator for economic activity in Germany, see Becker and Wohlrabe (2008)
for details on the survey. Moreover, refer to Seiler (2012) for a description of the different datasets of
anonymized micro data including the IBS that can be accessed under strict non-disclosure agreements
on-site the IFO Institute in Munich, Germany.
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mainly due to the fact that the sector-specific surveys of the IBS differ with respect to
the time period covered as well as the set of questions asked. In addition, panel data
research based on the universe of all firms in the IBS is prevented by the fact that the
sector-specific surveys are heterogeneous in the level of observational units (product vs.
firm) as well as in the industry classification systems used in the micro data.
The first goal of this chapter is to prepare the micro data of the IBS for a joint econo-
metric analysis of firms across its most important industry surveys. In order to ensure
a high level of generality, I focus on data in the three main covering (a) manufacturing
firms (IBS-IND (2015)—monthly micro data available since 1980), (b) retailers and whole-
salers (IBS-TRA (2015)—since 1990), and (c) service companies (IBS-SERV (2015)—since
2004).2 For this purpose, I harmonize the level of observational units across industry sur-
veys by aggregation to the firm-level. Thereby, I adjust for a break in the methodology of
the retail and wholesale survey in 2006. This adjustment is necessary for a joint analysis
of the time periods before and after the break.3
Moreover, I harmonize the sector identification variables in the micro data of the
IBS that are originally coded according to heterogeneous classification systems within
and across the different sector-specific surveys. The respective codes are transferred to
the German standard classification systems of 2003 and 2008 (henceforth, WZ 03 and
WZ 08 ), which largely correspond to the European “NACE Rev. 1.1” and “NACE Rev. 2”
classification systems.4 Codifying all firms to a unique classification system serves mainly
two purposes: on the one hand, fixed effects can be applied along the same level of industry
aggregation in order to flexibly control for industry-specific variation of any kind. On the
other hand, the IBS data can be merged to industry-level data from other sources which
are usually coded according to WZ 03 and WZ 08.5
The second goal of this chapter is to utilize the harmonized firm-level dataset to
2I do not use data from the construction survey due to a lack of comparability to the other sector-
specific surveys of the IBS.
3For example, Chapter 1 makes use of this adjustment when examining the anticipation effects of
the increase in German value added taxes in 2007 based on firms’ responses between January 2004 and
December 2007. In contrast, Schenkelberg (2014) does not adjust for the methodological break and
restricts her analysis to the micro data of the retail and wholesale survey prior to 2006.
4The NACE (European Industry Classification System) two-digit codes (divisions) are, in general,
more narrow than the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) two-digit codes (sectors).
Often, NACE two-digit divisions are comparable to NAICS three-digit subsectors; for example, in man-
ufacturing there are 24 “NACE Rev. 2” two-digit divisions, 3 NAICS two-digit sectors, and 21 NAICS
three-digit subsectors. In total, there are 88 “NACE Rev. 2” two-digit divisions and 99 NAICS three-digit
subsectors.
5For example, the study in Chapter 3 matches firms in the IBS to data on the distribution of wages in
their industry and location in order to identify the degree to which firms are affected by the introduction
of statutory minimum wages in Germany in 2015. Moreover, Chapter 2 examines the relationship between
market volatility and the information content of firms’ expectations in the IBS based on industry-level
revenue data from administrative sources.
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shed light on the interpretation of the most widely used variables in the IBS, i.e., firms’
assessments about their current business conditions as well as their expectations for the
next six months. Previous literature has been silent on the issue of interpretation in
spite of the rather vague wording of these questions with respect to the dimension and
the benchmark of the latent variable. Specifically, it is not unambiguous whether these
variables have to be interpreted as changes relative to an (unspecified) baseline date or in
levels, e.g., as a deviation from the trend. For this purpose, I proceed in two steps: first,
I analyze the relationship between average time series of both questions and industry-
level revenue data. Then, I provide insights from panel regressions at the firm-level. The
results suggest that it is most reasonable to interpret both questions in levels rather than
assuming that the expectations question captures the expected change in the level of
business conditions. Obviously, this finding has direct implications for the specification
of both econometric models, which use the micro data of IBS, and forecasting models,
which include time series based on the survey questions, alike.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the har-
monization procedure of the micro data of the different sector-specific surveys. Then,
Section 4.3 evaluates the interpretation of the survey questions regarding firms’ current
and expected future business conditions. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Preparing the IBS Micro Data for Panel Research
The goal of this section is to prepare the micro data of the IBS for a joint econometric
analysis of firms across its most important sector-specific surveys. This task includes two
challenges. First, the level of observational units is heterogeneous between the industry
surveys and, more importantly, changed over time in the retail and wholesale survey.
Section 4.2.1 addresses this problem. Second, the micro data contain information on
each firm’s main sector of business based on different classification systems across the
industry surveys. Section 4.2.2 describes how firms in the IBS are assigned to official
industry classification systems based on this information. Finally, Section 4.2.3 provides
descriptive statistics of the harmonized micro data of the IBS.
In principle, the harmonization procedure applies to all survey questions. For the sake
of convenience, the description is exemplified using the following questions from the IBS:
Q1 “Current situation: We evaluate our current business condition (latest business
trends) as [1] good, [0] satisfactory (typical for the season), [-1] bad.”
Q2 “Expectations for the next 6 months: After elimination of purely seasonal fluctua-
tions, the development of our business will be [1] more favorable, [0] about the same, [-1]
more unfavorable.”
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Table 4.1: Multiple Reported Expectations per Firm and Date: Within-Firm Correlation
Manufacturing Services Retail/Wholesale
1990-2015 2004-2015 1990-2006
# Firm-Date Combinations 968255 325536 238971
# Firm-Date Comb. w. Multiple Reported Expectations 7657 1030 117930
- of Which All Reports Refer to Same Category 6512 841 97129
- of Which Reports Refer to Distinct Categories 1145 189 20801
Fraction of Expectations Diverging from
Mode Expectation in Case of Multiple Reports 0.067 0.056 0.063
Notes: This table summarizes the degree to which firms in the different sector-specific surveys provided
multiple reports regarding their business expectations for the next six months (Q2) at the same date,
i.e., multiple reported expectations per firm-date combination. The frequencies are comparable once
computed for the case of Q1 and hence not displayed here. Statistics on firms in the retail and wholesale
survey are not displayed for the period after the methodological break in February 2006 as firms always
reported to the IBS once per month.
4.2.1 Standardization of Observational Units to the Firm Level
The level of observational units slightly differs across the sector-specific surveys of the IBS
as questions either refer to the firm as a whole or to specific products of the firm. Aiming
at the construction of a homogeneous data set, I define the firm as the unit of observation
and aggregate the micro data to this level. As the anonymized micro data of the IBS do
not allow to sharply discriminate between subsidiaries of the same company in different
locations and firms reporting to the IBS in one location only, the term “firm” refers to
both types of entities interchangeably. As the identification of manufacturing firms is not
unambiguous in many cases during the 1980s, I restrict the dataset to observations since
1990.6
To begin with, I have to cope with a methodological change in the retail/wholesale
survey of the IBS: Since February 2006, firms have been asked to answer each survey
question only once while referring to the firm as a whole. Before this date, firms were
asked to answer the same set of questions several times for different products on the same
questionnaire. As summarized in Table 4.1 for the example of answers to Q2, almost half
of the firms (49%) provided assessments of expected business conditions with respect to
more than one product per point in time prior to the break.
6The micro data of the IBS usually contain an anonymized identification variable “idnum” which
originates from IFO’s address database. This variable is needed to unambiguously discriminate between
firms because the firm-specific identifiers in the IBS micro data (“runnum”) of firms that dropped out of
the survey could potentially have been assigned to newly entering firms. As the identifier “idnum” is not
available for many manufacturing firms during the 1980s, the dataset is restricted to observations since
1990 for which the identifier “idnum” is available. This restriction is not too restrictive in light of the
fact that administrative data at the industry-level are only available according to the WZ 03 and WZ 08
classification systems since the early 1990s in most cases.
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Figure 4.1: Correction of the Methodological Break in Retail/Wholesale Survey
Current Business Conditions (Q1) Expected Business Conditions (Q2)
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Notes: The figures plot the cross-sectional means (upper graphs) and standard deviations (lower graphs)
of current business conditions (left) and expected business conditions (right) of retail and wholesale firms
over time. Before January 2006, the reports to the retail and wholesale survey of the IBS referred to
different products of the firms. This data is aggregated to the firm level by taking means and rounding to
the next integer. Cross-sectional means and standard deviations of the aggregated data are plotted using
a dashed line. Accordingly, the solid lines display the cross-sectional means and standard deviations of
reports of retail and wholesale firms after February 2006 that referred to the firm as a whole.
Importantly, the answers before the methodological break were almost perfectly corre-
lated within firms at a given point in time. If retail or wholesale firms provided assessments
with respect to multiple products at the same date, they reported exactly the same ex-
pected business conditions for all products in more than 82% of cases, see Table 4.1. In
turn, only 6% of the product-specific expectations differed from the mode expectation of
each firm at a given date.
In order to use the entire universe of the micro data in the retail/wholesale survey, I
aggregate the data before January 2006 to the firm level by taking arithmetic means of
the answers. In light of the strong within-firm correlation in case of multiple reports at a
given date, it is reasonable to assume that the current and expected business conditions of
each firm are well captured by the average reports with respect to different products. In
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case of dissimilar assessments referring to different products, I round the mean response
to the next integer. This includes that a mean of “-0.5” is rounded to “-1” for the sake of
symmetry. Figure 4.1 plots the time series of cross-sectional means and standard devia-
tions of aggregated reported business conditions and expectations of retail and wholesale
firms over time. The graphs indicate that the methodological break between January and
February 2006 did not generate differing patterns in the data and that the data before
January 2006 can be aggregated to the firm-level without major concerns.7
In contrast, the aggregation to the firm-level is more straightforward in the case of
the manufacturing and services surveys of the IBS. While the questions in the services
survey refer to the firm as a whole, firms in the manufacturing survey are asked for an
assessment regarding a specific product. As the latter usually refers to the main product
of the firm and firms are usually observed only once per month in the survey, the responses
of manufacturing firms are interpreted as referring to the current and expected business
conditions of the firm as a whole. In 0.8% (0.3%) of all reporting periods, however, the
micro data in the manufacturing (services) survey contain multiple reports per firm at a
given date. As documented in Table 4.1, simultaneous reports are usually identical. In
turn, only 7% of these multiple reports differ from the mode of the firms’ other business
expectations reported at the same point in time. Similar to the procedure in the retail
and wholesale survey, the small number of multiple observations per reporting month is
aggregated to the firm level by taking means and rounding to the next integer.
4.2.2 Harmonization of Industry Classification Systems
As the organization of sector identifiers strongly differs between the different sector-specific
surveys of the IBS, I describe the procedure of the assignment of firms to the officialWZ 03
and WZ 08 classification systems separately for each survey.
Manufacturing Survey
The transfer of sector identifiers to the official WZ 03 and WZ 08 classification systems
is most straightforward for firms in the manufacturing survey. In the micro data, infor-
mation about each firm’s main sector of business activity is contained in three variables
denoted “sector_wz93,” “sector_wz08,” and “sector_ifo.” Importantly, these variables do
not only contain sector codes, but also include verbal descriptions for each sector. While
“sector_wz93” and “sector_wz08” contain five-digit codes that are roughly equivalent to
the official older classification system of 1993 (WZ 93 ) as well as to WZ 08, “sector_ifo”
7Moreover, the distribution of reported business conditions and expectations for the next six months
is similar before and after the break. During the twelve months before the break, firms reported non-
neutral current (expected) business conditions in 49% (40%) of the cases. In the year after the break,
these numbers were largely comparable (47% and 41%).
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refers to a four-digit code that provides additional details about the good produced by the
firm. In more than 99% of the observations, all three identifiers are given simultaneously
in the dataset.
Based on this information, each observation is assigned to the respective WZ 08 sec-
tor. To begin with, I use the “WZ 93→WZ 03 ” conversion table provided by the Federal
Statistical Office, see Destatis (2003) p. 548ff.8 In some cases, however, the variable “sec-
tor_wz93” is empty or only provides information at the three-digit level. I circumvent
this problem by using more precise information contained in the variables “sector_wz08”
and/or “sector_ifo” to group the observation to the corresponding four-digit group ac-
cording to WZ 03.9
In turn, the variable “sector_wz08” is used to assign each observation to a WZ 08
sector. Again, information from the other sector identifiers is used once the observation
cannot directly be grouped to a four-digit WZ 08 sector based on information contained
in “sector_wz08.”
Overall, more than 99% of all observations in the manufacturing survey can be assigned
to sector identifiers of both classification systems that are informative at least at the four-
digit level.
Services Survey
The organization of sector identifiers in the micro data of the services survey differs from
the manufacturing survey as there is only one identifier available at any given point in
time. Firms have been coded with respect to the WZ 08 classification system only since
April 2011. Before this date, the micro data contain sector identifiers according to the
older WZ 03 classification system.10
Updating the sector identifiers in 2011, the practitioners of the IFO Institute assigned
each firm “by hand” to the WZ 08 -industry that was most consistent with its actual
business. Hence, the transfer of firms from WZ 03 to WZ 08 does not necessarily coincide
8In fact, the WZ 03 classification system is only marginally different from the older WZ 93, while
the replacement of WZ 03 by WZ 08 constituted a major re-organization of the classification system.
9For example, an observation classified as “sector_wz93=29400 Manufacture of machine tools” and
“sector_wz08=28410 Manufacture of metal forming machinery“ is grouped to the WZ 03 -industry “29420
Manufacture of machine-tools for metalworking.“ Moreover, if information is only available at the three-
digit level in all sector identifiers, I group this observation to the most general four-digit code, e.g., “1530(0)
Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables” is grouped to “1533(0) Processing and preserving of
fruit and vegetables, not elsewhere classified.” Obviously, this adjustment is only relevant if administrative
data at the four-digit level is merged to the firms in the IBS because the code “15.30” does not exist in
the official version of the WZ 03 classification system.
10In a small number of cases, the respective variables “sector_wz03” and “sector_wz08” only provide
information at the two-digit or three-digit level. As in the case of the manufacturing survey, I group these
observations to the most general four-digit code, e.g., “6200(0) Computer programming, consultancy and
related activities” is grouped to “6209(0) Other information technology and computer service activities.”
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with the official conversion table provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Therefore,
it is convenient to assign each firm’s post-break WZ 08 identifier to the period before
the break. Following this procedure, 78% of all observations prior to March 2011 can
be matched to sector identifiers according to WZ 08. The remaining observations are
assigned to the mode WZ 08 identifier of firms in the same three-digit industry according
to WZ 03. Accordingly, the pre-break WZ 03 identifiers are forwarded to the post-break
era.
Retail and Wholesale Survey
The methodological break in the questionnaires of the retail and wholesale survey in 2006
involves a change in the organization of sector identifiers. Since February 2006, firms
have been classified according to the WZ 03 classification system. During this period,
WZ 03 -specific identifiers can directly be used without major corrections and transferred
to the WZ 08 classification using the “WZ 03→WZ 08 ” conversion table provided by the
Federal Statistical Office, see Destatis (2008) p. 663ff.11
Until January 2006, each observation is classified in accordance with an IBS-specific
product classification system that is more detailed than the WZ 03 or WZ 08 indus-
try classifications. The respective identifier, denoted as “sector_ifo,” contains a verbal
description of the good and is usually accompanied with a variable, denoted “typtra,”
indicating whether the firm is a retailer or a wholesaler. I assign each combination of
“sector_ifo” and “typtra” to the corresponding WZ 03 and WZ 08 identifiers “by hand.”
To complicate things, retail and wholesale firms in East Germany were coded differ-
ently prior to 2006. In contrast to their counterparts in West Germany, the variable “sec-
tor_ifo” is very close to the WZ 03 classification system in the case of East German firms.
For example, the code “sector_ifo=[51550] chemical products” can only be found for East
German firms. Therefore, this observation is assigned to the WZ 03 -industry “[51550]
Wholesale of chemical products.” In contrast, the combination “sector_ifo=[51590] cos-
metic articles and personal hygiene articles” and “typtra=1” (retail) is unique to West
German firms and hence assigned to the WZ 03 -industry “[52331] Retail sale of cosmetic
and toilet articles.”12
In order to finalize the standardization of observational units to the firm-level described
11In order to be able to match data from administrative sources at the four-digit level to the micro
data of the IBS, I need to correct for minor deviations of the sector identifier in the IBS from the official
WZ 03 system. For example, the IBS-codes “[50131] Retail sale of new motor vehicles” and “[50132]
Retail sale of used motor vehicles” are assigned to the official WZ 03 -code “[50103] Retail sale of motor
vehicles.”
12Moreover, there is a third classification that covers all East German firms until June 1998 on a very
rough scale that cannot be transferred to the more precise WZ 03 and WZ 08 classification systems. The
sector identifier of these firms is set to missing.
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Figure 4.2: Number of Firms in the Different Sector-Specific Surveys of the IBS
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Notes: This figure plots the number of firms in the respective sector-specific surveys of the IBS over time
conditional on responding to the survey in at least two months.
in Section 4.2.1, firms with multiple observations per period in time, which potentially
are grouped to different sector identifiers, are assigned to unique WZ 03 and WZ 08
codes in each period. I proceed in the following steps: first, I use the sector identifier
referring to the first product of each firm in every period if all sector identifiers are
identical or within the same four-digit group. Second, I match the sector identifiers of
firms that are still ambiguous to the unique identifier of February 2006 if the firm “survives”
the methodological break. Third, if firms are not observed after the break in 2006 and
observations are not within the same four-digit sector, but in the same three-digit group,
I assign the firm to the mode sector of all observations at a given point in time. Lastly,
the remaining observations are grouped to a unique sector identifier by hand.13
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4.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Harmonized IBS Micro Data
The harmonized sample of the IBS comprises of on average approximately 5500 reports of
firms per month between 1990 and 2015 if the data is restricted to firms that responded
to the survey in at least two months. As displayed in Figure 4.2, the number of reporting
firms per survey period is largest in the manufacturing survey (on average approximately
3100 firms), but steadily declining over time. In contrast, the number of firms in the
retail and wholesale survey has been relatively constant (on average roughly 1300 firms).
Moreover, an average number of 2300 firms has responded to the services survey since its
introduction in October 2004.
Conditional on responding to the survey more than once, attrition is very low and
firms are observed for 7.5 years on average.14 While attrition of firms is not found to be
random, dropout of firms does not appear to be problematic for most research questions.
As documented in Column (1) of Table 4.2, firms reported current business conditions—
coded on a trichotomous scale with values {−1, 0, 1}—that were significantly worse by
-0.12 on average during the last month in the sample compared to the mean of reported
business conditions in all other observations.15 However, dropout of firms does not appear
to be driven by industry-specific shocks because the estimated average condition in the
month prior to firms’ dropout is largely unaffected by the inclusion of date fixed effects
at the level of four-digit industries, see Column (2). In contrast, the coefficient drops
by more than half after controlling for firm fixed effects in Column (3). Hence, firms
that drop out of the sample generally performed worse during all other periods compared
to the remaining firms. Furthermore, the pattern of attrition does not appear to have
changed substantially over time. As can be inferred from Table 4.A.1 in the Appendix,
the survival rates are rather constant across different cohorts of firms.
Moreover, the response rates to the survey are relatively high despite of the fact that
participation is voluntary. On average, firms answer the questionnaire in 80.3% of months
13If the remaining firms have distinct sector identifiers in less than three months, these observations
are assigned to the sector code of the previous month. Moreover, there are 23 retailers of food in
the groups WZ 03 :52110/WZ 08 :47110 (“Retail sale in non-specialized stores with food, beverages or
tobacco predominating”) and WZ 03 :52200/WZ 08 :47200 (“Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in
specialized stores”) which are manually assigned to group WZ 03 :52270/WZ 08 :47290 “Other retail sale
of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores.” In addition, 27 retailers of cars and motorcycles
including their maintenance are sorted toWZ 03 :50103/WZ 08 :45110 “Retail sale of cars.” The remaining
firms with ambiguous sector identifiers are assigned to groups WZ 03 :52120/WZ 08 :47789 “Other retail
sale” if they are retailers or WZ 03 :51900/WZ 08 :46900 “Other wholesale” if they are wholesalers.
14The average duration in the data set of firms in the different sector-specific surveys respectively is
9.4 years (manufacturing), 6.5 years (retail and wholesale), and 5.4 years (services).
15The respective empirical model reads: Conditionsi,t = (β0+)β1 ×
1(Last Observation of Firm in Samplei) + (αi + δt × 1(Sectori)) + εi,t, where Conditionsi,t de-
notes current business conditions as reported to Q1, 1(Last Observation of Firm in Samplei) is a dummy
that is one during the last date firm i is observed in the sample and αi and δt×1(Sectori) are firm fixed
effects and time fixed effects at the four-digit industry level.
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Table 4.2: Relationship Between Business Conditions and Sample Attrition
Current Business Conditiont
(1) (2) (3)
1(Last Observation of Firm in Samplei) -0.12∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0044)
Constant yes
Firm FE yes
Time*4-dig. Sector FE yes yes
R2 0.095 0.224 0.462
Observations 1698864 1698864 1692297
Notes: The dependent variable is the firms’ reported current business situation to Q1 of the IBS.
1(Last Observation of Firm in Samplei) is a dummy that is one during the last date firm i is observed
in the sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
and response rates do not differ substantially between firms in the industry surveys on
manufacturing (82.0%), retail and wholesale (79.0%), and services (77.1%). Even though
the response rate of firms is high, researchers working with the micro data of the IBS
might need to deal with non-response of firms if their empirical approach is based on
firms’ reports to the IBS in several consecutive months, for example. In order not to lose
too many observations, one possibility is to linearly interpolate missing answers to the
survey question of interest as long as the gap in the data is shorter than a predefined
number of periods. If missing answers to Q1 are interpolated as long as answers are
missing for at most two consecutive months, for example, the “artificial” response rate
increases to 87.6% on average. As documented in Figure 4.A.1 in the Appendix, the
interpolated responses do not differ substantially from the answers originally contained
in the dataset.16
4.3 Interpretation of Current and Expected Business
Conditions in the IBS
This section uses the harmonized firm-level data of the IBS in order to shed light on the
interpretation of the survey questions regarding firms’ assessments about their current
business conditions (Q1) as well as their expectations for the next six months (Q2).
Unfortunately, the wording of the questions is rather vague with respect to the dimension
16See Seiler (2014) for a more detailed analysis on the determinants of non-response in the IBS.
Moreover, Seiler and Heumann (2013) provide a statistical analysis of different imputation methods and
conclude that the bias due to non-response does not significantly reduce the forecasting performance of
the IFO Business Climate Index that is based on the micro data of the IBS.
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and the benchmark of the latent variable firms are supposed to refer to in Q1 and Q2.17
On the one hand, the wording of Q1 appears to ask for an assessment of the level of firms’
current business conditions, e.g., as being “good.” However, Q1 does not set a benchmark
to which firms should relate this level, for example as a deviation from the trend. On
the other hand, Q2 is formulated using relative terms such as “more favorable” but does
not provide an explicit benchmark, either. The more natural interpretation is that firms
relate the expected development of their business conditions during the next six months
to the situation prevalent in the reporting month. In this case, Q2 would capture the
expected change in business conditions. However, it is also reasonable that firms opting
for “[1] more favorable” in Q2 expect that their business conditions in the next six months
will be more favorable compared to the trend. Then, Q2 would capture the expected level
of future business conditions.
The majority of studies that used the IBS data at aggregated levels implicitly inter-
preted both survey questions along the same dimension. For example, there is a large
literature on the forecasting properties of the “IFO Business Climate Index” (henceforth,
IBC) which is calculated as a weighted average of firms’ responses to Q1 and Q2.18 These
studies relate the IBC to time series such as aggregate production indices or GDP. Thereby,
the respective authors implicitly assume that the IBC can be interpreted in a sensible way,
i.e., that Q2 is not capturing the expected change in Q1.19
While time series of aggregated survey results have frequently been used in the lit-
erature, micro-econometric analyses that exploit the cross-sectional variation in firms’
responses to Q1 and Q2 are rare. In the majority of these cases, the relationship between
current and expected business conditions is not at the heart of the econometric analysis
and reports to Q1 (or Q2) serve as covariates that control for firm-specific business con-
ditions in other contexts.20 These studies usually do not provide an interpretation of the
17It is important to note that the IFO Institute deliberately does not provide a latent variable when
asking Q1 and Q2 in order to capture the “sentiment” of firms as closely as possible in the “IFO Business
Climate Index.” Given this flexibility, each firm can assess its current and expected business conditions
according to the variable that is most relevant in the context of its business. I thank Klaus Wohlrabe
from the IFO Institute for pointing this out.
18See Abberger and Wohlrabe (2006) for a survey of the literature on the forecasting properties of
the IBC. Precisely, the IBC is calculated as the average between the weighted mean of firms’ reported
current business conditions from Q1 and the weighted mean of firms’ business expectations from Q2.
19In contrast, the “IFO Business Cycle Clock,” which portrays the two components of the IBC in a
four-quadrant scheme, provides an exemption. For example, Abberger and Nierhaus (2011) follow this
method and relate average reports to Q1 to the deviation of real GDP from its trend as well as Q2 to
changes in this measure.
20For example, Fidrmuc and Hainz (2013) control for firms’ reported business conditions when assessing
the effect of banking regulation on cross-border lending. The same applies to Bachmann et al. (2013a)
and Kleemann and Wiegand (2014) who use answers to Q1 and Q2 as covariates when examining the
relationship between business volatility and price setting of firms as well as the role of real effects for
credit supply, respectively. A notable exemption is Buchen (2013), who analyzes the relationship between
mass media and the expectation formation of firms. Her dependent variable is based on Q2, while firms’
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survey questions as the reading of their main results is not depending on this issue.
The following analysis takes a step in the direction of a better understanding of the
interpretation of Q1 and Q2. First, Section 4.3.1 summarizes evidence from the analysis
of time series of average reported realized and expected business conditions and exploits
the newly-created possibility to match industry-specific revenue data to the IBS. Second,
Section 4.3.2 provides insights from panel regressions at the firm-level.
4.3.1 Insights from Aggregate Time Series
This section provides evidence for the interpretation of the survey questions Q1 and
Q2 by means of analyzing firms’ average reports of current and expected future business
conditions. For this purpose, I exploit the possibility that administrative data of industry-
level revenues can be matched to the harmonized IBS data and compared to average
responses of firms. Moreover, the relationship between Q1 and Q2 is directly examined
by comparing the time series of average reported current and expected future business
conditions.
4.3.1.1 Current Conditions: Relation to Administrative Revenue Data
In a meta-study of the retail and wholesale survey conducted by Abberger et al. (2009),
firms stated to mostly refer to profits or revenues when being asked for an assessment
of their current business situation in Q1 of the IBS. Unfortunately, firm-level data on
revenues or comparable measures are not available at monthly frequency. I circumvent
this problem by using monthly time series of seasonally adjusted revenues (Revenuess,t) at
the level of four-digit industries s in the manufacturing as well as retail/wholesale sector
provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. In lack of more detailed data, I further-
more use quarterly data of seasonally adjusted revenues at the two-digit industry level in
the services sector.21 For the sake of comparability to the time series of average reported
business conditions (Condt), the industry-level time series are weighted by the share of
firms in the respective sectors of the IBS (ωs), i.e., Revenuest =
∑
s ωsRevenuess,t.
22 In
reported business conditions (Q1) are in the control vector. However, her paper neither provides an
interpretation of Q1 and Q2, nor displays the coefficient that captures the relationship between current
conditions and expectations.
21The following time series of seasonally adjusted revenue indices are downloaded from Destatis’
GENESIS database: Manufacturing (code 42152/period 1992-2015/monthly frequency/4-digit indus-
try level) as well as Retail and Wholesale (45211,45212,45214/1994-2015/monthly/4-digit), and Services
(47414/2005-2015/quarterly/2-digit). In turn, average conditions are deseasonalized using fixed effects
for each month.
22It is important to note that it is not reasonable to compare average business conditions and revenues
separately for each industry because the number of firms in the IBS is too low in most four-digit industries.
Consequently, the correlation between both time series is usually quite low due to the trichotomy of the
survey data.
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Figure 4.3: Average Business Conditions Relative to Administrative Revenue Data
Manufacturing Retail & Wholesale Services
Panel A: Mean Realized Business Conditions vs. Level of Revenues
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Panel B: Mean Realized Business Conditions vs. Past Changes in Revenues
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Notes: Panel A plots the mean current business conditions as reported to Q1 in the IBS (right axis)
against the mean of industry-specific, seasonally adjusted revenue indices weighted by the number of
firms in each industry (left axis). Mean business conditions are deseasonalized by purging for month
fixed effects. For the subset of services firms, mean business conditions are transferred to quarterly
frequency by taking means as revenue data are only available on a quarterly basis. Both time series
are detrended using the log-deviation from an HP-filtered trend with smoothing parameter λ = 129, 600
(1,600) for monthly (quarterly) data. Panel B plots mean current business conditions (right axis) against
the annualized change in weighted revenues relative to six months before reporting date t (left axis).
the case of the services survey, the time series of average business conditions is transferred
to quarterly frequency by taking means.
On average, the level of reported business conditions closely tracks the variation in
administrative revenue data. This can be inferred from Panel A of Figure 4.3, which
displays the detrended time series ˆCondt and ˆRevenuest, i.e., the log-deviation of av-
erage conditions and revenues from an HP-filtered trend with the standard smoothing
parameters of λ = 129, 600 (1,600) for monthly (quarterly) data suggested by Ravn
and Uhlig (2002). Both series are strongly correlated despite of the fact that the IBS
data are only qualitative in nature and the revenue data are quantitative. In the case
of the manufacturing and services surveys, ˆCondt precede ˆRevenuest and the time se-
ries correlation is highest if average business conditions are lagged by three months/one
quarter, i.e., ρ( ˆRevenuest, ˆCondt−3) = 0.85 and 0.84, respectively. In the case of the
retail and wholesale sector, the time series correlation is highest at contemporaneity
(ρ( ˆRevenuest, ˆCondt) = 0.72) although revenues and average business conditions fluctuate
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much more erratically around their trends.23
Further, the relationship between average reported business conditions and past
changes in revenues is examined. As shown in Panel B of Figure 4.3, Condt is pos-
itively correlated with the time series of annualized changes in weighted revenues rel-
ative to six months before reporting date t, denoted ∆Revenuest,t−6. In contrast to
the “level”-interpretation of Panel A, average reported conditions lag past changes in
revenues by four months in the case of the manufacturing survey, six months in the
retail/wholesale survey, and one by quarter in the services survey. While the correla-
tion between both series is still relatively high (albeit lower than in Panel A) in the
case of the manufacturing and services surveys (ρ(∆Revenuest−4,t−10,Condt) = 0.72 and
ρ(∆Revenuest−3,t−9,Condt) = 0.70), the relationship is much weaker in the subset of re-
tail and wholesale firms (ρ(∆Revenuest−6,t−12,Condt) = 0.39). The comparison of average
business conditions and revenue data hence points into the direction of interpreting cur-
rent business conditions reported to Q1 in levels rather than changes relative to previous
periods.
4.3.1.2 Interpretation of Expected Future Business Conditions
Next, the analysis focuses at the interpretation of firms’ expected future business condi-
tions reported to Q2. While the wording of the question refers to an expected change in
future business conditions, the evidence presented in the following points more into the
direction of an interpretation in levels, i.e., that firms reporting to expect “more favorable”
business conditions expect their future business conditions to be above the trend rather
than to increase relative to today’s levels.
To begin with, I compare the time series of average expected future business conditions
in the next six months (Q2), denoted Exp+6mt , to average realized business conditions
(Q1). Panel A of Figure 4.4 plots the log-deviation of average realized and expected
future business conditions from the HP-filtered trend with λ = 129, 600.24 Both time
series are highly correlated across all sector-specific surveys. As expected, the time series
of average (detrended) business expectations precede the mean levels in realized business
conditions. In the manufacturing and services surveys, the correlation between both time
series is largest if average business expectations are lagged by five months, which closely
23The respective cross-correlograms are presented in Table 4.B.1 in the Appendix. Alternatively, the
time series can be detrended using growth rates. As shown in Figure 4.B.1 in the Appendix, the growth
rate in revenues closely fits the growth rates in average reported business conditions.
24Deviations from the HP-filtered trend are chosen for the sake of comparability to the results presented
in Figures 4.3 and 4.6. Figure 4.B.2 in the Appendix plots the time series of average business conditions
and expectations without detrending (Panel A). Further, Panel B of Figure 4.B.2 displays the mean
reports to Q1 and Q2 after purging for firm fixed effects in order to control for time-invariant firm-
specific optimism or pessimism as documented by Bachmann and Elstner (2015) in a related context.
The results do not deviate substantially from those using deviations from the HP-filtered trend.
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Figure 4.4: Average Business Conditions Relative to Average Business Expectations
Manufacturing Retail & Wholesale Services
Panel A: Mean Expectations vs. Mean Realized Business Conditions
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Panel B: Mean Expectations vs. Past Changes in Mean Realized Business Conditions
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Notes: Panel A plots the time series of seasonally adjusted mean reports on current business conditions
(Q1) and expected business conditions for the next six months (Q2) of firms in the respective industry
surveys of the IBS. The time series are seasonally adjusted by controlling for month fixed effects. Both
time series are detrended using the log-deviation from an HP-filtered trend with smoothing parameter
λ = 129, 600 (1,600) for monthly (quarterly) data. Panel B plots mean expected business conditions
(right axis) against the change in average realized business conditions (Q1) relative to six months before
reporting date t (left axis).
corresponds to the forecast horizon in Q2 (ρ( ˆExp
+6m
t ,
ˆCondt+5) = 0.81 in both surveys).
In the case of the retail and wholesale survey, the correlation between both time series is
strongest at contemporaneity (ρ( ˆExp
+6m
t ,
ˆCondt) = 0.82).
Then, I examine the interpretation that is closest to the wording of the questions,
i.e., that Q1 refers to an expected change in future business conditions captured by Q2.
As displayed in Panel B of Figure 4.4, the time series of average expectations and the
change in average realized business conditions during the last 6 months are strongly
correlated in the case of the manufacturing and services surveys. However, average
expectations do not appear to precede changes in average business conditions because
the correlation between the time series is highest at contemporaneity in both cases, i.e.,
ρ(Exp+6mt , (Condt − Condt−6)) = 0.85 and 0.89 in the manufacturing and services sur-
vey, respectively. As can be inferred from the cross-correlograms in Table 4.B.2 in the
Appendix, the time series correlation between mean expectations regarding the next six
months and the subsequently realized change in business conditions during the next six
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Figure 4.5: Relationship Between Past Changes and Future Levels in Business Conditions
Manufacturing Retail & Wholesale Services
−
.3
−
.2
−
.1
0
.1
Lo
g−
D
ev
. o
f A
ve
ra
ge
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 fr
om
 T
re
nd
 
−
.6
−
.4
−
.2
0
.2
.4
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 A
ve
ra
ge
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 r
el
. t
o 
6 
M
on
th
s 
ag
o
1990m1 1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1 2015m1
Date
Past Change in Conditions
Level of Business Conditions
−
.2
−
.1
0
.1
.2
Lo
g−
D
ev
. o
f A
ve
ra
ge
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 fr
om
 T
re
nd
 
−
.2
0
.2
.4
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 A
ve
ra
ge
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 r
el
. t
o 
6 
M
on
th
s 
ag
o
1990m1 1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1 2015m1
Date
Past Change in Conditions
Level of Business Conditions
−
.1
5
−
.1
−
.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
Lo
g−
D
ev
. o
f A
ve
ra
ge
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 fr
om
 T
re
nd
 
−
.3
−
.2
−
.1
0
.1
.2
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 A
ve
ra
ge
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 r
el
. t
o 
6 
M
on
th
s 
ag
o
2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1 2012m1 2014m1 2016m1
Date
Past Change in Conditions
Level of Business Conditions
Notes: Time series of the change in average realized business conditions (Q1) relative to six months
before reporting date t (left axis) are plotted against the detrended level of average reported current
business conditions (Q1) (right axis). The latter time series is detrended using the log-deviation from an
HP-filtered trend with smoothing parameter λ = 129, 600. Both time series are seasonally adjusted by
controlling for month fixed effects.
months (Condt+6 − Condt) is much lower, i.e., ρ = 0.28 (manufacturing) and 0.34 (ser-
vices).
Furthermore, the relationship between Q2 and changes in Q1 is much worse in the
subset of retail and wholesale firms. Here, the correlation between both time series
is much weaker than in the first scenario. The correlation coefficient is highest at
the third lead of business expectations, i.e., once expectations formulated in month
t are compared to the change in conditions between three and nine months in the
past (ρ(Exp+6mt , (Condt−3 − Condt−9)) = 0.54). On top of this, the correlation be-
tween expectations and future realized changes in business conditions even turns negative
(ρ(Exp+6mt , (Condt+6 − Condt)) = −0.13).
The high correlation between past changes in Q1 and average business expectations
documented in Panel B for the case of manufacturing and services firms could be recon-
ciled with the “level”-interpretation of Panel A if past changes in realized conditions were
a strong predictor for their future level. Figure 4.5 points into exactly this direction as
changes in business conditions of manufacturing and services firms during the previous
six months are indeed strongly correlated with the subsequent deviation of business con-
ditions from their trend. Interestingly, this pattern is much weaker in the case of retail
and wholesale firms which possibly explains the lower correlation between their average
expectations and past changes in realized business conditions.
Relating average expectations about future business conditions to administrative rev-
enue data delivers a comparable picture. Average reported business expectations of firms
precede the level of administrative revenue data in all sector-specific surveys. Panel A
of Figure 4.6 displays the detrended time series ˆExp
+6m
t and
ˆRevenuest. In the case
of the retail and wholesale survey, the time series correlation is highest if expectations
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Figure 4.6: Average Business Expectations Relative to Administrative Revenue Data
Manufacturing Retail & Wholesale Services
Panel A: Mean Expectations vs. Level of Revenues
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Panel B: Mean Expectations vs. Past Changes in Revenues
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Notes: Panel A plots the mean expected business conditions for the next six months as reported to Q2 in
the IBS (right axis) against the mean of industry-specific, seasonally adjusted revenue indices weighted
by the number of firms in each industry (left axis). Mean business expectations are deseasonalized
by purging for month fixed effects. For the subset of services firms, mean business expectations are
transferred to quarterly frequency by taking means as revenue data are only available on a quarterly
basis. Both time series are detrended using the log-deviation from an HP-filtered trend with smoothing
parameter λ = 129, 600 (1,600) for monthly (quarterly) data. Panel B plots mean expected business
conditions (right axis) against the annualized change in weighted revenues relative to six months before
reporting date t (left axis).
precede revenues by six months (ρ( ˆRevenuest, ˆExp
+6m
t−6 ) = 0.71). In the case of the man-
ufacturing (services) survey, the time series correlation is highest if average business ex-
pectations are lagged by eight months (three quarters), i.e., ρ( ˆRevenuest, ˆExp
+6m
t−8 ) = 0.63
(ρ( ˆRevenuest, ˆExp
+6m
t−9 ) = 0.75). The finding that expectations preceded revenues by more
than six months in the latter two cases is in line with the observation in Section 4.3.1.1
that the level of realized business conditions preceded the time series of revenues by three
months in the manufacturing and services surveys.
In contrast, expectations do not precede future changes in revenues to a degree that is
comparable to the “level”-interpretation. For the case of the manufacturing and services
survey, average expectations are again highly correlated with past changes in revenues,
see Panel B of Figure 4.6 and the cross-correlograms summarized in Table 4.B.3 in the
Appendix. The correlation between the time series approaches its maximum at the second
lag of expectations in the subset of manufacturing firms, i.e., ρ(Exp+6mt−2 ,∆Revenuest,t−6) =
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0.82. Similarly, the correlation between both series is highest if expectations are lagged by
one quarter in the services survey, i.e., ρ(Exp+6mt−3 ,∆Revenuest,t−6) = 0.84. Comparable
to the evidence from Panel B of Figure 4.4, the relationship between expectations and
changes in revenues is much weaker for the case of retail and wholesale firms. Here,
the correlation is largest if expectations are related to the change in revenues between
seven and one months prior to the date when expectations are reported to the IBS, i.e.,
ρ(Exp+6mt ,∆Revenuest−1,t−7) = 0.47.
Taken together, the evidence presented in this section appears to be more consistent
with the “level”-interpretation of Q2. In this case, Q2 captures the expected level of future
business conditions being above/below the trend instead of the expected future change
in conditions relative to the level in the reporting month. With the exception of the
retail and wholesale survey, the latter interpretation cannot be ruled out with certainty,
however, as expectations stated in Q2 appear to reflect past changes in business conditions
and revenues to a comparable degree.
4.3.2 Relationship Between Survey Questions: Panel Regressions
The evidence based on aggregate time series presented in the previous section showed that
it is reasonable to interpret firms’ assessments of their current business conditions in levels.
In contrast, the picture is less clear regarding the interpretation of firms’ expectations
about their business conditions in the next six months. The evidence points into the
direction of interpreting expected conditions along the same lines as current conditions,
while the analysis could not rule out that Q2 captures the expected future changes in Q1.
In order to shed more light on the interpretation of the two main questions in the IBS,
this section takes a step forward by exploiting the panel dimension of the micro data.
For this purpose, I compare the degree to which firms’ expectations about business
conditions during the next six months either reflect the level of ex post realized future
business conditions or represent the ex post realized change in future business condi-
tions compared to the reporting month. Specifically, I perform several regressions of the
following form
Exp+6mi,t = β
′
1 Condi,t+l + β
′
2 ∆Condi,(t+l,t+l−6) + αi + εi,t, (4.1)
where Exp+6mi,t denotes firm i’s expectations for the next 6 months reported in month t to
Q2. The column vector Condi,t+l subsumes business conditions reported to Q1 l months
after reporting month t. In turn, the column vector ∆Condi,(t+l,t+l−6) refers to the six-
month change in business conditions at different points in time. I also add firm fixed
effects αi to control for time-invariant patterns in the expectation formation process of
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firms.25 The vectors β1 and β2 entail the coefficients of interest that capture the degree
to which expectations reflect future levels or changes of business conditions.
First, the level of business conditions realized six months after reporting date t is
strongly reflected in previously stated expectations. Column (1) of Table 4.3 displays the
results from regressing Exp+6mi,t on Condi,t+6 along with firm fixed effects. As standard
deviations of Exp+6mi,t and Condi,t+6 are of comparable size, the estimated coefficient β̂1
can be interpreted such that a one standard deviation increase in the level of ex post
realized business conditions in t + 6 is ceteris paribus associated with an appreciation of
expectations by 0.18 standard deviations in the panel of manufacturing, 0.16 standard
deviations for retailers and wholesalers as well as 0.13 standard deviations for firms in
services.
As displayed in Column (2), the inclusion of the current level of business conditions
does not substantially alter the degree to which ex post realized business conditions in
t + 6 are captured by expectations in the subset of manufacturing firms and services
companies. Hence, firms incorporate at least some information about the future level of
business conditions into their expectations that is not captured by their current business
condition. This effect is also prevalent in the retail and wholesale sector although the
coefficient capturing the effect of Condi,t+6 drops to 0.09 after controlling for Condi,t.26
Second, firms’ expectations are less strongly associated with the ex post realized change
in business conditions during the next six months (∆Condi,(t+6,t)). The results summarized
in Column (3) show that future changes in conditions are much less strongly reflected in
expectations compared to the future level in realized business conditions documented
above. In the case of manufacturing firms, β̂2 is only slightly positive and an increase in
∆Condi,(t+6,t) by one standard deviation is associated with an appreciation in Exp+6mi,t by
0.014 standard deviations, only. This relationship is also relatively small (β̂2 = 0.045) in
the subset of services firms and even turns negative in the case of retail and wholesale
firms (β̂2 = −0.10).
Including the change in business conditions during the previous six months to
model (4.1) does not substantially alter the degree to which future changes in business
conditions between t+6 and t are captured by expectations, see Column (4). Past changes
in conditions are reflected more strongly in the expectations of manufacturing firms as
25For example, firm fixed effects control for persistence in optimism or pessimism of firms as docu-
mented by Bachmann and Elstner (2015). The results do not differ once firm fixed effects are omitted
from the estimation as documented in Table 4.B.4 in the Appendix. Moreover, the results are robust
to the inclusion of time fixed effects as shown in Table 4.B.5. While time fixed effects control for the
general business cycle in business expectations, they also reduce the dimension of information reflected by
the other independent variables. The implications for the understanding of firms’ expectation formation
process are discussed in Chapter 1.
26This pattern is most likely due to heterogeneity in the forecast horizons of firms in the different
sector-specific surveys of the IBS. See Chapter 1 for a detailed analysis of this issue.
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Table 4.3: Relationship Between Survey Questions: Panel Regressions
Expected Business Conditons for the Next 6 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Manufacturing
Conditionst+6 0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0075)
Conditionst 0.10∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0053)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0046) (0.0066)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0049)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.26∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0084)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst 0.042∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0053)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.221 0.230 0.193 0.216 0.235 0.240 0.194 0.240
Observations 687178 687178 687178 687178 687178 687178 687178 687178
Panel B: Retail & Wholesale
Conditionst+6 0.16∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0038) (0.0092)
Conditionst 0.28∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0063)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) -0.10∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0080)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.0051
(0.0044) (0.0043)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.24∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0097)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst -0.13∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0063)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.322 0.384 0.314 0.332 0.384 0.397 0.314 0.397
Observations 243723 243723 243723 243723 243723 243723 243723 243723
Panel C: Services
Conditionst+6 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.0094) (0.013)
Conditionst 0.029∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0080)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.0027
(0.0060) (0.0074) (0.010)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0075)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.27∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst 0.087∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0080)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.323 0.323 0.314 0.320 0.324 0.333 0.316 0.333
Observations 187379 187379 187379 187379 187379 187379 187379 187379
Notes: The dependent variable is the business expectation for the next six months as reported to
Q2 of the IBS. Conditionst and Conditionst+6 are realized business conditons stated to Q1 at the
reporting month t as well as six months thereafter. Accordingly, (Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) and
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) capture the difference between realized business conditions at the respec-
tive dates. Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post realized business conditions in the following six
months. Standard errors are (two-way) clustered at the firm and date levels. Level of significance: * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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well as retailers and wholesalers than the ex post realized changes in future conditions.
In the case of services firms, both changes are reflected to a comparable degree. This
observation is in line with the results of Section 4.3.1.2 that average business expectations
are strongly correlated with past rather than future changes in business conditions.
Furthermore, a horse race between both interpretations clearly favors both variables
being driven by the same latent variable. As documented in Column (5) of Table 4.3, the
coefficient that captures the degree to which Condi,t+6 is reflected in expectations is largely
unaffected by the inclusion of future and past changes (∆Condi,(t+6,t) and ∆Condi,(t,t−6))
in the case of manufacturing and services firms and even increases strongly in size in the
sample of retail and wholesale firms. In contrast, the weight on ∆Condi,(t+6,t) gets either
negative (manufacturing and retail/wholesale) or insignificant (services), while the impact
of past changes strongly decreases across all sector-specific surveys.
Lastly, I demonstrate that expectations are even more strongly associated with the
average level of business conditions during the next six months compared to the level in
six months. Regressing business expectations on average reported conditions between t+1
and t+ 6, denoted Condi,t+1,t+6, delivers larger coefficients compared to the specification
using Condi,t+6 only. As displayed in Column (6), a one standard deviation increase in the
average level of ex post realized business conditions during the next six months is ceteris
paribus associated with an appreciation of expectations by 0.26 standard deviations in
the panel of manufacturing, 0.24 standard deviations for retail and wholesale firms, and
0.27 standard deviations in the case of service companies. In turn, the change in average
future business conditions relative to the level in t (Condi,t+1,t+6−Condi,t+6) is much less
strongly reflected in firms’ expectations as can be inferred from Columns (7) and (8).
Taking together, the evidence presented in this section strongly speaks in favor of
interpreting business expectations in levels rather than changes of business conditions.
Despite of the potentially misleading wording of the question, it is very unlikely that Q2
captures the expected change in Q1. In contrast, it is more likely that firms refer to the
current and expected level of their revenues when answering Q1 and Q2.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter describes how two major obstacles that have prevented panel data research
based on the universe of firms in the IBS can be removed: heterogeneities (1) across dif-
ferent sector-specific surveys of the IBS in the level of the observational units (product vs.
firm) as well as (2) in the industry classification systems used in the micro data. For this
purpose, I aggregate the survey responses of the most important sector-specific surveys
covering manufacturing, retail/wholesale, and services to the firm-level and transfer the
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sector identifiers contained in the micro data to the official German industry classification
systems WZ 03 and WZ 08.
The harmonized firm-level dataset expands the scope for economic research based on
the micro data of the IBS which has up to date mainly been restricted to the analysis of
manufacturing firms. The value added of the harmonization procedure is largest for the
micro data in the retail and wholesale survey as it adjusts for a break in the methodology in
the survey in 2006. This adjustment permits to jointly analyze firms’ survey responses in
the time periods before and after the break. For example, the analysis of Chapter 1 makes
use of this opportunity in order to study the formation of firms’ expectations regarding
their own future business conditions across firms in all main sectors of the economy.
Moreover, we are able to examine anticipation effects of retail firms to an increase in
German value added taxes in 2007 based on data before and after the methodological
break.
In addition, the transfer of the sector identification variables to the standard industry
classification systems WZ 03 and WZ 08 is useful for at least two reasons. On the one
hand, fixed effects can be applied along the same level of industry aggregation in order
to flexibly control for industry-specific variation of any kind. On the other hand, the
harmonized IBS data can be merged to industry-level data from other sources which
are usually coded according to the classification systems WZ 03 and WZ 08. Based on
this, Chapter 3 matches firms in the IBS to data on the distribution of wages in their
industry and location in order to identify the degree to which firms are affected by the
introduction of statutory minimum wages in Germany in 2015. Moreover, Chapter 2
examines the relationship between market volatility and the information content of firms’
expectations in the IBS based on industry-level revenue data from administrative sources.
Furthermore, the harmonized firm-level dataset can be used to shed light on the inter-
pretation of the most widely used variables in the IBS, i.e., firms’ assessments about their
current business conditions as well as their expectations for the next six months. The
chapter provides new insights on this issue based on the analysis of average time series of
both questions in relation to industry-level revenue data as well as applying panel regres-
sions at the firm-level. The results speak in favor of interpreting firms’ reported business
conditions and expectations as their assessment of current and expected future levels of
revenues. In contrast, it is very unlikely that business expectations capture the expected
change in reported current business conditions despite of the potentially misleading word-
ing of the questions. Empirical studies that examine the relationship of firms’ expected
and realized business conditions should hence interpret the respective survey questions as
referring to the similar dimension of the same latent variable.
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Appendices to Chapter 4
4.A Additional Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.A.1: Attrition: Survival Rates Depending on Starting Dates
Start Date t Firms @ t Fraction of Firms Surviving (in %) For At Least...
6m 1yr 2yrs 5yrs 10yrs 15yrs 20yrs
1992m1 6603 98.6 95.3 89.5 70.2 49.0 33.9 24.0
1995m1 6914 94.8 90.4 81.2 61.8 42.0 29.2 20.5
1998m1 5855 94.9 89.9 81.7 63.9 43.9 31.2
2001m1 5062 95.7 91.8 83.7 66.2 46.5 31.1
2004m1 4573 95.5 91.5 84.9 68.1 48.2
2007m1 7526 94.8 90.1 83.5 67.2
2010m1 8452 96.1 92.3 85.9 66.6
2013m1 8503 95.5 90.9 82.2
Notes: This table summarizes the survival rates of firms, i.e., the fraction of firms that is still contained
in the sample after a specific period of time elapsed since several predefined starting dates t.
Figure 4.A.1: Effect of Linear Interpolation of Missing Data
Current Business Conditions Expected Business Conditions
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Notes: Time series of average reports on current business conditions as stated to Q1 in the IBS and
average values of interpolated business conditions if missing answers are linearly interpolated as long as
the gap in the data is not longer than two consecutive months.
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4.B Interpretation of Current and Expected Business
Conditions: Supplementary Material
Figure 4.B.1: Average Business Conditions Relative to Administrative Revenue Data:
Detrending Using Growth Rates
Manufacturing Retail & Wholesale Services
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Notes: Times series of seasonally adjusted mean reports on current business conditions as stated to Q1
in the IBS (right axis) and the mean of industry-specific, seasonally adjusted revenue indices weighted by
the number of firms in each industry (left axis). Mean business conditions are deseasonalized by purging
for month fixed effects and and detrended using the change relative to twelve months before. For the
subset of services firms, mean business conditions are transferred to quarterly frequency by taking means
as revenue data are only available on a quarterly basis.
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Figure 4.B.2: Average Business Conditions Relative to Average Business Expectations:
Alternative Specifications
Manufacturing Retail & Wholesale Services
Panel A: Mean Expectations vs. Mean Business Conditions
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Panel B: Mean Expectations vs. Mean Business Conditions - Purged for Firm FE
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Notes: Panel A plots the time series of seasonally adjusted mean reports on current business conditions
(Q1) and expected business conditions for the next six months (Q2) of firms in the respective sector-
specific surveys of the IBS. The time series are seasonally adjusted by controlling for month fixed effects,
but not detrended as in Figure 4.4. Panel B plots the same time series after additionally purging for firm
fixed effects.
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Table 4.B.1: Cross-Correlogram: Average Current Conditions vs. Revenue Data
Lag/Lead l in Months -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: Manufacturing
ρ( ˆRevenuest+l,
ˆCondt) 0.254 0.364 0.471 0.567 0.656 0.731 0.783 0.822 0.845 0.849 0.837 0.815 0.779
ρ(
Rev.t+l−Rev.t+l−6
Rev.t+l−6
,Condt) 0.697 0.714 0.717 0.701 0.679 0.644 0.588 0.52 0.443 0.358 0.264 0.172 0.086
Panel B: Retail and Wholesale
ρ( ˆRevenuest+l,
ˆCondt) 0.404 0.475 0.518 0.558 0.621 0.669 0.724 0.677 0.716 0.715 0.685 0.667 0.68
ρ(
Rev.t+l−Rev.t+l−6
Rev.t+l−6
,Condt) 0.385 0.367 0.375 0.339 0.333 0.331 0.317 0.259 0.261 0.241 0.19 0.158 0.133
Panel C: Services
ρ( ˆRevenuest+l,
ˆCondt) 0.173 0.509 0.763 0.842 0.808
ρ(
Rev.t+l−Rev.t+l−6
Rev.t+l−6
,Condt) 0.687 0.700 0.577 0.321 0.049
Notes: Cross-correlogram of the time series of average (seasonally adjusted) business conditions (Q1) and
revenues. In the first row, both time series are detrended by means of an HP-filter with smoothing pa-
rameter λ = 129, 600 (1600) for monthly (quarterly) data. In the second row, average business conditions
are contrasted to the growth rate in revenues relative to six months before.
Table 4.B.2: Cross-Correlogram: Average Current Conditions vs. Average Expectations
Lag/Lead l in Months -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel A: Manufacturing
ρ( ˆCondt+l,
ˆExp
+6m
t ) -0.043 0.075 0.2 0.323 0.45 0.567 0.654 0.724 0.775 0.8 0.807 0.796 0.772
ρ((Condt+l − Condt+l−6),Exp
+6m
t ) 0.588 0.666 0.736 0.789 0.83 0.845 0.816 0.755 0.665 0.552 0.418 0.276 0.151
Panel B: Retail and Wholesale
ρ( ˆCondt+l,
ˆExp
+6m
t ) 0.359 0.465 0.567 0.632 0.728 0.818 0.78 0.796 0.792 0.748 0.693 0.643 0.596
ρ((Condt+l − Condt+l−6),Exp
+6m
t ) 0.496 0.527 0.539 0.509 0.504 0.489 0.392 0.299 0.209 0.118 -0.007 -0.125 -0.151
Panel C: Services
ρ( ˆCondt+l,
ˆExp
+6m
t ) -0.101 0.021 0.15 0.277 0.416 0.54 0.632 0.71 0.767 0.799 0.813 0.811 0.8
ρ((Condt+l − Condt+l−6),Exp
+6m
t ) 0.513 0.613 0.706 0.777 0.849 0.883 0.867 0.812 0.724 0.615 0.476 0.335 0.219
Notes: Cross-correlogram of the time series of average (seasonally adjusted) business conditions (Q1)
and business expectations for the next six months (Q2). In the first row, both time series are detrended
by means of an HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 129, 600. In the second row, average business
expectations are contrasted to the difference in average business conditions relative to six months before.
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Table 4.B.3: Cross-Correlogram: Average Business Expectations vs. Revenue Data
Lag/Lead l in Months -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Panel A: Manufacturing
ρ( ˆRevenuest+l,
ˆExp
+6m
t ) -0.205 -0.085 0.035 0.154 0.27 0.371 0.454 0.519 0.574 0.608 0.625 0.631 0.625
ρ(
Rev.t+l−Rev.t+l−6
Rev.t+l−6
,Exp+6mt ) 0.58 0.668 0.739 0.79 0.814 0.819 0.796 0.738 0.669 0.58 0.477 0.373 0.275
Panel B: Retail and Wholesale
ρ( ˆRevenuest+l,
ˆExp
+6m
t ) 0.246 0.315 0.385 0.455 0.505 0.565 0.626 0.651 0.685 0.706 0.694 0.693 0.664
ρ(
Rev.t+l−Rev.t+l−6
Rev.t+l−6
,Exp+6mt ) 0.437 0.443 0.465 0.459 0.453 0.457 0.444 0.404 0.371 0.328 0.275 0.221 0.143
Panel C: Services
ρ( ˆRevenuest+l,
ˆExp
+6m
t ) -0.399 0.008 0.381 0.635 0.747
ρ(
Rev.t+l−Rev.t+l−6
Rev.t+l−6
,Exp+6mt ) 0.399 0.737 0.842 0.707 0.443
Notes: Cross-correlogram of the time series of average (seasonally adjusted) business expectations for
the next six months (Q2) and revenues. In the first row, both time series are detrended by means of
an HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 129, 600 (1600) for monthly (quarterly) data. In the second
row, average business expectations are contrasted to the growth rate in revenues relative to six months
before.
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Table 4.B.4: Relationship Between Survey Questions: Panel Regressions Without Fixed
Effects
Expected Business Conditons for the Next 6 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Manufacturing
Conditionst+6 0.22∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0067)
Conditionst 0.12∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0053)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0065)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0051)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.28∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0069)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst 0.047∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0053)
Firm FE
R2 0.059 0.071 0.000 0.025 0.075 0.083 0.001 0.083
Observations 687418 687418 687418 687418 687418 687418 687418 687418
Panel B: Retail & Wholesale
Conditionst+6 0.28∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0045) (0.010)
Conditionst 0.32∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0063)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) -0.098∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0084)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.14∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0046)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.27∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.0078) (0.010)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst -0.13∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0063)
Firm FE
R2 0.101 0.196 0.012 0.032 0.196 0.214 0.011 0.214
Observations 243891 243891 243891 243891 243891 243891 243891 243891
Panel C: Services
Conditionst+6 0.21∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0079) (0.013)
Conditionst 0.073∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0082)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0071) (0.011)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.0045
(0.0087) (0.0082)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst 0.090∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0082)
Firm FE
R2 0.052 0.056 0.002 0.009 0.056 0.071 0.004 0.071
Observations 187595 187595 187595 187595 187595 187595 187595 187595
Notes: The dependent variable is the business expectation for the next six months as reported to
Q2 of the IBS. Conditionst and Conditionst+6 are realized business conditons stated to Q1 at the
reporting month t as well as six months thereafter. Accordingly, (Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) and
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) capture the difference between realized business conditions at the respec-
tive dates. Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post realized business conditions in the following six
months. Standard errors are (two-way) clustered at the firm and date levels. Level of significance: * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.B.5: Relationship Between Survey Questions: Panel Regressions Incl. Firm and
Date Fixed Effects
Expected Business Conditons for the Next 6 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Manufacturing
Conditionst+6 0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0058)
Conditionst 0.097∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0042)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) 0.0035 0.050∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0051)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.12∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0033)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.22∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0058)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst 0.025∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0042)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.254 0.261 0.238 0.251 0.264 0.269 0.239 0.269
Observations 687178 687178 687178 687178 687178 687178 687178 687178
Panel B: Retail & Wholesale
Conditionst+6 0.13∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0086)
Conditionst 0.26∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0060)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) -0.096∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0076)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.12∗∗∗ 0.0018
(0.0034) (0.0039)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.22∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0090)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst -0.13∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0060)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.350 0.402 0.349 0.363 0.402 0.412 0.348 0.412
Observations 243723 243723 243723 243723 243723 243723 243723 243723
Panel C: Services
Conditionst+6 0.10∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0055) (0.010)
Conditionst 0.024∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0071)
(Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ -0.0022
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0083)
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) 0.061∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0055)
Conditionst+1,t+6 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
Conditionst+1,t+6 − Conditionst 0.071∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0071)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.348 0.349 0.343 0.346 0.349 0.356 0.345 0.356
Observations 187379 187379 187379 187379 187379 187379 187379 187379
Notes: The dependent variable is the business expectation for the next six months as reported to
Q2 of the IBS. Conditionst and Conditionst+6 are realized business conditons stated to Q1 at the
reporting month t as well as six months thereafter. Accordingly, (Conditionst+6 − Conditionst) and
(Conditionst − Conditionst−6) capture the difference between realized business conditions at the respec-
tive dates. Conditionst+1,t+6 is the mean of ex post realized business conditions in the following six
months. Standard errors are (two-way) clustered at the firm and date levels. Level of significance: * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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